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There has been a continuously increasing demand for public services and 
infrastructure all over the world especially in developing countries in order to 
respond to the rapidly growing population and the targeted economic growth in 
these countries. Accordingly resorting to the PPP scheme is a way for the 
governmental authorities to achieve the objectives of better services to the end user 
in energy, educational, water and wastewater, and transportation projects with the 
help and expertise of the private sector. While PPP was proven to be successful in 
several instances, there are also several failure stories where the PPP scheme was 
used.  
 
In order to avoid such problems and due to the complex nature of PPP projects and 
their extended life span, an adequate risk management technique should be 
performed for PPP projects to ensure their success. One of the crucial steps linked 
to risk management is stakeholder management.  
 
This research primarily aims to develop a mathematical model that analyzes the 
expected total effect of risks associated with poor stakeholder management during 
the construction phase on PPP projects’ schedule based on historical details of 
previous PPP projects in a comparative study with traditional construction projects 
using Artificial Neural Networks.  
 
In order to develop “the risks checklist” that will be inserted in the model, an 
extensive literature review of 30 sources was thoroughly studied in order to develop 
the list of the risks affecting PPP projects. To properly develop a comprehensive list 
of risks, the journal papers, research and publications that were studied covered the 
time span between 1998 until 2018. Furthermore, the literature review performed 
for the sake of developing the risk factors was covering different countries such as: 
the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Scotland, China, Australia, India, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Iran, Malaysia, Thailand, Portugal and South Africa. These countries 
were chosen to encompass different levels of PPP experience. Accordingly, a 
comprehensive list of 118 risks was developed.  
 
In addition to the ranking and classification of risks into various risks categories, 
each one of the identified risks was mapped to its corresponding country. The 
purpose of this step is to determine the critical risks that the literature identified for 
each country in order to establish a cross-country comparison. From this mapping, 
it is found that most of the risks affecting PPP projects around the world are political, 
legal, stakeholder and construction risks. The inadequate PPP experience, lack of 
support from government, force majeure and permits delays are affecting PPP 
projects in all the countries included in this research. It is also noticed that risks 
affecting developed countries such as Hong Kong, China and UK are of similar 
nature to the risks affecting developing countries.  
 
The model was developed using Neural Designer ® Software. This software was 
used in particular as it is a powerful user-friendly interface able to make complex 
operations and build predictive models in an intuitive way with a graphical user 
interface. 
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To build the model, the input variables were the 44 risk factors related to 
consttruction and stakehoders while the schedule Growth (or total project delay) 
was used as the target variable. 
 
The dataset contains 12 instances (or 12 projects) and was divided into three sets: 
a. Training comprising 66.7% of the projects (8 traditional projects) 
b. Selection (testing) comprising 16.7% of the projects (2 traditional 
projects) 
c. Validation comprising 16.7 of the projects (2 PPP projects) 
 
Once all the dataset information has been set, some analytics were performed in 
order to check the quality of the data.  
 
Model performance was detected using Mean Squared Error (MSE) and Normalized 
Squared Error (NSE) over the training, testing and validation datasets. 
 
Ten trials of the ANN model were performed using different training and testing 
strategies in order to be able choose the optimum model that has the best learning 
capabilities and delivering the least possible errors during the training and testing. 
 
Based on the different trials output, it is concluded that Model 4 delivers the smallest 
range of error (MSE and NSE) for training and testing. The architecture of this 
particular model is: 18 input nodes, three hidden neurons on two layers and one 
output. It was trained using a logistic function.  
 
It is noticed that having the hidden perceptron on two layers improved the model’s 
performance significantly and decreased errors for both training and testing. After 
performing training and testing of all models, and in all trials, it was noticed that the 
error decreased considerably by decreasing the number of input nodes. 
 
In order to validate the model’s performance, sensitivity analysis was performed to 
determine the cause and effect relationship between inputs and outputs of the ANN 
model.  The most significant risk factor is “the lack of coordination” as it is the most 
important contributor to the model´s ability to predict total project´s delay. On the 
other hand, the least significant risk factor in this case is the “constructability” and 
the “protection of geological and historical objects”.  Comparing the results of this 
sensitivity analysis to the risk mapping to different countries, it is noticed that the 
lack of coordination risk is not present in other countries such as Australia, Hong 
Kong and the UK.  
 
Based on the model´s outcomes, correlations between all input and target variables 
ranked in descending order based on the best model out of the ten models were 
calculated. The maximum correlation (0.803336) is yield between the input variable 
“Delay in resolving contractual dispute” and the target variable “Schedule growth”. 
37 risk factors out of the 44 have a high correlation factor (more than 0.1) with the 
total project´s delay.  
 
Furthermore, a comparison was established between this new ranking and the 
ranking previously obtained from the literature review based on content analysis 
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and on the ranking obtained from the sensitivity analysis. The following observations 
were drawn: 
 
• Based on the literature review, the material availability risk occupies the 
first position in terms of the most critical risks. This ranking is similar to a 
great extent to its ranking based on the correlation calculations according 
to which this risk occupies the third position.  
 
• The “Delay in resolving contractual dispute” occupies the highest rank in 
terms of correlation with the total project delay based on the ANN model’s 
outputs. This ranking is also similar to the results of the sensitivity analysis 
where it occupies the second position in terms of the risks having the 
highest contribution to the total project’s delay. On the other hand, the 
same risk is ranked 31st based on the results of the analysis of the 
literature review. Since the ANN model was based on real case projects, 
it makes more sense that this particular risk can be of detrimental effect 
to the project’s completion time. The same goes for the risk “Inadequate 
negotiation period prior to initiation”. This risk, based on the model’s 
deliverables, is ranking 11th and 17th in sensitivity analysis and correlation 
to the total project’s delay while, based on the literature review, is ranking 
42nd out of 44.  
 
• The “Public opposition” risk is one of the most severe risks facing PPP 
projects based on the literature review as it occupies the second position 
based on the various sources taken into account. Nevertheless, based on 
the sensitivity analysis and on the correlation analysis, this risk occupies 
the 35th and 44th positions respectively. This difference in ranking can be 
caused by the relatively small sample size of PPP projects studied in this 
research. The dataset studied was not encompassing such risk as it was 
not faced in the projects that were analyzed. However, this does not mean 
that this risk is not significant especially for PPP projects.  
 
• For other risks such as “Constructability”, “staff crisis” and “subjective 
evaluation”, the literature review and the model deliverables produced 
very close results.  
 
• Based on the literature review, the material availability risk occupies the 
first position in terms of the most critical risks. This ranking is similar to a 
great extent to its ranking based on the correlation calculations according 
to which this risk occupies the third position. On the other hand, the 
ranking of this same risk is 31 based on the sensitivity analysis in terms 
of its effect and contribution to the total project delay. The “Delay in 
resolving contractual dispute” occupies the highest rank in terms of 
correlation with the total project delay based on the ANN model’s outputs. 
This ranking is also similar to the results of the sensitivity analysis where 
it occupies the second position in terms of the risks having the highest 
contribution to the total project’s delay. The “Public opposition” risk is one 
of the most severe risks facing PPP projects based on the literature 
review as it occupies the second position based on the various sources 
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taken into account. Nevertheless, based on the sensitivity analysis and 
on the correlation analysis, this risk occupies the 35th and 44th positions 
respectively.  
 
A future destination for this study is to provide, in addition to the ANN model 
determining the contribution of the risks to the overall project delay, a tool assisting 
the public sector to choose and determine whether the PPP scheme in a particular 
project is the optimum scheme to use or not.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Chapter Introduction  
Over the past years, there has been a continuously increasing demand for public 
services and infrastructure all over the world. In 2014, the World Bank Group 
announced the increase of their financed infrastructure projects by 45%. Such 
increase mainly occurred in developing countries (World Bank 2014). There has 
been a need to strengthen the infrastructure in the rapidly growing population 
countries with the intention of sustaining the economic growth. In order to meet such 
need, governments all over the world invest billions of dollars into infrastructure 
projects (World Finance 2015). In developing countries, and with the tremendous 
population increase, the need for projects in various domains: infrastructure (such 
as roads, water, wastewater, etc.), health, educational and residential is becoming 
inevitable to improve the living conditions. However, with the current economic 
circumstances prevailing in the developing countries, the public sector is sometimes 
unable to deliver such services and projects efficiently and effectively. The private 
sector, on the other hand, has the financial capability and skills to improve the 
delivery of public services and projects. 
 
According to the World Bank (2008), the collaboration between business, civil 
society and government can only produce a win-win situation for all parties as it 
provides long-term benefits to the business sector while meeting the social 
objectives of civil society and the state by helping create stable social and financial 
environments. Consequently, Public Private Partnership (PPP) has been, and 
continues to be used in various sectors all over the world especially in the 
infrastructure sector as it is considered as a “catalyst for economic growth” 
(Babatunde 2012). The PPP scheme is believed to be able to deliver better value 
for money especially for infrastructure projects (Hwang, et al., 2012). 
 
It has been noticed that there is an increasing attention towards the PPP scheme 
especially in the developing countries as PPP is a way for the public authorities to 
improve their infrastructure, provide better services to the end user through 
educational, water and wastewater, transportation projects with the help and 
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expertise of the private sector (Ke, et al., 2009). PPPs came into existence as a 
result of continuous challenges facing the public sector in its attempts to improve its 
services, facilities and infrastructure which is, in many cases, demanding 
challenging economic resources. Hwang et al. (2012) mentioned that in general, if 
an infrastructure project is expected to have a value in excess of $50 million, then, 
the involvement of the private sector should be considered. Also, sometimes, the 
need for the private partner comes as a solution to some problems caused by the 
deficiencies present at the public partner's side.  
 
Based on the annual report on private participation in infrastructure published by 
the World Bank in 2017, the investment in PPP infrastructure projects by the private 
sector reached $93.3 billion US dollars across 304 projects around the world, with 
an increase of 37 percent from 2016’s levels.  20 projects among the 304 projects 
are mega-projects with an average size of $2.4 billion US dollars accounting for 51 
percent of the total private participation in infrastructure in 2017 compared to only 
thirteen projects accounting for 40 percent of the total private participation in 
infrastructure in 2016. Figures 1 and 2 show the amount of investments in PPP 
infrastructure projects in US dollars (billions) from 1991 to 2015 and from 2008 to 
2017 respectively across the world.  Figure 1 shows the investments in PPP 
infrastructure projects as a percentage of GDP as well between 1991 and 2015.   
 
Figure 1. Investment in PPP infrastructure projects in US dollars (millions) between 1991 and 2015 
across the world (World Bank, 2016, p.8) 
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Figure 2. Investment in PPP infrastructure projects in US dollars (billions) between 2008 and 2017 
across the world (World Bank, 2017, p.4)  
 
From the charts, it is clear that the number of projects increased from 280 projects 
in 2016 to 304 in 2017 (by approximately nine percent.). It is however noticed that 
despite the increase of the private sector participation in 2017 compared to 2016, 
the total investment in 2017 is still 15 percent lower than the average during the last 
five years (starting from 2012). Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of project 
sizes in US Dollars (million) over the past five-year period and 2017.  
 
Table 1. The frequency distribution of project sizes in US Dollars (million) over the past five-year 
period and 2017 (World Bank, 2017, p.5) 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017, p.5 
 
On a country level, the five countries with the highest levels of investment in PPP 
infrastructure projects in 2017 were: China, with $17.5 billion US dollars across 73 
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projects; Indonesia, with $15.4 billion US dollars across 11 projects; Mexico, with 
8.6 billion US dollars across 20 projects; Brazil, with $7.3 billion US dollars across 
24 projects; and Pakistan, with $5.9 billion US dollars across four projects. In 2017, 
in total, these five countries attracted $54.7 billion US dollars, and captured 58 
percent of global investment (World Bank 2017). This is illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Investment in infrastructure projects with private participation by region and country (World 
Bank, 2017, p. 8) 
 
To have a broad and more general view, the participation of the private sector in 
infrastructure projects by region, between 2008 and 2017 is illustrated in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Participation of the private sector in infrastructure projects by region, between 2008 and 
2017 (World Bank, 2017, p. 7) 
 
As the above figure shows, private sector investment for all the regions except Latin 
America and Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa were higher in 2017 than in 2016. 
In these two regions, private sector participation declined by 40 percent and 44 
percent, respectively.  
 
It is also noticed that the private sector investment share for East Asia and Pacific 
has been increasing and reached its peak in 2017, accounting for over half of global 
investment. Although the private sector investment has always been higher in Latin 
America and Caribbean, reaching its peak of 68 percent in 2016; in 2017, it dropped 
significantly to 21 percent. Meanwhile, private sector investment in South Asia 
Region continues to increase after its lowest level in 2015. In the Middle East and 
North Africa, the private sector participation has remained consistent over the years, 
at around two percent. Nevertheless, in 2017, it tripled to six percent (World Bank 
2017).  
 
From the aforementioned statistics, it can be concluded that recent years have 
witnessed an increased cooperation between the private and the public sector 
especially in the infrastructure sector all over the world as it is believed that PPP 
can deliver a better Value for Money (VFM) for facilities, projects and services. 
Accordingly, the public sector resorted to the partnership with the private sector in 
order to deliver projects or public services by benefiting from the private sector’s 
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experience, financial ability, management and technical skills. Based on the 
General Regional Policy guidelines for successful Public Private Partnerships 
published by the European Commission Directorate (2003), the Private sector has 
four major roles within the PPP model which are to provide the following:  
• Supplementary capital; 
• Alternative management techniques and a good use of skills; 
• Value added to the consumer and the public at large; 
• Better identification and response to the public needs through the optimum 
use of available resources. 
 
Nevertheless, while the PPP model appears attractive, it should be considered that 
it is not miracle solution: for each project, it is indispensable to perform the 
necessary study assessing whether the PPP scheme will be an added value to this 
project compared with other options such as the traditional model (Abdel Wahab 
2009).  In fact, due to the lack of the adequate study of the feasibility of certain PPP 
projects, Valipour et al.,(2016) argues that several PPP projects failed to be on 
budget and on schedule. Furthermore, many projects were not delivered to the 
required quality. According to the statistics published by the World Bank in 2015, 
from 1990 and until 2012 there were 327 unsuccessful PPP projects: 135 projects 
in Latin America, 86 projects in East Asia and Pacific, 50 projects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 13 projects in South Asia, 36 projects in Europe and Central Asia and 7 
projects in Middle East and North Africa.  
 
Accordingly, for each project, it is necessary to perform the necessary study in order 
to know whether implementing PPP will be beneficial or not.  Furthermore, there are 
various degrees of success of PPP projects across the countries which differ based 
on the place and time where PPP is applied. Henjewele et al.,(2013) argues that 
PPPs are not just a normal partnership between the public and private parties. PPPs 
have a very complex nature as they consists of bringing together two entirely 
different organizations, having different goals (Starr 1988) into one single project 
(Collin 1998). Moreover, Kumaraswamy et al., (2015) points out that the PPP 
scheme consists of combined and critical relationships, not just “contractual 
relationships” as it involves people, from different backgrounds, working in a long-
term relationship to achieve common goals.  
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Due to the long term nature of PPP contracts, the key concepts present in the 
relationship between the public partner and the private partner such as the 
management of risks, stakeholders, quality of service required, value for money, 
how to handle disputes and how to deal with changes that may occur during the 
project’s lifetime should be identified. There are several success factors that 
contribute to the success of any PPP project such as the effective procurement, 
project implementability, government guarantee, favorable economic and political 
conditions and available financial market (Marques and Berg 2011). Moreover, Zou 
et al., (2013) argues that “Relationship Management” is also crucial in PPP projects 
as it establishes the partnering strategies with project counterparties and project 
stakeholders in order to create sustainable relationships for the benefit of the 
project. Accordingly, a good and sound management of stakeholders is crucial for 
the success of the PPP project and this should be applied at the start of the project 
(Schepper, et al., 2014).  
 
On the other hand, there are two major causes of PPP failure which are the 
contractual incompleteness in addition to the imperfect allocation of risks to the 
appropriate parties/stakeholders. According to the Guidelines for Successful PPP 
Projects in Egypt published by the PPP Central unit (2013), “Risk allocation is at the 
heart of how PPPs are structured”. Also, El-Gohary, et al., (2006) and Rwelamila, 
et al., (2014) argues that such underestimation of the stakeholders’ effect and 
impact on the success of the project led to the failure of several previous PPP 
projects. 
 
It is against this backdrop that this research seeks to analyze the risks associated 
with PPP projects with a special emphasis on the risks emerging from construction 
and poor stakeholder management in order to determine the effects of such risks 
on future PPP projects in an attempt to provide some solutions for dealing with such 
risks.  
1.2  Problem Statement 
PPP has often been viewed as an optimal solution especially in developing 
countries as it is a way for the public authorities to improve their infrastructure, 
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provide better services to the end user for infrastructure, educational, water and 
wastewater, transportation projects with the help and expertise of the private sector. 
In some cases, because of certain budget constraints and due to the government’s 
unwillingness to raise the taxes despite the need for the project, the PPP model can 
be the only way the project can be built (Reuters 2013).  The PPP model is based 
on the concept of bringing the strengths of both parties (public and private sectors) 
together. The private sector has the financial capability and skills to improve the 
delivery of public services and projects while the public sector shall perform its usual 
and normal duties which consist of planning, regulation and policy making.  
 
Nevertheless, not all PPP projects that have been performed were successful. The 
PPP scheme is different than the conventional project delivery methods and is 
characterized by its complexity and by its long terms relationships. Moreover, in any 
country (especially the developing countries), the needs, agendas and priorities can 
differ from time to time (Akintola, et al., 2016).   
 
Furthermore, PPP projects involve two entirely different entities, naturally having 
different objectives, to work together, for an extended duration, towards a common 
goal which is not an easy target to achieve especially in light of the complexity of 
the relationships being both contractual and non-contractual (involving people 
dealing together). Based on previous projects, PPP history showed that the major 
cause of PPP failure is the inadequate risk management and the underestimation 
of the stakeholder management’s importance. Unfortunately, the failure of PPP 
projects not only affects the public sector and the private sector but also will be 
affecting the end users of the projects and taxpayers who will bear several 
consequences especially economic ones.  Moreover, poor risk and stakeholder 
management will lead to project delays and subsequently cost overruns and poor 
Value for Money.  
 
According to the PMBOK (2009), the current risk management techniques are 
significantly inadequate in managing risks associated with several issues such as 
the selection of the appropriate procurement types, contractual arrangements, 
management of stakeholders, organizational complexity and operational 
performance and de-investment decisions. Henjewele et al. (2013) points out that 
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both the private and public partners took stakeholders and stakeholders 
management from a narrow perspective. El-Gohary et al. (2006) and Rwelamila et 
al. (2014) argue that such underestimation of the stakeholders’ effect and impact 
on the success of the project led to the failure of several previous PPP projects. 
Accordingly, it is not difficult to appreciate the need for the early implementation of 
risk management for the PPP project ensuring it takes into account the concept of 
“Stakeholder Involvement” (SI). Stakeholders do not only include the private and 
public entities but must also include the “general public” and the “end users”. 
According to Doloi (2012), due to the involvement of various stakeholders in the 
PPP project, the risks associated with PPP projects are “multifaceted”. 
Consequently, proper risk management in PPP projects necessitates a clear 
understanding of the PPP process and a proper identification of all the risks 
associated with all stakeholders over the PPP lifecycle, specially the construction 
phase.  
1.3  Research aim 
This doctoral study seeks to resolve the existing gap in knowledge in the context of 
the relationship between poor stakeholder management and the arising of additional 
risks to the PPP project affecting the PPP project’s completion time and 
subsequently leading to additional costs especially in developing countries. 
Accordingly, establishing a good stakeholder management technique will eliminate 
many risks facing PPP projects and will make the parties involved in the PPP project 
focus on the actual uncertainties facing the project.  
 
The research primarily aims to develop a mathematical approach modelling the 
expected total effect of risks associated with poor stakeholder management during 
the construction phase on PPP projects’ schedule based on historical details of 
previous PPP projects in a comparative study with traditional construction projects 
using Artificial Neural Networks. This mathematical approach shall primarily assist 
the Private Sector in choosing the optimum contractual relationship for any given 
project and to decide whether (or not) the PPP scheme will be the optimum solution.  
1.4  Research objectives 
In order to achieve the aforementioned aim, the objectives are stated as follows: 
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1. Provide a better conceptual understanding of the PPP scheme and different 
types of PPP. 
2. In light of the PPP history, study, evaluate previous failure and success 
stories in different countries that used PPP delivery method and critically 
appraise existing international literatures relating to PPP to identify the 
common key success factors and major causes of failure of PPP projects. 
3. Provide a better conceptual understanding of “Risk Management” and 
“Stakeholder Management” and ascertain, through a critical review of the 
literature, how both concepts are related.  
4. Develop from existing literature a comprehensive list including all the risks 
affecting PPP projects and determine to which risk group each individual risk 
is associated (For instance: economic, political, etc.), map each identified 
risk to its root cause and establish a cross-country comparison between 
different risks.  
5. Develop a ranking for the identified risks based on the literature review with 
a special emphasis on risks related to construction and poor stakeholder 
management.  
6. Using data collected from real case projects, design the Neural Network 
approach modelling the effect of construction risks and poor stakeholder 
management risks (previously identified in step (4)) on the project’s schedule 
and time for completion. The data will be collected for both traditional and 
PPP projects. 
7. Determine, based on the model’s outputs, a new ranking for the risks 
affecting the project’s time for the completion. 
8. Compare the risk ranking generated through the Neural Network model to 
the risk ranking previously developed though the literature review in step (7). 
9. Critically evaluate the mathematical model’s performance based on: 
a. The percentage error the model will deliver;  
b. The discrepancies in the risk ranking between the model and the 
literature review. 
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1.5 Research Questions 
A preliminary review of the literature on PPP projects led to the following research 
questions that will guide the research in order to achieve the previously stated 
research aim and objectives: 
 
• What is the phase characterized by the highest number and impact of risks that 
is really worth being studied in a PPP project’s lifetime? 
Any PPP project has different phases throughout its lifecycle, expanding over a long 
time span, sometimes reaching up to 40 years. There are several ways to describe 
the different stages any PPP projects goes through. Li and Zou (2012) identified the 
stages of PPP differently; into six main stages:  
• Feasibility 
• Financing stage 
• Design stage 
• Construction stage  
• Operation stage 
• Transfer stage 
 
As Chapter two and three will demonstrate, each phase in the PPP project lifecycle 
is characterized by its own risks. There are also some risks with an extended effect 
all over the project’s lifetime. Accordingly, in any PPP project, the risk picture will 
vary throughout the different stages. However, a primary review of the literature 
sources point out to the fact that the majority of the risks occur during the 
construction phase. Then, the number and magnitude of risks start to decrease 
gradually until reaching the end of the PPP project’s lifecycle. Accordingly, the 
construction period of the PPP project can be considered as a representative period 
for studying the risks affecting PPP projects as it is characterized by being a critical 
period in the PPP project’s lifetime where most of the risks occur.  
 
• What are the major distinctions between the PPP scheme and other 
conventional procurement techniques? 
The literature review confirms that the PPP scheme is not just a collaboration 
between the public and private sectors. It is a unique concept resulting in a boundary 
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zone where both the public and the private sectors’ characteristics are still present 
and identifiable (Collin 1998). PPP projects are mainly characterized by the long-
term nature and by the complexity of relationship among stakeholders. In PPP 
projects, the private partner bears more risks and responsibilities related to design, 
construction, operation and maintenance depending on the PPP type.  
 
On the other hand, in traditional procurement model, the public partner finances the 
design and construction of the facility. Once the construction phase is complete, the 
government will be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the facility.  
Nevertheless, a primary review of several literature sources demonstrates that the 
construction phase in particular, in PPP projects, is similar in its characteristics to 
traditional projects especially when it comes to the major risks impacting it. The 
major difference lies in the allocation of the risk (who bears the risk). Accordingly, 
comparing the impact of risks on traditional projects versus their effect on PPP 
projects can be a valid initiative.  
 
• Has PPP always been a successful solution in order to provide better Value for 
Money and in order to ensure the public needs are met? 
The literature review shows that while PPP has been widely implemented and while 
it aims to bringing the strengths of both the public and private parties together, PPP 
is not a miraculous solution for any project: while PPP was proven to be successful 
in several instances, there are also several failure stories where the PPP scheme 
was used. There were projects that suffered from cost overruns, others were 
negotiated and others were abandoned. Based on the literature review, failure of 
PPP projects can be attributable to several reasons such as: poor risk management, 
inadequate risk allocation, poor stakeholder management and underestimation of 
the role of the general public and end user for the success of PPP projects.  
 
• How are “Risk Management” and “Stakeholder Management” related especially 
in PPP projects? 
The literature review has proven that Risk Management and Stakeholder 
Management are closely related. Zou et al. (2013) argues that due to the fact that 
PPP projects have a long lifetime, there will be a higher chance of 
problems/changes arising. Accordingly, a good risk allocation between PPP parties 
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is crucial to ensure a successful PPP project. Nevertheless, many of the changes 
happening during the lifetime of the PPP project will be unanticipated for as potential 
risks and therefore, will not be accounted for in the PPP contract. Therefore, relying 
on the established relationships is crucial in order to maintain and protect the 
contractual bond. The quality of the relationship between public and private sector 
on one side and the end users on the other side has been shown to be a key 
contributor to the success of a PPP project. Furthermore, many of the risks affecting 
PPP projects arise due to poor management of stakeholders. Therefore, minimizing 
the risks caused by inadequate management of stakeholders is a way of mitigation 
of a significant number of risks affecting PPP projects which is step towards better 
Risk Management for PPP projects.  
 
• What advantages can Artificial Neural Networks offer to this research over linear 
regression model? 
This research aims to develop a mathematical model (Artificial Neural Network 
approach) modelling the impact of stakeholder risks on PPP projects during the 
construction phase. This is a complex problem involving several attributes linked by 
non-linear relationships. Based on an initial review of the literature, Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANNs) were proven to deliver better outcomes in this kind of problems. 
Furthermore, ANNs have analogies with the human brain especially when it comes 
to their ability to learn, to adapt and to generate results. This conforms to the aim 
and objectives of the research.    
1.6 Overview of research approach 
This research mainly adopts a quantitative approach with some elements of 
qualitative approach.  
 
After the aims and objectives were defined, a thorough and extensive review of the 
literature was done on the PPP concept, types of PPP, failure and success stories 
of PPP, risk management and stakeholder management in PPP projects. The 
literature review played a crucial role in developing the list of risks (checklist) 
affecting PPP projects and mapping each risk to its root cause. Also, the literature 
review was essential in performing the cross-country comparison for the different 
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risks in addition to establishing the risk ranking. A list including the risks caused by 
poor stakeholder management is obtained.  
An experimental approach was then designed based on data collected from actual 
projects in order to develop the mathematical model for both traditional and PPP 
projects in light of the risks related to construction and poor stakeholder 
management and their impact on the project’s schedule and completion time. The 
research approach and methodology will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter Three.  
1.7 Contribution to knowledge 
According to Ke et al. (2009), in the period from 1998 to 2003, the papers published 
and tackling PPP scheme were initially studying three major aspects in PPP which 
are the risks associated with PPPs, Procurement method in PPP and financial 
issues in PPP. Among these three major points of interest, papers published about 
risk management for PPPs account for approximately 21 percent of the total number 
of papers published and concerning PPPs. Table 2 identifies the major points of 
interest of PPP papers from 1998 to 2008. 
 
Table 2. Areas of concern in PPP papers from 1998 to 2003  
 
Source: Ke et al. 2009 
 
Moreover, Figure 5 shows the number of papers published worldwide about PPP 
from 2005 and until 2014 showing the increased attention towards studying PPP 
projects and their related aspects (Zhang, et al., 2016).  
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Figure 5. Number of papers published about PPP from 2005 till 2014 worldwide (Zhang et al. 2016) 
 
Figure 6 shows the total number of papers published worldwide about PPP projects 
from 2005 until 2014 categorized by research topic.  
 
Figure 6. Total number of papers published worldwide about PPP projects from 2005 until 2014 
categorized by research topic (Zhang et al. 2016) 
 
Accordingly, it is noticed that the top two research topics in the domain of PPP 
projects are: 
• PPP models and their applications 
• Risk management  
Accordingly, this proves that these two topics are considered as areas of concern 
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One of the most important barriers to a sound and proper risk management is the 
poor stakeholder management causing issues in collaboration, trust, negotiation 
and teamwork. Accordingly, analyzing the effect of risks associated with poor 
stakeholder management on the PPP project is a crucial step towards better risk 
management.  
Among the published papers on PPP projects, different research methods are 
adopted. Figure 7 illustrates the research methods adopted by PPP research 
papers from 2005 until 2014. It is worth mentioning that some papers combine 
different methods into one research. This chart shows that the case study method 
is adopted in most of the papers (331 papers), modelling occupies the third place in 
terms of the number of papers adopting it (203 papers). On the other hand, from 
2005 till 2014, only 80 papers adopted the comparison method.  
 
 
Figure 7. The research methods adopted by PPP research papers from 2005 until 2014 (Zhang et al. 
2016) 
 
Based on the above, the contributions of this research to the field of construction 
project management and especially to the domain of PPP projects are in line with 
the research aims and objectives described previously. The major contributions are 
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Primary contribution: 
• A mathematical Artificial Neural Network approach modelling the 
contribution of construction and stakeholders related risks to the 
project’s delay based on a comparative analysis between traditional 
projects and PPP projects in developing nations 
 
There was one research conducted in 2010 about modelling optimal risk allocation 
in PPP projects using artificial neural networks by Jin and Zhang (2010) and though 
the adoption of neural networks models developed by: Odeyinka et al (2002), Maria-
Sanchez (2004) and Lhee et al., (2014) studying respectively the impact of 
construction risks on total project cost, the impact of environmental risks on 
construction projects and predicting the optimal contingency for transportation 
projects. The contribution here is developing a mathematical model determining the 
impact of poor stakeholder management risks and construction risks in PPP 
projects for developing nations based on a comparative analysis with traditional 
projects. The Artificial Neural Network approach is modelling the impact of those 
risks on the project’s time for completion.  
 
Furthermore, the data used to develop the model is based on real case projects not 
on questionnaires results. Accordingly, the results delivered by the model are closer 
to real life and not subject to bias as it may happen in case of depending on 
respondents’ opinions. Also, the research is adopting a combination between 
different research methods and techniques such as: literature review, modelling, 
comparison and case studies which is enriching the research and enabling the 
problems studied to be treated from different perspectives.  
 
It is not expected for the developed model to be ready for immediate use but the 
construction industry is active and research is continuously done. This research 
here makes an original contribution to it.  
 
Secondary contributions: 
• A comprehensive definition of Stakeholder Management and 
Stakeholder Involvement (including the importance of the “People” 
(general public/end users) as a major PPP project stakeholder) 
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According to Schepper et al. (2014), proper stakeholder management along with 
the identification and classification of all stakeholders are indispensable to ensure 
the PPP project’s success especially in the early set-up phase. Nevertheless and 
despite the importance of stakeholder analysis and stakeholder engagement, there 
exist various limitations and gaps in the literature regarding these concepts 
(Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida 2014;, Jepsen & Eskerod, 2009, Littau et al., 2010, 
Pacheco and Garcia, 2012, Yang, et al., 2009). Achterkamp and Vos (2008) argue 
that research examining the importance of stakeholder management and 
involvement in traditional construction projects is generally limited and even less so 
for PPP projects.   
 
The contribution here is a thorough study and examination of previous research 
conducted on Stakeholder Management in PPP projects in addition to a set of failure 
and success stories highlighting the importance of performing adequate stakeholder 
management technique involving the “general public” as an essential project party.  
 
• Understanding of the relationship between Risk Management and 
Stakeholder Management 
 
According to Henjewele et al. (2013), both the private and public partners took 
stakeholders and stakeholders management from a narrow perspective. El-Gohary 
et al. (2006) and Rwelamila et al. (2014) argue that such underestimation of the 
stakeholders’ effect and impact on the success of the project led to the failure of 
several previous PPP projects. The contribution here is to provide a clear 
relationship between Stakeholder Management and Risk Management and to 
provide clear Stakeholder Management recommendations and guidelines that can 
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1.8 Thesis structure 
Figure 8 shows the various chapters that the research consists of: 
 
Figure 8. Thesis Structure 
 
1.8.1 Chapter One- Introduction 
This chapter includes the background and context of the research, specifying the 
problem statement along with the aims and objectives of the research. An overview 
of the research approach is presented. The research questions are also stated in 
this chapter.  
 
1.8.2 Chapter Two- Literature Review 
This chapter forms the critical spine of the research. It analyzes and shows the 
explicit gaps in the literature. The literature review is divided into three major 
sections.  
• The first section is a general overview of PPP projects including a description of 
the history of PPP projects, PPP structure among other procurement options, 
stages of PPP. A subsection is describing the complex nature of PPP projects. 
In this subsection, a concept is explained which is: “building resilience in PPP 
projects”. Another subsection is dedicated to success and failure stories of PPP 
projects around the world with failure and success stories. Finally, a subsection 
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• The second section is concerning the management of risks associated with PPP 
projects. In this section, the impact of various risks on PPP projects delays (and 
associated cost overruns) is also discussed.  
• The third section is about PPP stakeholders. In this section, the following topics 
are discussed: Relationship Management in PPP projects, stakeholder concepts 
(power, legitimacy and urgency) and their relationship to PPP projects, 
limitations in studies about stakeholders in PPP projects and changing the PPP 
nomenclature (introducing the 4th P to the PPP). In the section discussing the 
introduction of the 4th P to the PPP, real case PPP projects showing the power 
of the general public are presented and the importance of stakeholder 
involvement in PPP projects is discussed. Finally, an important section 
summarizing the literature review by stating the relationship between Risk 
Management and Stakeholder Management is included.   
 
1.8.3 Chapter Three- Research Strategy and methodology 
This section includes the research approach and the framework that will guide the 
rest of the research. It provides a critical appraisal and justification of the research 
methodology adopted. It includes the steps performed and that will be followed and 
further explained in Chapter Four. Furthermore, the background, components and 
applications of Artificial Neural Networks in civil engineering are also evaluated in 
this chapter. The advantages and criticism to Artificial Neural Networks are 
discussed in addition to the reasons for which this technique was used in this 
research in particular.  
 
1.8.4 Chapter Four- Research findings 
This is the experimental chapter of the research. The chapter starts by developing 
a risk checklist based on the literature review, a categorization of the identified risks, 
cross-country comparison and ranking.  Then, the specific risks studied in this 
research are listed. Then, all the data collected for both traditional and PPP project 
will be “put to work” to develop the ANN model. The steps of the data collection are 
explained, a justification for the sample size for both traditional and PPP projects is 
discussed. The datasets are then subject to extensive pre-processing steps 
consisting of cleaning, integration, transformation and partitioning in order to be 
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inserted into the ANN model. The different details associated with the model 
development are thoroughly explained starting by choosing the network 
architecture, the training and testing strategies. The model is trained numerous 
times until reaching the “optimum” model delivering “acceptable” results. Then, 
validation is performed in order to test the model’s performance and ability to 
generate “new data”.  
 
Furthermore, sensitivity analysis is used in order to get a new ranking of the different 
risks previously identified through the literature review. This new ranking is also 
compared to the first ranking that was obtained from the literature review. The aim 
of this whole chapter is straightforward: to make data “learn” and “work” by 
extracting embedded useful information in order to predict the contribution of major 
stakeholder and construction risks to the total project’s delay in a comparative study 
between traditional and PPP projects. The data analysis and the results achieved 
have intentionally been integrated into the same chapter in order to strengthen the 
link between the analysis and the results which shall improve the clarity and 
readability of the research.  
 
1.8.5 Chapter Five- Conclusions, recommendations and future work 
In the closing chapter, conclusions will be drawn based on the findings from the 
literature review in addition to the data modelling chapter. The aims and objectives 
presented in Chapter One will be revisited and a judgement shall be made on 
whether such objectives were achieved, and to which extent. Furthermore, the 
novelty and contributions of the research will be summarized, detailing the 
implications of such contribution on future work and projects. Moreover, limitations 
to the current research and challenges that were faced are discussed. Finally, an 
overview of the future work that can become a new destination for this research is 
presented.  
1.9 Chapter Summary 
There has been an increasing demand for public services and infrastructure all over 
the world especially in developing countries. With the population increase in 
developing countries, the need for projects in various domains such as roads and 
wastewater projects is becoming inevitable. Nevertheless, with the current 
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economic circumstances, the public sector is sometimes unable to deliver such 
services and projects efficiently and effectively; this is why the need for the private 
sector’s capability and skills became essential. Consequently, PPP is used around 
the world and can be of special importance to developing countries as “catalyst for 
economic growth”. The PPP model emerged as a way to bring the strengths of both 
the public and private sectors together. Nevertheless, due to the complexity and the 
long-term relationships involved in the PPP scheme, not all PPP projects that have 
been performed were successful. Consequently, proper risk management in PPP 
projects is of utmost importance to ensure the success of PPP projects. This 
doctoral study seeks to resolve the existing gap in knowledge in the context of the 
relationship between poor stakeholder management and the arising of additional 
risks to the PPP project affecting the PPP project’s completion time and 
subsequently leading to additional costs especially in developing countries. The 
following chapters will explain in details how this aim is achieved by developing a 
mathematical approach modelling the expected total effect of risks associated with 
poor stakeholder management during the construction phase on PPP projects’ 
schedule based on historical details of previous PPP projects in a comparative study 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
2.1 Chapter Introduction  
Public Private partnership (PPP, also referred to as P3 or P³) is described as a 
venture between the government from one side and one or more private companies 
from the other side in which responsibilities, risks and rewards are shared between 
the public and the private parties for the aim of delivering a clearly defined and 
agreed upon activity which is collectively needed such as public services. PPP is 
an output-oriented long-term relationship between the public and the private party 
(Marques 2012).  Being focused on outputs rather than on inputs is a distinctive 
characteristic of a PPP project (Guidelines for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt 
2013). “PPP is best described as an arrangement between the private and public 
sectors to deliver cost effective and high quality services to the public sector over 
an extended period of time” (Quick 2006, p.3). 
 
Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001, p.598) define PPP as “a cooperation of some sort 
of durability between public and private sectors in which they jointly develop 
products and services and share risks, costs and resources which are connected 
with these products”.  
Accordingly, PPP is characterized by the following: 
 
• It is a long term relationship 
• The major role of the Public partner is to define the end result, or in other 
words, the goals that need to be attained in terms of the public demand in 
addition to the type and quality of services. This means that the public partner 
plays the role of the policy maker. 
• In general, the aim of such partnership is to transfer the major risks facing 
the public sector in the project’s implementation. However, this does not 
mean that the private party shall bear all the risks. A proper risk allocation 
technique shall be done in order to ensure each risk is borne by the party 
that is able to manage it (Abdel Wahab 2009). 
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Kumaraswamy et al. (2015) stated that despite the fact that PPPs have been 
defined in somewhat different ways, they all encompass the private sector playing 
roles that were traditionally played by the government in the provision of public 
infrastructure. According to Smith et al. (2018, p.103) PPPs are defined as “a cross-
sectoral collaboration wherein the following features are present to different 
degrees: joint determination of goals, collaborative and consensus-based decision-
making, nonhierarchical and horizontal structures and processes, trust-based and 
informal as well as formalized relationships, synergistic interactions among 
partners, and shared accountability for outcomes and results” (Birkerhoff and 
Birkerhoff 2011). According to Henjewele et al. (2013), the partnership between the 
public and private partner helps in providing supplementary capital, skills and 
motivation which can be of great benefit to developing countries to help them 
enhance their infrastructure. Chowdhury, Chen and Tiong (2011) points out that the 
reason countries adopt PPP differ: for some countries, PPP is a way to provide 
solutions to supply and demand gaps, fiscal deficit, budgetary pressure and 
inadequate infrastructure. On the other hand, other countries use PPP to benefit 
from the private sector’s innovative solution, experience and managerial skills.  
 
2.2 Background of PPP projects  
2.2.1 History and start 
The idea of PPP is not recent. In fact, it was initiated before World War I when 
various projects such as: railways, roads, ports and power plants were undertaken 
by private entrepreneurs, who were willing to take risks in return for high rewards.  
El-Gohary et al. (2006) stated that the first PPP project in modern history was the 
construction and operation of the Suez Canal in 1854. Tang, et al., (2009) specifies 
that the public sector in Europe has started collaborating with private companies for 
infrastructure projects since the 18th century. The most important contract where, in 
that time, the public sector entered into a partnership with the private sector was the 
supply of drinking water to Paris. Later in the 19th century, there were other projects 
that were implemented not only in Europe but also in the United States, China and 
Japan where infrastructure projects such as canals and railroads were undertaken. 
Moreover, the Suez Canal and the trans-Siberian railway were two huge projects 
where a collaboration between the public and the private sectors was implemented.  
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After World War I, the governments started financing different projects (especially 
infrastructure ones) out of general taxation (Abdel Wahab 2009).  In the 1980s and 
the 1990s, neoliberalism and the funding requirements of capital projects for 
essential infrastructures made several countries choose the privatization which was 
a better option for energy and telecommunications projects while PPPs were 
preferred for the water sector and transportation projects (Marques 2010). 
According to Almarri and Abuhijleh (2017), engaging the private sector in projects 
in the United Kingdom was considered among the “Private Finance Initiative” (PFI) 
projects. Meanwhile, the first time the term “Private Public Partnership” or “PPP” 
was introduced and used was in the United Kingdom in 1997.  
 
2.2.2 PPP structure among project procurement options 
There is no standardized nomenclature used for describing the different PPP 
categories as each case has to be studied and understood separately. However, 
since the instruction of the nomenclature of PPP projects in the UK in 1997, four 
major forms of PPP appeared which are: Build-Operate- Transfer (BOT), Build-
Own-Operate (BOO), Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) and Design-Build-
Finance-Operate (DBFO). BOT is considered as the most widely used method 
(Almarri & Abuhijleh 2017).  
 
There is a scale for Public-Private Partnerships which is defined by the degree of 
the Private sector involvement which ranges from the Design Build (DB) where the 
private sector only designs and builds the project up to the privatization (Private 
Divestiture) by giving the private sector not only full control over the investment, 
operation and maintenance but also a permanent ownership of the facility's assets. 
In other words, PPP can fall somewhere between the full control of the public sector 
over a certain project and privatization.  In the "Finance Only" model which is located 
at the start of PPP spectrum, the private partner provides financial services to the 
projects through lease payments which transfer the commercial risks to the private 
entity. This type of agreement can last for a period ranging from five to fifteen years.  
The involvement of the private entity can take place in another type of PPP called 
"Operation and Maintenance Contracts" (O & M) also known as "Operation and 
Management Contracts". In this type of contractual agreement, the ownership stays 
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public while the private partner operates and maintains the facility for a short period 
of time (which can be extended though). This type of PPP is useful for communities 
with recent PPP history or for a private partner who wants a little risk exposure. 
Also, this type of agreement ensures a smooth transition from public ownership.  
Another type of PPP is called "Build-Finance" in which the private partner is 
responsible for building the project or facility as well as financing it during the 
construction period only (Canadian Council for Private-Public Partnerships 2009). 
In the lease or affermage contracts, the assets of the project are owned by the 
Public Partner who is also responsible for the investment costs. However, the end 
users (the consumers) in this case deal with the Private Partner and not with the 
Public Partner. In a lease contracts, a portion of the payments by the end users 
goes to the Public Sector as owner of the assets in the form of a lease fee and the 
remainder is given to the operator (The Private Partner). In this case, the Public 
Partner bears less risk as it is guaranteeing a fixed payment irrespective of the 
revenues. In the case of an affermage, the Private sector retains its fees and the 
additional fees (that are charged to customers) are paid to the Public sector. In this 
case, the Private Sector is the party that is guaranteeing receiving its fees (World 
Bank 2014).  
 
When it comes to the categorization of PPP schemes, existing literature seems to 
conflate different categorization principles. For instance, according to the European 
Union, PPPs can be divided into two major types: Contractual PPPs and 
Institutionalized PPPs. The differences highlighted by the literature sources 
between both terms will be explained in this section.   
 
Contractual PPP: 
In the case of a "Contractual Public Private Partnership", the exact relationship 
between the private and the public partner as well as the rights and responsibilities 
of each party relative to the other are clearly specified in the contractual terms. One 
of the best models to describe this relationship is the "concession model" in which 
the private sector concessionaire is in direct contact with the final user (the 
customer) by undertaking the investment, constructing, operating and maintaining 
the service or the facility for a certain period of time, charging customers for such 
service and afterwards, the ownership goes back to the public partner. The 
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concession contracts are characterized by being long term relationships (usually 
between 20 and 35 years or even longer) between the private and the public partner. 
They can be used in various sectors especially in water and transportation (such as 
highways).  Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) or Design-Build-Finance-
Maintain-Operate (DBFMO) is another type of PPP which is similar to the 
concession model except for the fact that in this type of PPP (DBFO) or (DBFMO), 
the project or facility recovers its costs not through charging the users for the service 
but mainly through public subvention. The DBFO and the DBFMO differ in the fact 
that in the latter, the private partner carries also the responsibility of the 
maintenance of the facility or project (Marques 2010). One of the most well-known 
forms of PPP is the "Build-Operate-Transfer" (BOT) system in which the private 
partner builds and operates the project or facility, transferring it to the public partner 
at the end of the contractual period. In this case, the ownership of the facility 
remains, during the whole contractual period, in the hands of the public sector.  
According to Ke et al. (2009), BOT system is considered as the most popular type 
of PPP used and adopted. However, the whole idea in this type of PPP consists in 
transferring the construction and operation risks to the private partner.  The Private 
party in BOT projects is generally referred to as “the concessionaire”. In the Build-
Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) form, the facility's ownership becomes also private 
during the whole contractual period. According to the Guidelines for Successful PPP 
Projects in Egypt published by the PPP Central unit, there are other versions of PPP 
such as Rehabilitate-Operate and Transfer (ROT) or the Build-Own-Operate (BOO). 
Each type of the aforementioned PPP types has its own strengths, weaknesses and 
risks which have to be individually taken into consideration for each project (Ke et 
al. 2009).  
 
The major types of contractual PPP that the existing literature explored are 
summarized in table 3: 
 
Table 3. Summary of major types of contractual PPPs 
Name Meaning Role of private sector 
DB Design and Build Designs and Builds 
OM Operation and 
Management Contracts 
Operates and maintains the 
facility 
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Name Meaning Role of private sector 
Concession 
 
Undertakes the investment, 
constructs, operates and 
maintains the project 
BOT Build Operate Transfer Builds, operates and 
transfers the project at the 
end of the contractual 
period. 
BOOT Build Own Operate 
Transfer 
Builds, owns operates and 
transfers the project at the 
end of the contractual 
period. 
DBFO Design Build Finance 
Operate 
Designs, builds, finances 
and  operates the facility 
DBFMO Design Build Finance 
Maintain Operate 
Designs, builds, finances, 
maintains and operates§ 
the facility 
ROT Rehabilitate, Operate and 
Transfer 
Does the necessary repairs 
for the facility, operates and 
transfers. 
 
There are various spectrums explaining the different kinds of PPP and explained in 
the literature and which all draw on the same concept. According to the Canadian 
Council for PPP (2009), Figure 9 depicts the categorization of PPPs based on the 
degree of the public and private sector involvement and based on the extent of risk 
allocation between different parties (Ke et al. 2009). 
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Figure 9. The Scale of Public Private Partnership according to the PPP council  (Canadian Council for 
PPP, 2009) 
 
Similarly, the World Bank (2011), offers a slightly different view of this spectrum, 
shown in figure 10, which captures the varying degree of private enterprise 
involvement in the different PPP arrangements. Both perspectives are just 
complementing sides of the same coin. The difference lies in the nomenclature of 
the PPP type.  
 
 
Figure 10. The Scale of Public Private Partnership according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2011) 
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The aforementioned perspectives are also in line to the one stated in the Guidelines 
for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt published by the PPP Central unit in 2013. 
Figure 11 describes the different degrees of private sector participation in projects 
ranging from the Works and Services Contracts up to the Concessions Contracts 
and finally the Privatization.  
 
 
Figure 11.  Degree of Private Sector Participation in PPP projects according to the PPP Central Unit in 
Egypt (Guidelines for Successful PPP projects in Egypt) 
 
Institutionalized PPP: 
Concerning “Institutionalized PPP”, it means creating a joint entity or more precisely 
a third company formed by the public and the private sectors in order to ensure 
delivering the necessary benefit to the public. This can be achieved as well through 
selling a part of the assets of the public sector to the private sector. Usually, the 
third party or company that is designed to bear the risks is called a “Special Purpose 
Vehicle” (SPV). In this case, the public sector remains in control though remaining 
as a shareholder or through some special rights while the private sector is 
responsible for the technical management and operations. This type of relationships 
can be very beneficial as it gives the public sector the power and authority over the 
project while the public sector will benefit from the private sector’s experience. In 
fact, Quick (2003) discussed the fact that the private sector is more suitable to 
directly provide the service to the end user in exchange for a fee in the case of 
economic infrastructure such as toll roads and concessions are the optimum 
solution in the cases where the private sector provides the service to the public 
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Nevertheless, Marques and Berg (2011) tried to show a different facet to PPP 
projects by highlighting that problems and conflicts may arise between both the 
public and the private sectors which can have negative implications on the end 
customers through higher service rates. The relationship between the PPP project 
parties will be critically discussed in the next sections of the Literature Review.   
 
This categorization of PPPs into “contractual” and “institutionalized” goes in tandem 
with the study done by Marques and Berg in 2011. 
 
2.2.3 Stages of PPP 
There are different ways to describe the stages that any PPP project goes through. 
Osborne and Murray (2000) identified five PPP stages which are: pre-contract, 
preliminary contact, negotiation, implementation and evaluation. On the other hand, 
Smith, et al., (2018) proposed a more global identification for the stages that a PPP 
consists of. They defined four stages for any PPP project which are: 
 
• Initial feasibility: During this stage, the public partner weighs the potential 
advantages and disadvantages for the project and does a study for the 
stakeholders. According to Keong et al. (1997), this step is crucial to 
determine the success or failure of any project. Nevertheless, and despite its 
importance, Ng, Wong and Wong (2012) argues that this step is usually not 
studied enough and not well covered in research conducted regarding PPP 
projects.  
• Procurement: During this stage, the contractual negotiations between the 
private and public partner occur. Carrillo, et al., (2008) argues that this stage 
is of utmost importance to the private partner as it shows the risks associated 
with unclear contractual requirements, financing, etc.  
• Operation: This is the phase of the actual project execution where all the 
construction is undertaken (Smith et al. 2018).  
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On the other hand, Li and Zou (2012) identified the stages of PPP differently into a 
more detailed classification; into six main stages as follows: 
• Feasibility: This period is considered as the phase in which the project is 
studied. This stage is described in a similar way to its description in the study 
performed by Smith et al. (2018). 
• Financing stage: which is equivalent (in Smith et al. study) to the procurement 
stage. 
• Design stage 
• Construction stage  
• Operation stage 
• Transfer stage 
 
As it appears from the above classification, Li and Zou (2012) divided “the operation 
stage” (as named by Smith et al. (2018)) into three sub-stages: design, construction 
and operation. In light of the nature of PPP projects, the classification provided by 
Li and Zou (2012) provides a clearer understanding of the phases and stages of 
PPP projects especially that the operation period is a distinct characteristic in any 
PPP project.  
 
2.2.4 The complex nature of PPP and building resilience  
Chou and Pramudawardhani (2015) argues that the public private partnership is not 
just a normal collaboration between the public and private sectors as the PPP is a 
much more unique concept. In fact, a long time before Chou and 
Pramudawardhani’s study was performed, Collin (1998) described PPP as bringing 
together two institutionally different milieus to operate in a single project 
organization. The resultant is a boundary zone where both the public and the private 
sectors’ characteristics are still present and identifiable. In an earlier study, Starr 
(1988) provided an interesting observation explaining that the extreme challenge 
facing PPP project is the paradox between the concepts of “public” and “private”. In 
his research, Starr (1988) points out that the goal of the public sector is to act for 
the general public being concerned about the community as a whole. This is exactly 
the opposite of the private sector’s aims as the private sector is more concerned 
about the Value for Money, the profit and the market competitiveness.  Chou and 
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Pramudawardhani (2015) draws on this concept by discussing the fact that in order 
to bring together those two different entities, the major aim of a PPP project is to 
“outsource” risks to the private partner in order to enable the public partner to 
perform its usual and normal duties which consist of planning, regulation and policy 
making. Kumaraswamy et al. (2015) discusses the fact that in PPPs the public 
partner (the government) does not just sign a contract with a private consortium as 
it may occur in conventional project. In a project under the PPP scheme, both the 
government and the private partner are expected to work closely as “partners”. Such 
partnership is very significant as it usually goes beyond the “contractual 
partnership”, or “structured relationship” which is already defined in the contract 
terms and conditions. Such relationship depends on the coexisting social and 
cultural norms that are less explicit and less visible. Consequently, in their research, 
Kumaraswamy et al. (2015, p.121) confirms that “this combined or dyadic 
relationship is more critical than “rule-based” relationship alone, because PPPs 
involve people working in long-term teams that include societal elements and deliver 
outputs aimed at meeting societal needs”. 
 
In their research roadmap for Public Private Partnerships, Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) discusses a different side of PPP by arguing that PPP are 
not flawless solutions that ensure the success of any project. There are projects that 
were abandoned, renegotiated, taken over by governments, etc. as they became 
impossible to manage. This is due to the fact that PPP projects usually have greater 
scales, more sophisticated and complex nature and their duration is extended over 
a long-time span; increasing variables, unknowns and therefore risks. Moreover, 
according to Kumaraswamy et al. (2015), the large number of stakeholders involved 
in a PPP project causes it to be more complex than a conventional project.  
Kumaraswamy et al. (2015) provides a holistic assessment of the types of 
relationships in PPP projects by defining two types of relationships: 
 
• ‘Hard’ relationships 
This type of relationships is built on the contract, it can be also called the ‘formal’ 
relationships. The contract is the tool providing the framework defining each party’s 
right, roles and responsibilities. Despite the fact that contracts can only provide 
solutions and remedies for foreseen problems, it can just provide processes for 
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some of the unforeseen ones. Even a very well prepared and structured contract 
cannot contain all necessary safeguards for any problem or risk that may arise. 
Kumaraswamy et al.(2015) argues that even this ‘hard’ type of relationships is 
influenced by “socially embedded relationships, such as trust and commitment” 
which can appear for instance in ‘grace periods’ for completing tasks and/or making 
payments which can often go beyond deadlines based on only “trust and 
commitment” concepts.  
 
• ‘Soft’ relationships 
This type of relationships is built on social concepts such as trust, confidence, 
commitment, flexibility, solidarity, information exchange, etc. These ‘informal’ 
concepts “lubricate the cooperative arrangements for smoother operations” 
(Kumaraswamy et al. 2015, p.122). Soft relationships are crucial to establish during 
the PPP project’s lifetime especially in order to solve any unforeseen problem that 
may arise because it will be impossible for the parties to revert back to the contract 
terms and conditions to rewrite/modify them each time a problem arises. Moreover, 
in light of the long life cycle of any PPP project (which can be ranging from 10 to 40 
years), such relationships are very beneficial to the project as they facilitate the work 
towards the common goal of all parties which is the project’s success. Henjewele et 
al. (2013) explored a different dimension related to the success of PPP projects, in 
light of their complex nature. They argue that the success of a PPP project depends 
on two important factors: 
• Meeting the project’s objectives 
• Acceptance of the project by the general public.  
 
The outcomes of both studies can be combined together to reach the conclusion 
that both good “hard” and “soft” relationships between the PPP project parties are 
beneficial to the project’s success taking into consideration that the general public 
should be involved as an important project party. Healthy hard and soft relationship 
result in a better PPP project “resilience”. Resilience of a project is a term that 
emerged from Kumaraswamy et al.’s (2015) study and which is defined as the 
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2.2.5 PPP around the world: Success and failure stories  
2.2.5.1 Canada 
PPP projects have been widely implemented in Canada. According to Akintoye and 
Kumaraswamy (2016), until 2016, more than one hundred PPP projects have been 
completed in different domains such as: healthcare, justice, transportation, 
wastewater treatment, energy and recreation facilities. Furthermore, another one 
hundred PPP projects are still under construction. It is worth mentioning that the 
government in Canada is keeping its central role for the infrastructure development 
based on the public needs.  
 
2.2.5.2 The Americas 
In the United Stated the BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) method is the same as 
the BOOT (Build, Own, Operate and Transfer) method in Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand. In some cases, BOT projects have not witnessed success such as in 
Mexico where the Mexican government had to take over 23 BOT toll road projects 
as well as pay $5 billion in debt to the Mexican Banks and $2.6 billion to construction 
companies. The failure of PPP projects is accordingly caused by improper risk 
allocation whether to private or public partners as well as some supply and demand 
related problems. In the United States, in order to solve the demand problems, two 
major principles are applied. The Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) is a way of 
support provided by the government in order to solve the problem that may arise for 
the private company if the revenues are less than anticipated. On the other hand, 
the Toll Revenue Cap (TRC) is applied if the demand is higher than anticipated. 
This principle consists in sharing the extra revenues between the private and public 
sectors (Ashuri et al. 2011). According to Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016), as of 
2016, 33 states and one territory gave authorization to implement PPP projects. 29 




According to Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016), the need for partnership between 
the public and private partners arose due to the increase in population and the lack 
of government funding to support such demographic increase. The involvement of 
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the private sector in the public infrastructure projects has started particularly in New 
South Wales (NSW) and in Victoria especially in the provision of roads. Victoria 
witnessed the prosperity of the partnership between the public and the private 
sector. This was named “Partnerships Victoria”. Partnership Victoria was focusing 
on a main objective which is “Value for Money.” This term is generally used to 
describe a commitment established in order to ensure that the money spent brings 
the best possible results and outcomes. It is based on the philosophy of “Gain-
share, pain-share” (Quick 2003). The Australian PPP market is characterized by the 
lack of standardization which is widespread in the various Australian states, a lack 
of international contractors, some unfair tendering processes and a common trend 
for risk transfer.  Many experts think that Australia should improve its contract 
documents, its ethics as well as adopt better risk management in order to improve 
the application of PPP concepts (Quick 2003). According to the Australian Centre 
for Public Infrastructure, the PPP agreement is output focused. This is the basic 
difference between the PPP and the traditional procurement model. The 
government is rather focused on the end use of the project/facility rather than on 
the methods or techniques that are used to achieve this end use. This makes the 
government play the role of the regulator or more precisely “eyes-on/hands-off” 
(Quick 2006). 
According to Quick (2006), typical project documents for PPP projects in Australia 
are: 
• The Concession deed (or Project Agreement) 
• Output specifications 
• Construction Contract 
• Operation and Maintenance agreement 
• Financing documents. 
 
Starting November 2003, the Victorian State Government promoted a “National 
PPP Ministerial Council” in order to provide better enhancement for PPP Projects 
as well as to develop a new national PPP market (Quick 2006). In 2005, PPP 
projects accounted for approximately eight percent of the total infrastructure 
projects executed in Australia (Ke et al. 2009). Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) 
stated that by 2012, there has been 125 PPP projects completed under the PPP 
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scheme with a total value exceeding $59 billion Australian Dollars. Furthermore, 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) specified that the Australian government 
gained great skills of risk assessment and risk allocation.  
 
2.2.5.4 Europe 
2.2.5.4.1 European Union 
According to General Regional Policy guidelines for successful Public Private 
Partnerships published by the European Commission Directorate in 2012, in 
Europe, recent years have witnessed a great increase of PPP projects. Chou and 
Pramudawardhani (2015) confirms that there has been 1,400 PPP projects in the 
European Union between 1990 and 2009 with a total value of €260 billion. The 
history of Member States countries of the European Union (EU) differs from one 
country to the other.  The European Commission that is responsible for the regional 
policy has shown a great attention to the implementation of PPP projects. The 
continuous efforts and studies implemented by the European Commission in this 
domain helped in having a complete view about the strengths and weaknesses of 
the PPP projects. It has been found that successful PPPs require an effective 
legislative and control framework and each partner should recognize the objectives 
and the needs of the other party. There are major issues that have to be ensured 
when applying PPPs such as time impact, choosing the most suitable PPP type for 
the project, ensuring that the goals and objectives of the end user are realized, 
conforming to the regional regulations and avoiding monopoly. According to Hwang 
et al. (2012), the PPP scheme is applied to a great extent in the water sector with 
different forms. For instance, in France and Spain, the private sector is mainly 
responsible for the operation of the whole water system. In Holland and Belgium, 
the private sector is only partially responsible for the operation of the water system. 
In England and Wales, the private sector may own the assets while the public sector 
is the party responsible for the water provision (Hwang et al. 2012). In Belgium, for 
instance, PPP was not widely used in infrastructure projects until 2013. Based on 
the number and magnitude of PPP projects, the Flemish region has more PPP 
projects that the Walloon region and Brussels Capital region. This is due to the fact 
that a national PPP policy is not yet drafted in Belgium. In Italy, there exist several 
gaps in the existing literature related to PPPs. Moreover, the existing studies are 
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not tackling the various aspects of PPPs which makes PPP projects less efficient in 
Italy. The same occurred in Switzerland due to the lack of a clear PPP law that 
regulates the relationships between parties (Akintoye and Kumaraswamy 2016).  
 
2.2.5.4.2 Portugal 
A comparison was established between the two major types of PPP (Contractual 
and Institutionalized) in the water sector in Portugal. The major outcome of this 
study was that proper risk allocation is a crucial tool that ensures the success of any 
project under the PPP scheme. In Portugal, the private participation in governmental 
projects started in 1993 through purely contractual PPPs. As the government 
wanted to have a proper regulation and supervision over the private companies 
entering into PPPs, a special institute was established for that purpose called “the 
IRAR” (Institute for the Regulation of Water and Waste) which was replaced 
afterwards by “the ERSAR” (Water and Waste Services Regulatory Authority) which 
aimed at supervising the service quality and which had a “nonbinding” opinion 
concerning all the tender documents. Until that time, PPPs were only of contractual 
type. Starting from 1998, PPPs started to take the institutionalized type as well by 
creating mixed companies between the public and the private sectors. The private 
partner is always chosen for both cases (whether contractual PPPs or 
institutionalized PPPs) through an open bid.  However, it has been noticed that there 
has been problems associated with the implementation of PPPs in Portugal whether 
for contractual or institutionalized PPPs. For instance, statistics were developed in 
December 2009 mentioning that at that time, 25 of the 30 signed PPP contracts 
were concessions (contractual PPPs) while the rest were institutionalized PPPs with 
60% of the PPP projects that were negotiated. According to Marques and Berg 
(2011), the main causes of such a problem is related to an improper risk allocation 
between the private and public sectors which proves the importance of a good 
application of risk allocations and risk study before the start of the project. This 
conclusion is similar to that reached by Akintoye and Kumaraswamy in 2016 when 
confirmed in their study that several PPP renegotiations took place in Portugal due 
to several reasons among them is the improper risk allocation. Furthermore, 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) offered another conclusion in this regard by 
explaining that having too many PPP projects in a short period of time, with an 
obvious lack of preparation from the public sector’s side for such collaboration in 
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addition to not properly using the expertise of the private sector contributed to the 
problems that emerged with the use of PPP projects and which resulted in some 
cases, in a financial burden on the public sector instead of realizing the main goal 
of PPP which is “better value for money”.  
 
2.2.5.4.3 Turkey 
Ozeke (2009) provided a robust study on PPP projects in Turkey. In Turkey, the 
concession method was rarely used under the Concessions Law of 1910. However, 
the Concessions Law of 1910 provided only general guidelines but not detailed 
procedure. Concessions contracts are reviewed by the Council of State. In 1984, 
the first BOT law (Law No. 3096) was established. The amendments to the 
aforementioned law appeared in 1994, in law No. 3996 in a new law applicable in 
various sectors such as energy, transportation, communication and municipal 
services.  In Turkey, the BOT system is now used for most of the infrastructure 
projects especially airports while the normal concession scheme is used to give the 
private party the right of operations of public properties such as ports. However, the 
PPP scheme in Turkey has shown some proofs of deficiencies due to the absence 
of any entity affiliated to the government whose role is to monitor and supervise the 
PPP projects in hand. Consequently, in 2009, a draft law was proposed which 
includes amendments and improvements to the previous laws and regulations such 
as the following: 
• Defining PPP according to the law. Accordingly, PPP is a general term under 
which many definitions can be extracted such as BOT, BO, etc. 
• The draft PPP law encloses a standardized format that can be followed by 
nearly all PPP projects. 
• PPP can be used in any project type such as state hospitals, prisons, water 
and energy projects, transportation, etc.  
• Risks should be properly allocated between the private and public partners 
according to one criterion: the partner that is better able to manage the risk 
will be the one who bears it (Ozeke, 2009).  
 
The improvements and enhancements of the PPP scheme in Turkey continued. 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) stated that the 10th Development Plan 
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announced by the Turkish government includes a roadmap for the PPP applications 
in the country.  
2.2.5.4.4 United Kingdom 
According to the literature, the United Kingdom takes the first place in performing 
studies about PPP projects in terms of the number of published papers. In fact, the 
published literature considers the United Kingdom as the founder country of the 
PPP concept. According to Ke et al. (2009), the countries that follow are the United 
States, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, China and Germany. According to Chou 
and Pramudawardhani (2015), the United Kingdom is considered as the most 
successful country in adopting PPP projects which amounted to approximately £10 
billion from 1992 and until 1999. There is a term used in the UK called Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) which is considered as one of the types of PPP. It is based 
on the fact that the public sector pays periodically (monthly or annually) the private 
sector provider for the supply of service or project delivered through an asset 
developed by or transferred to the private sector provider (Quick 2006) (Marques 
2010). This type of partnership started for health projects (such as hospitals) and 
educational projects (such as schools) and is now used for other sectors such as 
transportation, water and wastewater treatment plants. This concept can be useful 
and effective in projects where costs are difficult to be paid such as projects in 
developing countries. This concept started to be widely used in the UK and was 
encouraged by the government in 1992. By 1997, PFI projects in the domains of 
transportation, health, defense, office accommodations, prison, education and 
water started to be delivered. In fact, 1997 is considered as the year when PPP 
projects were officially introduced in the English community (Ke et al. 2009). 
However, there was an obvious delay in the delivery of those projects. Since this 
date, various efforts have been undertaken to improve this concept in the UK 
through the Bates Committee who attempted to get the public sector more 
acquainted with PFI. In the year 2000, a major entity mainly owned by the private 
sector was established in order to further develop PFI concept by offering the public 
sector project management skills, by providing support to them and by providing 
initial capital for projects.  New guidelines were established as well for whole life 
cycle service costing for PFI. In the period from 1999 to 2004, the standardization 
of the PFI scheme continued over 4 editions (SoPC1, 2, 3 and 4) until reaching the 
 
Page 65 of 313 
 
phase where all PFI schemes in the UK should be compliant with this standardized 
form of Contracts. This standardization aims at reducing the time and costs 
associated with various negotiations throughout the project as well as allowing for 
a proper risk allocation technique instead of allocating all the risks to the private 
sector (Quick 2006). According to the National Audit Office report that is assessing 
the performance of PFI construction projects in the United Kingdom and that was 
issued in 2009, PFI projects were on time 69% of the time and on budget 65% of 
the time till that year (Quick 2006). In 2005, PPP formed around 15 % of 
infrastructure projects performed in the United Kingdom (Ke et al. 2009). Chou and 
Pramudawardhani (2015) explained that the success of PPP projects in the United 





There were several studies performed regarding PPP projects in China. According 
to the study done by Xu, et al., (2010), the Chinese economy has been recently 
prospering and growing at a fast rate: between 2006 and 2010, 2,400 infrastructure 
projects were developed with a total budget of RMB (Renminbi, the Chinese 
currency) 470 billion. This wide expansion is to serve the huge population of the 
PRC (People’s Republic of China) which is expected to jump from 536 million in 
2005 to 827 million in 2025. This makes the government or the public sector in 
general look for the intervention of the private sector.  The Bird’s Nest (National 
Stadium) in Beijing and Beijing Metro Line 4 (BJL4) are two major examples of PPP 
projects in China. Nevertheless, Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016) argues that 
the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks for PPPs are still immature. 
 
In order to ensure the success of the adoption of the PPP principle in China, studies 
were established in order to determine the critical success factors (CSF) for PPP 
projects. CSFs are defined as the areas of activity in which favorable results are 
crucial for a manager in order to achieve his goals. According to the study done in 
2010, 18 critical success factors were identified in China and they were grouped 
into five main factors which are: 
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• Stable macroeconomics environment 
• Shared responsibility between the public and the private sector 
• Transparent and efficient procurement 
• Stable political and social environment 
• Wise government control and supervision 
 
However, it is important to note that these main factors can change from year to 
another based on the actual conditions in the country and based on the time at 
which the study was made (Chan et al. 2010). The proof is that in 2001, the major 
critical success factors for BOT projects in China were slightly different (Hwang et 
al. 2012). Nevertheless, both studies seem to complement each other. The major 
critical success factors defined in 2012 were:  
• Appropriate Project Identification 
• Stable Political and economic situation 
• Attractive financial package 
• Acceptable toll/tariff levels 
• Reasonable risk allocation 
• Selection of Suitable Subcontractors 
• Management Control 
• Technology transfer 
 
Table 4 is developed to show a comparison between the critical success factors 
associated with PPP projects identified in 2001 and the ones identified in 2010 
(approximately 10 years later) in China. 
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Source: Hwang et al. and Xu et al. 
 
According to the study performed by Xu et al. (2010) and which is aiming to develop 
a model that helps in calculating the risk level of PPP projects in China, it has been 
found that the top 10 risks affecting PPP projects are: 
• Government Intervention 
• Poor public decision making process 
• Government corruption 
• Financing risk 
• Inadequate law and supervision system 
• Public credit 
• Subjective project evaluation method 
• Interest rate fluctuation 
• Conflicting or imperfect contract 
• Change in Market demand 
 
These risks were obtained through and extensive literature review and a two round 
Delphi survey to reduce the identified list using a consensus approach amongst 
respondents. Data analysis was then performed through statistical and analytical 
tools in order to rank those risks, identifying the ten most significant.  
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2.2.5.5.2 Singapore 
The first PPP project in Singapore was in 2003 (Hwang et al. 2013). According to 
Gunawansa (2010), the Public Utilities Board (PUB) awarded the first PPP project 
which was a desalination plant. Starting from 2003 and for the next 3 to 5 years, the 
government awarded projects worth $1 billion to the private sector (Li 2006). The 
number of completed projects reached 10 projects which were successfully 
completed while only 3 projects were unsuccessful and not completed (Gunawansa 
2010; Weaver 2010). According to Hwang et al. (2012), the ministry of Finance 
(MOF) in Singapore specified in its PPP handbook published in 2004 that the PPP 
scheme is suitable for several sectors such as water and sewage, sports facilities, 
education, healthcare, roads and government buildings.  
Hwang et al. (2012) also points out that despite the various efforts done to enhance 
PPP projects in Singapore, only little effort was deployed to study risk allocation.  
 
2.2.5.5.3 India 
According to Lyer and Sagheer (2010), the necessary financing for infrastructure 
projects in India for the next five years is approximately $ 448 billion in the water, 
ports, roads and airports projects. However, this cannot be achieved in India without 
the intervention of the private sector. Public Private Partnership is considered as a 
solution to enhance and improve India’s infrastructure. One of the best models and 
examples for Public Private Partnerships comes within the Sustainable Cities 
Programme (SCP) which is supported by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) started in 1990. The main objective of the SCP is to provide 
an improved and enhanced environment for management and planning. The Indian 
City of Chennai joined the SCP in 1995. Accordingly, in order to implement such 
program which aims to improve the environmental and managerial conditions in the 
city, the private partner’s participation along with the government is important and 
crucial and hence the “Private-Public Partnerships” (Sarangi 2002). According to 
Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016), despite the need for PPP projects and despite 
the fact that PPP projects started to be widely implemented in various sectors such 
as power, airports and infrastructure, there has been a recent “slowdown” in PPP 
projects. According to the study performed by Lyer and Sagheer (2010) which was 
conducted through and extensive literature review, interviews and case studies, the 
major risks affecting BOT projects in India are: 
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• Pre-investment risks: The project may be prone to cancellation or inadequate 
bid preparation. 
• Delay in financial closure: The private party may not have enough financial 
ability to execute the project. 
• Resettlement and rehabilitation operations: These may be necessary for 
habitants due to the new project, such as in the case of road projects 
requiring the displacement of habitants to allow the work to take place. 
• Delay in land acquisition: This may be due to political opposition or delays in 
permits. 
• Permit/approval risks: This may be due to the government corruption, poor 
documentation or poor coordination among the public sector parties. 
• Technology risks: Sometimes, the technology adopted may not be beneficial 
or suitable for the project. 
• Design and Latent Defect Risk: These risks may occur due to poor geological 
studies or deficiency in design. 
• Cost Overrun risks: This risk occurs when the project cannot be completed 
within the specified budget. This can be due to a certain party’s fault or may 
be due to reasons beyond the party’s control such as inflation or interest rate 
fluctuation. 
• Schedule risk: This risk occurs if the project cannot be completed within the 
expected time. 
• Direct political risks: This may be due to changes in law, nationalization or 
problems in getting the necessary approvals for the project.  
 
2.2.5.5.4 Taiwan 
According to the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory, a national PPP unit can 
be considered “an outcome of a game” (Tserng, et al. 2012). A national PPP unit is 
a large unit including several governments which is responsible for regulations and 
advice for PPP projects such as Treasury PPP Taskforce/ Partnerships UK, PFI 
Promotion Office in Japan, the National PPP taskforce on Taiwan and the Public 
and Private Infrastructure Investment Management Center in Korea. Taiwan has an 
abundant experience in PPPs. Of the 39 departments of the Taiwan government, 
only the Ministry of Transportation and Communications implements an average of 
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10 or more PPP projects annually (Tserng, et al. 2012). One of the largest PPP 
projects in the world is located in Taiwan, which is “Taiwan High Speed Rail Bank 
of Taiwan Project” (Tserng et al. 2012). PPP in Taiwan represent around 12.7 % of 
the annual investment of Taiwan in the domain of infrastructure. Table 5 provides a 
summary for the annual percentage of PPP in various countries with respect to the 
total number of projects in the country, according to 2011’s statistics: 
 
Table 5. Annual PPP project percentage in different countries  
Country PPP Contribution 
United Kingdom 10-15 % 
Australia 5-20 % (average 10 %) 
Korea 5-14 % 
Taiwan 12.7 % 
Source: Tserng. et al. 2012 
 
According to Tserng et al. (2012), the key to successful PPP projects is Government 
credibility at the public opinion. Therefore, the National PPP taskforce in Taiwan 
helps in enhancing and increasing the trust and credibility between the private and 
public sectors. 
 
2.2.5.6 Middle East 
2.2.5.6.1 Kuwait 
Kuwait is rapidly moving to the increase of PPP projects on its land.  The number of 
potential Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) projects in Kuwait is probably the most 
significant in the Middle East with over $25 billion worth of projects whether under 
study or already started (2nd Annual PPP Investment Summit in Kuwait, 2009). In 
its attempts to improve the PPP scheme in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Government has 
established a PPP project guidebook in addition to Law No. 7/2008 which 
established the basis for the application of infrastructure PPP Projects in Kuwait. 
According to the guidelines published by the State of Kuwait, the PPP law limits the 
PPP contract to 30 years. It can be however extended to a period that can reach 40 
years. However, when no specific period is stated in the contract, it is deemed to be 
assumed as 25 years. A Project exceeding KD 60 million must be carried out by a 
PPP Project company that will be a special-purpose vehicle formed as a Kuwaiti 
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Joint Stock Company (Kuwait PPP projects: Project Guidebook 2009).  The 
evaluation and supervision of PPP projects in Kuwait takes place in the Partnership 
Technical Bureau (PTB). The PTB helps in providing standardized PPP contracts, 
increase and enhance the credibility for the PPP market. 
 
2.2.5.6.2 United Arab Emirates 
The concept of PPP has been relatively recent for the United Arab Emirates 
especially that it was more common for the Emirati government to be responsible 
for the procurement for any project without much depending on a private partner. 
The studies related to PPP projects in United Arab Emirates are still incomplete. 
Actually, there are around 10 PPP projects all over the country which proves that 
PPP in the United Arab Emirates is still at its first stages of implementation. 
Therefore, political support is necessary in order to encourage the private partners 
to invest in the country. Also, it is crucial to get the end customer more 
knowledgeable about the PPP concept so that it can gain more credibility (Dulaimi 
et al. 2010).  
 
2.2.5.6.3 Egypt 
In Egypt, in an attempt towards economic reform, the involvement of the private 
sector with the government has increased. A legal framework for PPP projects in 
Egypt has been issued called the PPP Law (67 for the year 2010) in addition to the 
establishment of standard PPP Contracts, procurement documents as well 
standardized procedures. In addition to that, a new body has been established at 
the Ministry of finance called the PPP Central Unit.  The PPP Law in Egypt is “Law 
No. 67 for Partnerships with the Private Sector in Infrastructure Projects and Public 
Utilities.” It was approved by the Parliament in May 2010. It is divided into 4 chapters 
as follows (and 39 articles): 
• Chapter 1: General Provisions 
• Chapter 2: The Supreme Committee for Public Private Partnership Affairs 
and the PPP Central Unit 
• Chapter 3: Tendering and Awarding Procedures 
• Chapter 4: Substantive Provisions of the PPP Contract 
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This law aims at unifying and standardizing the PPP scheme in the various projects 
as the PPP scheme is characterized by uniqueness.  According to the PPP Central 
Unit website, The PPP Central Unit is a unit that has been established by the 
Ministry of finance since June 2006 in order to supervise and assure the proper 
implementation of PPP projects in Egypt. The PPP Central unit seeks the help and 
advice of international experts in order to enhance the success of PPP Projects in 
Egypt through the following:  
• Establishing standard contracts for PPP as well as proper guidelines and 
methodology, 
• Coordinating the PPP program across Line Ministries, private sector and 
funding market, 
• Providing technical supervision over PPP projects,  
• Studying potential projects where PPP can be a better option (“PPP’able 
Projects”), 
• Studying tender documents,  
• Ensuring the application of proper risk allocation between the public and 
private sector,  
• Benefiting from the previous experience of other countries in the domain of 
PPP, 
• Acting as the “Public Face” for PPP in Egypt who is responsible for spreading 
news, 
• Issuing a quarterly PPP booklet to all stakeholders, 
• Hosting a yearly PPP summit called “MENA Region PPP summit”,  
• Providing sessions, trainings and workshops for both the private and public 
sector in order to get them more acquainted with PPP projects. 
 
The first PPP project that took place in Egypt was “New Cairo Waste Water 
Treatment Plant”. The PPP was an “Institutionalized PPP” in which the private 
sector’s duties was to design, finance, construct, operate, maintain and transfer the 
waste water treatment plant whose capacity is 250,000 m³/day (Tarek 2011). 
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The PPP’s duration for this project is 20 years at the end of which the private partner 
should transfer the plant in good operational condition as mentioned in the Contract. 
The Public entities in this project were: 
• The Ministry of Housing (MHUUD), 
• The Ministry of Investment (MoI) and  
• The Ministry of Finance (MoF) and more specifically the PPP Central Unit.  
 
The main consultant for the PPP Central unit was the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC).  The IFC is considered as “the private sector arm of the World 
Bank group.” 
(Valente 2010). Since 2006, IFC in Egypt has been giving advisory services to the 
ministry of Finance in order to enhance the application of PPP aiming to improve 
the PPP at the country (IFC 2013). While the World Bank “provides support to 
governments on developing the enabling environment for PPPs and sector reform, 
through technical assistance and as part of broader sector support facilities or 
facilities to support the development of PPPs. The World Bank Group also 
supports a number of knowledge management tools and collaborates on 
initiatives to support governments” (World Bank 2013). The private partner was a 
joint venture between Orascom and Aqualia, a Spanish water company named 
“Orasqualia”. The total value of Orasqualia’s bid was $ 490 million. This joint venture 
is the one who won the bid face to other 6 bidders including Veolia, Befasa, Metito 
and Kharafi. In June 2009, the contract was signed. The Contract was signed 
between the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) and Orasqualia referred to 
as the Service Provider.  NUCA is responsible for planning and developing new 
water and wastewater communities in Egypt (Osgood 2009).  The main regulator of 
the project is the Water Sector Regulator (EWRA) which is responsible for 
supervising, reviewing and monitoring all activities related to the water and 
wastewater sectors (Osgood 2009). The project ended in 2012 with total project 
duration of 2 years (Draz 2012). Under the PPP scheme for water and wastewater 
projects in Egypt, the service provider (the investor or the developer) who is in this 
case Orasqualia will be periodically paid as soon as the plant enters in to the 
operation phase (Osgood 2012). New Cairo Wastewater Treatment Plant won the 
title of the “Water Deal of the Year” in 2009 which is a prize given by the Global 
Water Intelligence (GWI) (Tarek 2011). Figure 12 shows the project’s structure: 
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Figure 12. Key Stakeholders in Water and Wastewater Projects 
 
2.2.5.7 Africa 
In developing countries, the public sector is not the major responsible for 
development anymore. On the other hand, the private sector started to play an 
important role by taking part in the delivery of a public service, project or facility 
(Dansereau 2005). In Nigeria for instance, there has been an increase in the 
projects executed under PPP scheme especially when it comes to infrastructure 
projects. In order for Nigeria to improve its infrastructure to meet the standards, the 
country needs from $12 to $15 Billion annually, thus, the role of the private sector 
became crucial in such developing countries. According to a study done for the 
projects that are most suitable for PPP application in developing countries and 
especially Nigeria, it has been found that PPP scheme can applied in approximately 
all the project types whether water and wastewater, power and electricity, 
transportation, educational and real estate. The study’s output was also to 
determine the critical success factors (CSFs) in order to ensure the success of PPP 
projects which were as follows:  
• Competitive procurement 
• Realistic assessment for costs and benefits 
• Favorable framework 
• Proper risk allocation 
• Government intervention and guarantees 
• Political support 
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• Stable economic conditions 
• Sound economic policy 
• Availability of suitable financial market 
 
The above critical success factors should be studied with utmost care in order to 
endure the success of PPP projects (Babatunde 2012).  
 
2.2.6 Advantages and criticism of PPP  
Kwak et al. (2009) argue that the partnership between the Public and the Private 
entities can have several benefits especially to the government. The major benefit 
is to bring “value for money” by benefiting from the private sector’s quality and 
experience. The Private partner will bear several risks that the government cannot 
bear such as the construction, financial and operation risks (Carbonara, et al., 
2014).  Badala, et al., (2018) provided support for the research conducted by 
Carbonara et al. (2014) and Kwak et al. (2009) by stating that the PPP scheme has 
several benefits and that the major benefit is bringing cost savings to the project. 
According to a research performed by Reuters in 2013, further explanation to the 
term “cost savings” was provided: in the case of PPP projects, the public sector 
usually signs a single contract with the private sector involving design, construction, 
operation and/or maintenance which eliminates the additional costs associated with 
entering into and signing a series of separate contracts with various contractors for 
each of the project phases. Reuters (2013) added an interesting observation: in the 
case of PPP projects, the fact that the PPP contractor will be responsible for the 
O&M during the entire concession period will make the PPP contractor focus during 
the design and construction phases on ways to reduce O&M costs afterwards. The 
integration of design, construction and operation will have a positive impact on the 
whole lifecycle cost of the project. Furthermore, Badala et al. (2018) argues that 
“project acceleration” is another main benefit of the PPP model as the private 
partner has the ability to deliver the project faster than the typical public owner.  
Reuters (2013) point out that bundling the design and construction process into a 
single contract will help decrease the duration of the project compared to the classic 
Design-Bid-Build project delivery method. Also, the high level of involvement of the 
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private sector in PPP projects results in a higher quality project in terms of design 
and construction.  
 
Nevertheless, Grimsey and Levis (2002) brought a rebuttal to this perspective by 
pointing out that despite the advantages that PPP projects can present, this scheme 
has some “drawbacks”. Such downsides arise from the complexities in planning, 
documentation, taxation, control, performance, “politics and policies”. According to 
Heravi and Hajihosseini (2011), such complexities cause risks to arise and to be 
associated with PPP projects. Reuters (2013) argues that in PPP projects, more 
risks are transferred to the PPP contractor than in the case of conventional Design-
Bid-Build projects. This can be beneficial to the public sector as it transfers many 
(or sometimes all) project risks to the PPP contractor while remaining in control over 
the project.  
2.3 Managing risks associated with PPP projects 
According to Hodge and Greve (2007) and Kwak, Chih and Ibbs (2009), Public 
Private Partnership became a major scheme especially for infrastructure projects 
due to the several benefits such partnerships can bring to the governments. 
Nevertheless, Carbonara et al. (2014) argues that in order to gain all the benefits 
that could emerge of the partnership between the Public and the Private partners, 
several critical aspects should be managed and taken into consideration such as: 
• The identification of risks associated with PPP projects 
• The determination of the proper risk allocation for the identified risks 
• Establishing a good financial plan 
• A careful selection of the Private partner 
• The presence of an optimum concession period 
 
Hwang et al. (2012) points out that due to their complex nature, PPP projects include 
risks that are difficult to control and to analyze. Ke et al. (2009) reached the same 
conclusion by stating that risks in PPP projects are difficult to deal with which 
requires a proper management technique for risks.  
 
 
Page 77 of 313 
 
2.3.1 Risk Management for PPP projects  
ISO 2009 defines a risk as “The effect of uncertainty on objectives”. This means that 
risk is an uncertain event that can affect the project’s objectives or outcomes if it 
occurs. Risks can affect three major aspects of any project which are cost, time and 
quality. Because of the long term nature of PPP projects, which can range from 20 
to 40 years or even sometimes exceeds this period, and because PPP projects are 
based on expected and pre-specified assumptions, sometimes, these expectations 
and forecasts lack accuracy to a great extent as it may be difficult to make accurate 
predictions for 10 years especially in unstable economic, technological and political 
conditions as well supply and demand forecasts (Cruz and Marques 2013). 
 
According to Akintoye and Kumaraswamy (2016), there are seven main questions 
related to the use of PPP that have to be taken into account: 
• Is having several PPP projects simultaneously in a short period of time a 
good solution? 
• Does the government have the capability and skills to monitor the PPP 
project in light of its complex nature? 
• Is the tender process sufficiently managed and regulated? 
• Is PPP really the best and optimum solution for the project? 
• Does the PPP contract contain proper financial assumptions? 
• Is the risk identification and allocation clearly determined? 
• Why, in several previous PPP projects, there has been a renegotiation of the 
contract terms and conditions leading to increased financial burdens on the 
public sector?  
 
Hwang et al. (2012) argues that the long-term nature and the complexity of 
relationships between parties in PPP make “risks” an important and crucial factor to 
be studied and analyzed. A good and sound risk management can make the PPP 
project reach its objectives. When the Traditional procurement method is used, risks 
do not disappear, but they are simply passed to the end customer and taxpayers. 
Figure 13 provides an illustration showing the difference in principle between the 
traditional procurement model and the PPP model. When using the traditional model 
for delivering the project, the base cost is higher, in addition to the presence of a 
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cost assigned for the inefficiency risk which is mainly due to the lack of experience 
of the government in certain areas such as construction and technology. However, 
in the case of project executed under the PPP scheme, along with a sound risk 
allocation between the private and public sectors, the base cost is reduced thanks 
to the PPP incentives. In spite of adding a risk premium to account for the different 
risks affecting the project in addition to the financing cost, the net result is that the 
total cost is less in the case of PPP projects than in the case of traditional project 
without passing the risks and the extra cost to the end user. Also, in general and in 
most of the projects executed under the PPP scheme, the payment to the private 
sector occurs when the project starts operating. This payment can be by the 
government (the public sector) or by end users. This is an incentive for the private 
partner to complete the project on time and within budget (Marques and Berg 2011) 
 
Figure 13. Comparison between PPP projects and traditional projects in terms of cost (Marques and 
Berg 2011) 
 
However, there is a point of view mentioning that not all risks are harmful since they 
can carry opportunities as much as threats in some cases (Marques and Berg 
2011).  There are several risks that can affect PPP projects, especially infrastructure 
projects which are: technical, construction, operations, revenue, financial, 
resources, production, force majeure, political, regulatory, environmental, 
commercial and unforeseen risks (Marques and Berg 2011). 
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According to the Guidelines for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt published by the 
PPP Central unit, the most common risks affecting PPP projects are: 
• Timing and Planning 
• Unforeseen geotechnical conditions 
• Technical design issues 
• Operation Cost Overrun 
• Time overruns during construction 
• Supply and demand 
• Operational service costs 
• Inflation 
• Change of legislation 
• Insurance 
• Technological risks 
According to Marques and Berg (2011), the major risks affecting infrastructure 
projects executed under PPP scheme are: 
• Technical risks 
• Construction risks 
• Operating risks 
• Revenue risks 
• Financial risks 
• Force Majeure 
• Regulatory/political risks 
• Environmental risks 
• Project default risks 
 
2.3.1.1 Effects of risks on the project’s time and cost performance 
According to Hampton, Baldwin and Holt (2012, p.73), “delays are inherent 
throughout the construction process and can affect either a single activity in isolation 
or become the catalyst for delay of a group of activities” and subsequently the whole 
project. 
Doloi (2012) argues that in order to evaluate the overall success of a construction 
project in light of the risks facing it, the following performances are the most 
important to observe: 
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• Time performance 
• Cost performance 
• Operation performance  
 
Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006) points out that time and cost are different facets for the 
same issue and they provided evidence to support such supposition. They 
concluded that delay factors will ultimately have a financial impact on both the client 
and the contractor. This conclusion is similar to that reached by Trauner (1990) who 
explained the effect of the project’s delays on the major project’s parties. When the 
client is delayed in starting using the constructed facility, revenue is also delayed in 
being generated from it. On the other hand, in case of a project’s delay, the 
contractor is exposed to the risk of Liquidated Damages (LDs). Furthermore, the 
contractor may be obliged to incur additional inflation costs while continuing to work 
on site after the original completion date of the project. Accordingly, in the absence 
of a proper risk management technique, each party can start blaming the other for 
delays in an attempt to alleviate its responsibility towards delays and associated 
costs. Chappell, et al., (2006) argues that if the cause of delay is simultaneously 
due to different parties, it is often difficult to assign such delay in terms of 
responsibility and associated cost. Accordingly, analyzing the impact of risks on the 
project’s schedule is a crucial step in order towards a proper risk management.  
 
2.3.2 Importance of risk allocation 
The topic of risk allocation in PPP projects was discussed in several studies 
conducted in the literature. Existing literature seems to complement each other in 
this issue. A proper risk allocation is beneficial as it can decrease economic costs 
to both parties (the private and the public sector) (Marques and Berg 2011). 
Furthermore, Alireza, et al., (2013) points out that efficient risk allocation play a 
crucial role in reducing the disputes during the concession period. 
 
The results of a survey conducted in 2006 by the Construction Industry Institute (CII) 
show that inappropriate risk allocation causes at least a 3% contingency in bids (CII 
2006). Furthermore, Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) point out that using disclaimer 
clauses to allocate risks adds a premium of between 8% and 20% to construction 
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project bids. Accordingly, improper allocation of risks will cause both parties to incur 
additional costs (Jin and Zhang 2011). Valipour et al. (2016) confirms that 
inadequate risk allocation can severely harm the PPP project. According to 
Kumaraswamy (1997), most of the claims and disputes occurring in the construction 
industry are caused by improper allocation of risks. Moreover, allocating the risk to 
the wrong party can cause the contractors to add a high contingency (risk premium) 
to their bids or can cause the contractors to sometimes delivery low quality of work 
(Khazaeni,  et al.,  2012b, Lam, et al., 2007).  
 
Therefore, for each project, choosing the proper risk allocation will assist both 
parties to make more strategic decisions (Valipour et al. 2016). This will help in 
expecting the financial and economic consequences of these potential risks. On the 
other hand, Marques and Berg (2011) provided an interesting observation: 
according to their study, it should be noted that there is an optimal level of risk 
transfer beyond which, the desired Value for Money cannot be achieved for a 
specific project. This is because allocating more risks to the private partner may 
increase the project costs. The optimum level of the of risk transfer is illustrated in 
figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. Optimum Level of Risk transfer to ensure realizing the Value for Money (Marques and Berg, 
2011) 
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The most well-known and efficient concept for risk allocation is known as the 
“Abrahamson” principle which is based on allocating the risk to the party who will 
be best in managing this risk. There are criteria that make the party eligible for 
bearing the risk which are: 
• Having a risk that is within the party’s control and which can be dealt with 
efficiently. 
• Having a risk that can be mitigated or transferred through different ways such 
as insurance or service premiums. 
• Having a risk that gives the party bearing it an economical benefit (Quick 
2003) 
 
Therefore, the party who will be better in managing the risk means the party who 
can handle this risk at “the least cost” (Hwang et al. 2012). In other words, if the 
public sector is able to bear a certain risk; then it should not be transferred to the 
private sector as doing that may increase the project’s costs. For instance, allocating 
customers related risks (e.g. supply and demand risks) to the private partner put its 
assets at the stake. On the other hand, the public sector (the government) can be 
better in knowing the consumption forecasts and accordingly can be more 
appropriate to bear such risk.  Also, in order to conduct a proper allocation of risks, 
some known rules can be applied. For instance, it is believed that the environmental, 
political and regulatory risks should be borne by the public sector. On the other 
hand, production risks, construction risks, supply and demand risks should be borne 
by the private sector. Some risks, such as operation, maintenance and design 
depend on the project conditions and circumstances. Some risks are controversial 
such as Force Majeure. Figure 15 shows a typical risk allocation matrix for general 
risks affecting PPP projects developed by Marques and Berg (2011) in their study. 
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Figure 15. Risk Allocation Matrix for PPP projects (Marques and Berg 2011) 
  
2.3.3 How to conduct a proper risk management for PPP projects 
Marques and Berg (2011) proposed a useful methodology that ensures a proper 
risk analysis and evaluation which is illustrated in figure 16. 
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This methodology starts by the step of the risk identification which is an essential 
step for the project and which should started as early as possible in the project’s 
lifetime (Hwang et al. 2012).  
 
In order to start a proper and effective risk management, first the risks that can affect 
a certain project have to be specified. Then the risks should be properly classified. 
There are various classifications of risks; for instance, one of the possible 
classifications is dividing the risks as follows (Marques and Berg 2011) 
• Macro Level Risks: the Risks that are beyond the project’s boundaries and 
however, have the power to affect the whole project, 
• Meso Level Risks: the risks that occur within the project, 
• Micro Level Risks: the risks that occur within the project parties in the project. 
• In a previous study, Li, Akintoye and Edwards (2005) adopted a similar three-
level way of classifying risks as follows: 
• Macro-level risks: having effects beyond the project’s limits 
• Meso level risks: having effects within the project’s limits 
• Micro level risks: associated with the stakeholder relationships 
• Another risk classification is dividing the risks into: 
• Global Risks (General Risks): external risks affecting the project such as 
legal, political commercial and environmental risks 
• Elemental Risks (Project Risks):  risks within the project such as 
construction, operation, project default and revenue risks.  
 
Figure 17 shows another way to classify risks associated with PPP projects by 
dividing the risks into three major categories: Production risks, commercial risks and 
context risks.  
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Figure 17. One of the adopted risks classification techniques for PPP projects (Marques and Berg 
2011) 
 
Then, the probability and impact of each risk should be quantified. The severity of 
each risk can be determined by multiplying the probability by the impact for each 
risk. This way, all the risks can be ranked for a specific project (Marques and Berg 
2011). This stage has to be started from the bidding process. A complete risk matrix 
should be developed for all the risks associated with a certain project (Marques and 
Berg 2011).  
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2.4 PPP Stakeholders   
2.4.1 Relationship Management in PPP 
Zou et al. (2013) argues that due to the fact that PPP projects have a long lifetime, 
there will be a higher chance of problems/changes arising. Accordingly, a good risk 
allocation between PPP parties is crucial to ensure a successful PPP project. 
Nevertheless, many of the changes happening during the lifetime of the PPP project 
will be unanticipated for as potential risks and therefore, will not be accounted for in 
the PPP contract. Therefore, relying on the established relationships is needed to 
maintain the contractual bond. The quality of the relationship between public and 
private sector has been shown to be a key contributor to the success of a PPP 
project. 
 
Smith et al. (2018) defines the concepts of “principal” and “agent” in the PPP 
context. The “principal” is the public partner, the “agent” is the private partner. The 
relationship between the principal and the agent is defined in the contract terms and 
conditions. Any problems occurring between the principal and the agent are known 
as “agency problems”. In fact, Eisenhardt (1989) offered a holistic view supported 
by robust explanation on five assumptions associated with the “agency theory” 
which are as follows: 
 
• The presence of “conflict of interests” between the principal and the agent.  
Smith et al. (2018) provided some evidence to support this assumption by 
stating that one of the examples for conflict of interest in PPP projects is 
where the agent’s aim is to make profit while this is not the principal’s goal. 
The principal is concerned with cost-effectiveness only as “an ultimate goal”.  
• The “rationality” which means that both the principal and the agent are 
looking first to their personal interest. Shrestha and Martek (2015) illustrate 
the problem of rationality by describing what happens in case the agent 
jeopardizes the quality of the works as well as the standards to make more 
profit. In their study, Mok, et al.,  (2014) argues that sometimes, the 
stakeholders’ interests play a crucial role in the project as the interests and 
hence the priorities differ among the various project stakeholders. Such 
different interests can sometimes reach the point that stakeholders may use 
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strategies to influence the project decision-making just to realize their 
objectives. Accordingly, Missonier and Fedida (2014) confirms that 
stakeholder analysis plays a crucial role in stakeholder management. 
• “Asymmetric information” which includes two major problems: 
o “Adverse selection” where the principal does not know what the agent 
knows. This problem occurs mainly before the signature of the 
contract. According to De Palma, et al., (2012), this is the case in PPP 
projects where the private partner has skills, experience and 
knowledge that the public partner does not have (Missonier and 
Fedida 2012).  
o “Moral hazard” where the principal cannot watch the agent’s behavior. 
This problem usually occurs after the contract is signed.  
• “Uncertainty” which is known in other words as “risks” which includes any 
unforeseen event out of the parties’ control and could not have been 
accounted for.  
• “Risk-aversion” which assumes that the agent’s main role is to bear all risks 
associated with the project to protect the principal’s interests.  
 
According to Smith et al. (2018), there is still a gap in the knowledge regarding the 
“agency problems” and the five assumptions stated above and which were 
developed by Eisenhardt in 1989.   
 
Consequently, there has been an increasing attention towards the use of the term 
“Relationship Management” or “RM” in the domain of Construction Management 
and especially in PPPs. Zou et al. (2013, p.269) defines RM as “a set of 
comprehensive strategies and processes of partnering with selected counterparties, 
and the project stakeholders, to create superior value for the PPP project through 
developing sustainable relationships.”  
 
2.4.2 Stakeholder concept and its relationship to PPP projects  
The stakeholder concept appeared into the management domain for the first time 
in 1963 by the Stanford Research Institute in California. Stakeholders meant the 
institutions or individuals that are essential for any organization to exist (Freeman 
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1984). The traditional definition of a stakeholder is “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman 
1984). Existing literature includes several definitions for “Stakeholders” which seem 
to be similar to a great extent. According to Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida (2014), 
the term “stakeholder” means any institution or individual having an interest or “a 
stake” in a certain project. As per the Project Management Institute (2008), “project 
stakeholders are individuals and organizations that are actively involved in a project 
or whose interests may be affected as a result of project execution or completion”. 
According to Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida (2014, p.1110), Vidgen and McMaster 
(1996) define stakeholders as “human or non-human organization unit that can 
affect as well as be affected by a human or non-human organization’s policy or 
policies”. Generally, there two types of stakeholders: primary and secondary 
stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are the ones having a considerable impact on 
the success and survival of the organization. Secondary stakeholders are having 
an impact on the organization without being directly involved in it and are not crucial 
for the organization/project to survive (Schepper et al. 2014, Clarkson 1995).  
 
Li, et al. (2012) suggested a different classification for stakeholders in the 
construction industry. According to their study, stakeholders are classified into two 
major types: 
o “Internal stakeholders, who are located on the “demand side” such as 
employees, customers, end-users and financiers) and “supply side” 
(architects, engineers, contractors, trade contractors and material suppliers); 
and  
o External stakeholders, including private partners such as local residents, 
landowners, environmentalists, and archaeologists and public partners such 
as regulatory agencies, and local and national government”.  
 
There are two major features for stakeholders which are: 
o Being interested in the actions taken by the organizations 
o Being able to influence the organization (Savage et al. 1991) 
 
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), there are three important perspectives 
the stakeholder theory is based on; which are as follows: 
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o Normative; which means that the stakeholders are institutions or individuals 
having a fundamental interest in the corporate activity. According to 
Donaldson and Preston (1995), the normative perspective considers the 
stakeholder theory “rooted in norms and traditions”. 
o Instrumental; which verify whether the institutions goals are achieved by 
paying more attention to stakeholders and relationships among them. 
According to Crane and Livesey (2003), the instrumental form of stakeholder 
relationship is usually a single way of communication that does not give voice 
to stakeholders.  
o Descriptive; meaning that “it describes the corporation as a constellation of 
cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value”. In other 
words, it describes what the project is and defines the project stakeholders. 
Amaeshi (2010) argues that it shows that theory goes in parallel with the 
reality without being neither judgmental nor prescriptive. 
o Donaldson and Preston (1995) and Freeman (1984) point out that the 
normative aspect is considered as the “core” of the stakeholder theory. 
Accordingly, they suggest considering the three aspects as nested, this is 
illustrated in figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18. Stakeholder aspects 
However, Henjewele et al. (2013) argues that the aforementioned paradigms are 
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managers are the ones who play a role in identifying the stakeholders. Amaeshi 
(2010) points out that this view is emerging from “the dependency on the centrality 
of manager’s perceptions in stakeholder-related decisions”.  Mitchell, Agle and 
Wood (1997) and Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfield (1999) confirm that this 
managerialistic view considers the stakeholder salience as the ability of 
stakeholders to influence managers’ decisions. Henjewele was even more forthright 
and advocated for his view by explaining that the perspectives of the stakeholder 
theory suggested by Freeman (1984) and Donaldson and Preston (1995), which is 
focusing only on managers had the following limitations: 
o Managers are considered the center of the stakeholder theory. 
Consequently, managers were not developing new managerial/strategic 
directions (Freeman and Mcvea 2005).  
o Managers are considered as autonomous actors. Nevertheless, Freeman 
and Mcvea (2005) points out that the common and shared interests should 
be taken into account.   
o Perceptions of managers are valued more than the wider social system’s 
influence (Amaeshi 2010).  
o On a separate note, Mitchell et al. (1997) offered a holistic study explaining 
the three major features characterizing stakeholders as follows:   
o Power  
o Legitimacy  
o Urgency  
 
2.4.3 Stakeholders power in PPP projects 
Eesly and Lenox (2006) defines stakeholder power as the control of critical 
resources having an influence on the project. For instance, in PPP projects, the 
public partner chooses to transfer partial or full control over the project to the private 
partner which increases the power of the private partner in such case (Schepper et 
al. 2014). In defining the stakeholders’ power, Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
highlighted an interesting observation: there should be a clear difference between 
“influencers” and “stakeholders”. Some stakeholders have both “stakes” and 
“influence” on the project. Nevertheless, some “stakeholders” have no “influence” 
and some “influencers” have no “stakes” (Donaldson and Preston 1995). On a 
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separate note, Schepper et al. (2014) outlines an important issue in the case of PPP 
projects: giving more power to the private partner in PPP projects; on the contrary 
to the case in a traditional project means a shift in the power position which may 
lead to an alternated assessment of the power relationships in the same 
environment. For instance, in the case of more power given to the private partner in 
PPP projects, the private sector can attribute more attention and importance to 
investors than the attention that the public sector could attribute in case the latter 
had more control over the project. Furthermore, Hodge (2010) argues that in PPP 
projects, with the private partner having more control over the project, there will be 
more pro-active involvement of shareholders. This is due to the fact the focus of the 
public sector is different than the focus of the private sector. The private sector’s 
aim is to increase its profit or cash flow while the public sector’s objective is to 
maximize the social benefit.  
 
2.4.4 Stakeholders legitimacy in PPP projects 
There is some debate in the existing literature regarding the definition of 
stakeholders’ legitimacy in PPP projects. Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, definitions. Mitchell et al. (1997) confirms Suchman’s definition. On the other 
hand, Phillips (2003) argues that Suchman’s definition lacks precision within the 
stakeholder literature and proposes to define stakeholder legitimacy based on 
contractual relationships or relationships that are based on general norms, values 
and beliefs. Accordingly, Phillips classifies stakeholders into: normative, derivative 
and non-stakeholders. Normative stakeholders are “those stakeholders to whom 
the organization has a moral obligation.” Derivative stakeholders are the ones 
having an effect on the organization in addition to its normative stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, Phillips argues that the legitimacy of the stakeholders is more of a 
static characteristic.  
 
2.4.5 Stakeholder urgency in PPP projects  
Mitchell et al. (1997) defines urgency as the degree to which stakeholder claims call 
for immediate attention. The urgency includes two important aspects which are 
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“time sensitivity” expressed by the extent to which a delayed response is 
unacceptable to the stakeholder and “criticality” expressed by the importance of the 
claim (Mitchell et al. 1997). Rowley and Moldoveanu (2014) explains that in the case 
of PPP projects, the fact that the project is owned by the public partner while it is 
realized and operated by the private partner makes specifying the stakeholder that 
a certain claim targets more challenging. Schepper et al. (2014) gave a robust 
example to such case dilemma: if there is a claim that a PPP project is not-
complying with the environmental regulations, both the public and private partners 
may be responsible for that but in different aspects. For instance, based on the 
contract terms and conditions, the public partner may be responsible for the choice 
of the materials while the private partner may be responsible for the noise levels 
during construction works.  
 
2.4.6 Limitations in studies about stakeholder analysis and engagement  
Based on a study performed by Mok et al. (2014), table 7 shows scholars’ 
contribution to stakeholders-related publications from 1997 and until 2014. Most of 
the research and efforts were deployed in the domain of stakeholders’ analysis 
methods and engagement (21% and 28% respectively of the total publications in 
this domain) while only 18% of the publications were studying the stakeholders 
interests and influences.  
Table 6. Scholars' contribution to stakeholders-related publications  
 
Source: Mok et al. (2014) 
 
PPP projects are different in their nature from traditional projects. In traditional 
projects, the project stakeholders and their responsibility is clearly defined and not 
questionable. This is not the case in PPP projects. In PPP projects, on the other 
hand, there exists a much higher stakeholder complexity due to the number of 
stakeholders and the relationships among them (Schepper et al.  2014). Moreover, 
Schepper et al. (2014) argues that in a PPP project, the private partner enters into 
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a contract with the private partner for the latter to design, build, finance and operate 
the project. However, in the case of a traditional project, “the government unbundles 
these phases and contracts them separately to other private contractors”.   
 
According to Schepper et al. (2014), proper stakeholder management, the 
identification and classification of all stakeholders concern is indispensable to 
ensure the PPP project’s success especially in the early set-up phase. Nevertheless 
and despite the importance of stakeholder analysis and stakeholder engagement, 
there exist various limitations and gaps in the literature regarding these concepts 
(Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida 2014, Jepsen and Eskerod 2009, Littau, et al. 2010, 
Pacheco and Garcia 2012, Yang, et al. 2009).  Achterkamp and Vos (2008) argue 
that the research examining the importance of stakeholder management and 
involvement in traditional construction projects is limited, even less so for PPP 
projects.   
 
Jones and Fleming (2003), Yang et al. (2009) and Amaeshi (2010) specify that the 
general stakeholders’ literature and specifically the stakeholder literature related to 
the Construction Industry (CI) suffer several gaps. Such gaps are present in the 
research related to methods and tools used to identify stakeholders, the effect that 
stakeholders have on the project and how changes can affect stakeholders. 
According to Henjewele et al. (2013), the literature related to stakeholders in the 
Construction Industry did not tackle procedures used to manage the relationships 
between different stakeholders throughout the lifecycle of the construction project 
and which are crucial for its success.  
 
Ng et al. (2012) argues that research papers and studies have not studied well 
enough and did not cover the stakeholder analysis during the initial feasibility stage 
of the project. Nevertheless, according to Keong, et al. (1997), this step is crucial to 
determine the success or failure of the project.  
According to Henjewele et al. (2013), both the private and public partners took 
stakeholders and stakeholders management from a narrow perspective. El-Gohary 
et al. (2006) and Rwelamila et al. (2014) argue that such underestimation of the 
stakeholders’ effect and impact on the success of the project led to the failure of 
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several previous PPP projects. Henjewele et al. (2013) point outs that current 
stakeholders’ models are inadequate for PPP projects.  
 
Schepper et al. (2014) confirms that to date, no PPP research has addressed the 
concept of identifying, mapping, processing and controlling of stakeholders in PPP 
projects. In fact, Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida (2014) classified the gaps in the 
following areas of literature: “relevance, dynamic and emergence”. According to 
Schepper et al. (2014), no research primarily described the dynamics of 
stakeholders in an analytical way. Consequently, there are no clear paths to a 
solution or a way to manage stakeholders. Nevertheless, El- Gohary et al. (2006) 
deployed considerable efforts in discussing stakeholders’ involvement in PPP 
infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, El-Gohary et al. (2006) focused more on the 
“public” or “end-users” as stakeholders without putting much emphasis on the 
“public partner, also known as the principal” and the “private partner, also known as 
the agent”. In fact, Smith et al. (2018) identified a gap in the knowledge in this area 
especially regarding the “agency problems” related to “conflicting interests, self-
interest and rationality, asymmetric information, uncertainty and risk behaviour”.  
 
Regarding the relevance of the stakeholders to the project, it is admitted that there 
were efforts previously deployed in order to have a clear identification, classification, 
categorization and analysis of behavior for stakeholders in various projects 
(Crawford 2005, Cummings and Doh 2000, Mitchell, et al. 1997, Savage, et al. 
1991). However, Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida (2014) argues that those previous 
studies lack a proper way of identification of stakeholders along with their interests. 
Concerning the dynamic nature of the stakeholders’ relationships; according to 
Eskerod and Vaagaasar (2012), the stakeholder analysis and engagement are a 
“dynamic” process in the project’s lifetime. This fact is often overlooked in several 
projects and was thus not thoroughly covered in literature. Thirdly, Missonier and 
Loufrani-Fedida (2014) argues that several researches have studied the “resultant” 
of the relationship between different stakeholders. However, “the co-evolution of the 
stakeholder identity and the project over time” has not been addressed. Such 
evolution constitutes the “emergent effects of stakeholder networks”. Pacheo and 
Garcia (2012) argues that the evolving of the stakeholders throughout the project’s 
lifetime is “understudied”.  
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Pouloudi, et al. (2004) argues that the definition of stakeholders includes both 
individuals and institutions that are affected by the project, meaning that there are 
human and non-human. Nevertheless, the analysis of stakeholders only included 
human stakeholders without paying much attention to non-human stakeholders. 
Since the introduction of the concept of stakeholders in 1984, the only concentration 
was on the mutual relationship between the stakeholders and the organization 
(Missonier & Loufrani-Fedida 2014). However, Rowley (1997) argued that in 
studying such relationship, stakeholders shall not be treated together as one set; 
they shall be treated as a “network” where the multiple and interrelated relationships 
between stakeholders are studied instead of the “dyadic” perspective. Schepper et 
al. (2014) argues that only limited resources have studied stakeholders aspects 
throughout all its life cycle phases, starting from the initiation phase, operational 
phase and coming to the phase starting after the contract ends.  
 
2.4.7 Changing the “PPP” nomenclature (introducing a 4th P) 
According to Schepper et al. (2014), there are at least two main organizations 
involved as stakeholders In PPP projects which are: the public sector and the private 
sector, being involved in the project as a “SPV” (Special Purpose Vehicle). 
Rwelamila et al. (2014) argues that in PPP projects, the public sector is recognized 
as a crucial player in the partnership while the “general public” is often neglected 
and not taken into account. Consequently, the general public suffers a lack of trust 
in regard to the effectiveness of the PPP projects (Henjewele et al. 2013) (Shaoul 
2005). According to Henjewele et al. (2013, p.211), “for the partnership to work there 
should be a nurtured trust between the demand and supply sides, which is built on 
the understanding that both parties work towards a common goal”. 
 
2.4.8 Instances showing the power of the general public in PPPs (Failure and 
success stories involving the general public) 
El-Gohary et al. (2006) offered one of few studies completely concerned with the 
stakeholder management for PPP projects. In their study, el-Gohary et al. (2006) 
argues that the major cause of failure of many PPP projects is the “public 
opposition”. There were evidence to support this supposition. For instance, as a 
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result of public opposition to the involvement of the private partner in PPP 
hazardous waste disposal projects in the United States, such projects had only a 
three percent chance of success (Ibitayo 2002). This was supporting Abdul-Aziz’s 
studies (2001) explaining that Malaysia failed in privatizing its sewer system 
because of public opposition as such transfer to the private partner occurred without 
informing the public which was considered as “a lack of transparency”. The public 
opposition’s strength reached a point that the government was obliged to re-buy the 
sewer system. El-Gohary et al. (2006) argues that such failure were mainly due to 
the lack of education of the public regarding the concept of PPP. Moreover, no 
detailed information was provided to the public. According to Henjewele et al. 
(2013), in West Newcastle, in Ireland, a public private partnership was established 
in order to clear slum areas and to develop education action zones (EAZ). 
Unfortunately, such partnership failed because what was intended to be an 
economic transformation ended up by being a partnership that excludes the 
community. 
 
Monbiot (2000) illustrated another case indicating the extent of the power of the 
general public. It is the Skye Bridge in Scotland. It was a BOOT contract signed in 
1991. The scope of work of the Private Partner consisted of building a toll bridge 
reaching the Isle of Skye off the west coast of Scotland. The bridge was supposed 
to become toll free within 17 years of its operation. Nevertheless, the toll price was 
high which made the public use the ferry instead of the bridge. Consequently, the 
concession period which was originally accounted for around 17 years had to 
become longer to overcome the losses. Furthermore, there was another public 
protest against the design of the bridge which led to the application of discounted 
tolls starting from 1998. Afterwards, the bridge became toll-free before the 
anticipated concession period which led to an early end of the partnership.  
De Lemos, et al. (2004) and De Sousa (2012) point out to another PPP project 
illustrating the power of the general public. It is the Lusponte concession in Lisbon 
Portugal. The private partner’s role was to design, construct, finance, operate and 
maintain the new Vasco Da Gama Bridge in addition to operate and maintain the 
existing bridge to Lusoponte. The project’s initial cost was € 850 million. The bridge 
was supposed to be a toll bridge with the concession duration to end on 14 March 
2028 or at a total traffic flow of 2,250 million vehicles, whichever comes earlier. 
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However, some internal disputes, it was agreed that the concession duration will be 
changed to end on 24 March 2030, two years after the planned concession end 
irrespective of the traffic flow. This led to an increase in the tolls imposed on the 
public. On 24 June 1994, large protests took place to the extent that the bridge was 
blocked by trucks carrying sand. Such huge reaction made the government annul 
the tolls and make taxpayers bear the difference. All of these issues led to various 
renegotiations and compensations reaching €408 million. 
 
On the other hand, Henjewele et al. (2013) illustrates a successful example of 
partnership between the private and the public sectors in Sao Paulo in the domain 
of education remodelling as all the stakeholders’ objectives and interests were taken 
into consideration in a way that all the objectives continue to be met even after the 
private sector is disengaged.  
 
Furthermore, another successful example of partnerships is the “sustainable school 
design to improve learning” in Bristol. It is an educational ten year partnership 
aiming to establishing four schools in poor areas between 2007 and 2009. The 
second phase of the project consisted of establishing nine more secondary schools 
and two primary schools. The aim of the project was to establish new better schools 
with enhanced education, safety and facilities. Before the start of the work, Local 
Educational Partnership (LEP) team had several meetings with the parents, 
teachers and students “so that the schools would be fit for purpose” and in order to 
know the exact requests of the “users”. The results were that the parents accepted 
to send their children to these new schools. The statistics showed the safety 
performance (students feeling safe) increasing from 30 to 87 percent. The 
educational level of students improved by 15 percent and the percentage of content 
of students going to these schools increased from 43 percent to 77 percent.  
 
2.4.9 Importance of stakeholders involvement 
As it was discussed in the previous sections, there are different concepts associated 
with stakeholders when it comes to their relationship to projects. There is a 
difference between “stakeholder management”, “stakeholder analysis” and 
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“stakeholder engagement” (Missonier & Loufrani-Fedida 2014); also known as 
“Stakeholder Involvement” (El-Gohary et al. 2006). 
 
Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida (2014) have argued that it has been concluded 
based on several studies that a project failure is not attributable to wrong project 
management practices but is rather due to “inappropriate social interactions 
between project stakeholders”. In fact, Schepper et al. (2014) confirms that one of 
the causes of the lack of success of PPP projects is due to the presence of a “gap 
between different stakeholders involved in PPPs on the desired process or outcome 
of the project” which is caused by improper stakeholder management. Stakeholder 
Management (SM) can be done by taking the stakeholders’ concerns into 
consideration and attempting to develop and maintain strong relationship between 
stakeholders (Mok et al. 2014). Pouloudi (1999) argues that co-operation and 
mutual trust between any institution and its stakeholders will decrease contracting 
costs and will result in “more efficient transactions”.  
 
El Gohary et al. (2006) explains that in several PPP projects, the public is only 
considered as end customers who will pay the tariffs associated with the project 
which make them feel marginalized to the extent that they do not become involved 
at all in the project and are just outsiders. Furthermore, Rwelamila et al. (2014) 
argues that stakeholders’ management and involvement issues especially the 
marginalization of the public are one of the most critical factors increasing the 
complexity of PPP projects.  
 
Henjewele et al. (2013) argues that in order to ensure the success of the PPP 
projects, the public sector, the private sector and the public should be involved.  
Stakeholder engagement means involving and building relationships with different 
stakeholders as early as possible in the project’s lifetime (Missonier and Loufrani-
Fedida 2014). Similarly to the concept of stakeholder engagement, el-Gohary et al. 
(2006) discussed the concept of “Stakeholder Involvement” (SI). They argue that 
the concept of “Public involvement” is now being replaced by the concept 
“Stakeholder involvement”. In their research, El-Gohary et al. (2006) discusses the 
fact that “stakeholders” primarily mean “the general public” not the “public partner”. 
They argue that stakeholders should be involved in the project starting from the 
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planning and design phase; where they should be part of the decision-making 
process and until the construction phase. The involvement of the public in the design 
process will be a 2-way process where the public feedbacks must be obtained. 
Nevertheless, the involvement of the public in the construction process is only a 
one-way process aiming to transferring information and knowledge to the public 
such as the sequence of work, the road closures, etc. Nevertheless, El-Gohary et 
al. (2006) never provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion they 
reached regarding “stakeholders” being mainly “the general public” instead of the 
“public partner”.  
 
Henjewele et al. (2013) argues that based on a study in the UK, getting early 
feedback from the stakeholders can help avoiding doing many changes afterwards 
during the project’s lifetime which can reduce cost overruns and poor VFM. It was 
also proved that PFI projects that paid attention to public needs resulted in less 
changes during operation.  
In an attempt to decrease the debate and in order to reach unanimity regarding the 
PPP project stakeholders, Zhang (2012) and Kumaraswamy et al. (2015) suggested 
introducing a 4th P (People) “in order to cement the relationships with a focus on 
sustainable overall value to the end user and community in specific disaster 
management scenarios”. Kumaraswamy et al. (2015) point out that adding the 
People/Public to the equation will provide the “missing link” as it will help in always 
responding to people’s needs throughout the project. The long life span, complex 
nature and large magnitude of the PPP project need “ex ante” inputs from the 
projects end users. The introduction of the “public-private-people” partnership was 
previously studied by Ahmed and Ali (2006) for Solid Waste Management (SWM) 
in Bangladesh and by Majamaa (2008) by involving the public in PPP-based urban 
development processes. Furthermore, Kumaraswamy et al. (2015) studied such 
partnership specifically in disaster management for PPP projects and for a general 
scenario. In disaster management, Kumaraswamy et al. (2015) considered the 
fourth “P” as local communities and NGOs in addition to professional bodies, 
academia and media. These groups usually can collaborate with the public and 
private partners in case any disaster happens. Such “social infrastructure” is of 
utmost importance in post-disaster reconstruction (Zhang 2012) and in risk 
management. Kumaraswamy et al. (2015) illustrated this issue by pointing out to 
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the 8.0 Richter scale earthquake in Schuan Province, China on 12 May 2008 
causing tens of thousands of deaths. During this disaster, the importance of the 
local communities assisting both the private and public partners to rebuild its 
infrastructure and overcome the damages was very clear. Kumaraswamy et al. 
(2015) reached the conclusion of the necessity of involving people in PPP projects, 
arguing that in light of the complex nature of PPP projects and with the disputes that 
may arise between the private and public, people will act as the “cementing agent” 
or “the link” connecting the public to the private partner. It will be in the project’s 
benefit to engage the general public as early as possible in the project in order to 
unify the goals, objectives and benefits of all the stakeholders as marginalizing the 
general public could lead to detrimental results. 
 
2.4.10 How are Risk Management and Stakeholder Management related? 
The relationship between risk management and stakeholder management will be 
explained in this section. Valipour et al. (2016) argues that there are several barriers 
that may prevent the implementation of a proper risk allocation such as the ability 
of both parties to manage the risks and “the attitude of stakeholders towards shared 
responsibility” (Iqbal, et al. 2015) and risk (Lam et al. 2007,  Zhang, et al. 2002, 
Tserng, et al. 2014). Furthermore, poor stakeholder management causing problems 
in cooperation, teamwork, negotiation and trust is a major barrier to risk allocation 
(Valipour, et al. 2014). Xu et al. (2010) points out that recognizing the barriers to 
proper risk allocation in PPP projects will help in achieving better risk allocation. 
  
As it has been shown throughout this section concerning stakeholders and their 
presence in PPP projects, the quality of the relationship between public and private 
sector on one side and the end users on the other side has been shown to be a key 
contributor to the success of a PPP project. In fact, the real case projects that were 
discussed can be considered as clear evidence to support the following statement 
“Many of the risks affecting PPP projects arise due to poor management of 
stakeholders”. Therefore, analyzing the risks caused by inadequate management 
of stakeholders and determining their effect on PPP projects compared to their 
effect on traditional projects is a way of mitigation of a significant number of risks 
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affecting PPP projects which is step towards better Risk Management for PPP 
projects.  
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of PPP history and start along with the two 
major PPP types: contractual and institutionalized. Furthermore, the major types of 
contractual PPP were explained which are detailed in what-so-called “PPP 
spectrum”. The categorization of PPP in the PPP spectrum is based on the degree 
of the public and private sector involvement and based on the extent of risk 
allocation between different parties. The stages of PPP are also explained. Then, 
an overview of PPP around the world is presented along with associated failure and 
success stories. From these stories, it is confirmed that managing risks associated 
with PPP projects is of utmost importance in order to ensure the success of PPP 
projects. Also, due to the fact that PPP projects have a long lifetime, there will be a 
higher chance of problems/changes arising, many of which will be of unanticipated 
nature. Therefore, relying on the established relationships is needed to maintain the 
contractual bond. The quality of the relationship between public and private sector 
has been shown to be a key contributor to the success of a PPP project. This 
highlights the importance of stakeholder management in PPP projects.  
Consequently, analyzing the risks caused by inadequate management of 
stakeholders and determining their effect on PPP projects’ completion time 
compared to their effect on traditional projects is a way of mitigation of a significant 
number of risks affecting PPP projects which is a step towards better risk 
management for PPP projects.   
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Chapter 3– Research Strategy and Methodology 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction  
Remenyi et al. (1998) explored the fact that there are three important questions that 
should be considered by researches and which are: 
1. What to research? 
2. How to research? 
3. Why research? 
 
The answer to the first question is mostly related to the researcher’s own academic 
interests. However, the answers to the second and third questions are interrelated. 
The “how of research” is the research methodology. The methodology is a summary 
for the research process and is the way the research will proceed. Choosing the 
methodology involves a deeper concept needing a philosophical solution and this is 
where the answer to the third question “Why research” comes.  
 
In order to build the methodology for any study, there should be a standpoint 
regarding the following seven terms: paradigm, theoretical framework, research 
approach, data collection, data analysis, ethics and validity (Chilisa and Kawulich 
2012).  
 
Chilisa and Kawulich (2012) performed a robust study regarding how to select a 
research approach. In this regard, they suggested that in order to better understand 
each of the aforementioned terms, some questions should be asked as follows: 
• Paradigm: What is the paradigm that is informing the methodology? 
• Theoretical framework: What are the theories mostly affecting the 
following aspects of the research: 
o Research topic 
o Research questions 
o Literature review 
o Data collection techniques 
o Data analysis and interpretation 
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• Research approach: Based on the research questions, what research 
approach shall be adopted? 
• Data collection:  How to collect the data necessary for the study? What 
is the type of data that shall be collected?  
• Data analysis: How does the theory assist in the data analysis and 
interpretation? 
• Ethics: Based on the paradigm, theoretical framework, research 
approach, data collection and data analysis, what shall be the ethical 
considerations? 
• Validity: How can the research design, data collection and data 
analysis be verified to endure their reliability? 
 
Understanding those terms is the key to developing the methodology. Methodology 
is the area where the paradigm, theoretical framework, research approach and 
ethics meet. Figure 19 shows how it is important to place the specific methodology 
used in this research within those terms.  
 
Figure 19. Methodology as the convergence of 3 terms (Chilisa & Kawulich 2012) 
 
Creswell (2014) offers a more holistic assessment that aligns, to a great extent, with 
the views of Chilisa and Kawulich (2012). Nevertheless, instead of using the term 










Page 104 of 313 
 
according to him, represents the intersection between the philosophical worldviews, 
research designs ad research methods.  
 
Creswell (2014 p.5) defines the research approach as “the plan or proposal to 
conduct research, involves the intersection of philosophy, research designs and 
specific methods.” Creswell suggests the framework for research according to the 
illustration in figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. Framework for research (Creswell 2014) 
 
Accordingly, from both point of views presented, it is essential to place the 
methodology used in this research in the context of “all” research methodology and 
within the framework for research, which will be done in this chapter.  
 
This chapter will present justifications for adopting the research approach in light of 
the various philosophical perspectives. This chapter will also explore the 
experimental framework that based on which the modelling aspect of the research 
shall be performed. Artificial neural networks will be thoroughly discussed including 
their applications, strengths, weaknesses and the reasons they were selected for 
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3.2 Research approach 
There are three research approaches: 
o Qualitative 
o Quantitative 
o Mixed methods 
The qualitative technique is the open-ended information obtained through interviews 
while quantitative technique consists of closed-ended exact figures calculated from 
questionnaires. Both types of techniques are crucial to the research. In the domain 
of PPP projects, qualitative techniques are used to evaluate subjective risk 
elements of PPP projects that are not possible to quantify in terms of monetary 
values. On the other hand, quantitative technique is used to work on risks that were 
first identified and ranked through the qualitative approach (Boussabaine 2014).  
One of the major advantages of the mixed-method approach is the possibility of use 
of “triangulation” which consists of using various methods to examine the same 
phenomenon.  
 
However, Creswell (2014, p.3) brings an interesting side to that topic by both 
agreeing on the fact that qualitative and quantitative approaches are not “rigid, 
distinct categories, polar opposites or dichotomies. Instead they represent different 
ends on a continuum” while the mixed methods research is located in the middle of 
this range as it equally includes essentials of both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. Based on the literature, the major research approaches can be defined 
as follows: 
o Qualitative research: It is an approach used for exploring and studying the 
meanings that groups or individuals attribute to a social or human problem. 
In order to conduct a qualitative research, first the data is collected, and 
interpretation is performed for the collected data. The outcome is a report 
characterized by its flexible nature (Creswell 2014).  
o Quantitative research: It is an approach used for examining the 
relationships between different variables, which are measured numerically. 
The obtained data is analyzed using statistical methods. Usually the final 
report is structured by consisting of an introduction, literature review, method, 
results and discussion. Researchers adopting the quantitative methods 
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should generally develop assumptions, avoid bias, be open to alternative 
solutions and explanations and be able to replicate the findings (Creswell 
2014). 
o Mixed methods research: It is an approach consisting of collecting both 
quantitative and qualitative data and combining them together. Researchers 
adopting the mixed method research ensure that the problem is approached 
equally from both views in order to have a better understanding for the 
studied problem (Creswell 2014).  
 
3.2.1 Adopted research approach in this study 
According to Creswell (2014), a study can be more qualitative than quantitative and 
vice versa. Accordingly, and based on the above explanations and justifications, the 
adopted research approach of this study is mainly a quantitative research approach 
with some elements of qualitative approach. As it was previously stated in Chapter 
one: Introduction, the research started by defining the problem statement, aim and 
objectives of the research and the research questions. Then a thorough exploration 
and critique of the existing literature review on failure and success stories of PPP 
projects, risk management and stakeholder management in PPP projects was 
conducted. The literature review analyzed and made explicit the gaps in the 
knowledge which clarified the initial aim and objectives. An experimental approach 
is then designed in order to collect the data from real projects and develop the 
mathematical approach modelling the risks associated with construction and poor 
stakeholder management in a comparative analysis between PPP and traditional 
projects. The final section includes conclusions, recommendations and future work. 
The adopted research approach is illustrated in Figure 21.  
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Figure 21. Adopted research approach 
  
3.3 Developing the philosophical perspective 
Developing the philosophical perspective was explored and discussed by Burrell 
and Morgan in 1979. The dimensions of the philosophical perspective are illustrated 
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Figure 22. Dimensions of philosophical perspective 
 
In order to develop a philosophical perspective, the researcher should make the 
assumptions regarding two dimensions: the nature of society and the nature of 
science.  
 
The sociological dimension 
This dimension involves a choice between two opposing views of the society: the 
rational view; where the society is viewed as unified and cohesive which is the basis 
of modernism and the radical change perspective, which is the basis of the post 
modernism and which assumes that the society is in continuous conflict. The 
postmodernism lacked the analytical nature and thoughts were completely based 
on belief as humans were striving to free themselves “from the domination of 
societal structures” (Burell and Morgan 1979). The sociological dimension will not 
be the subject of this research as, in light of its nature, it is concerned with the 











rationally. Society is 
viewed as unified 
and cohesive.
Post modernism: 










Page 109 of 313 
 
The science dimension 
Holden and Lynch (2004) and Hussey and Hussey (1997) point out that this 
dimension includes two opposite approaches: subjective and objective. 
Nevertheless, there is no unanimity in the literature when it comes to the 
nomenclature of the two opposing approaches. For instance, Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, Richard and Andy (1991) names the approaches as “positivism” and 
“phenomenology” while Hughes and Sharrock (1997) name them as “positivism” 
and “interpretive alternative”.  
 
In this research, as most of the literature studies named the approaches as 
“subjective” and “objective”, this nomenclature will be used. Figure 23 shows a 
general comparison between both approaches.  
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3.3.1 Research paradigms 
Whether the research is approach is subjective or objective, the two approaches 
involve a set of core assumptions concerning the following aspects: 
o Ontology: what is the nature of reality?  
o Epistemology: how do we know what we know? What is the evidence?  
o Axiology: What do we believe is true? 
o Methodology: How should we study the world? 
 
According to Chilisa and Kawulich (2012), those four assumptions form the core of 
the philosophical paradigms. The paradigm is a shared world view that represents 
the beliefs and values in a discipline and that guides how problems are solved. The 
term “paradigm” was used by researchers such as Lincoln, Lynham and Guba 
(2011) and Mertens (2009). However, Creswell (2014) used the term “worldview” 
instead of the word “paradigm” and defined it as “a basic set of beliefs that guide 
action” which is similar to the definition of “paradigm” provided by Chilisa and 
Kawulich (2012), Lincoln, Lynham and Guba (2011) and Mertens (2009). Other 
researchers such as Crotty (1998) called them epistemologies and ontologies or 
broadly conceived research methodologies. In all cases, there was a unanimity on 
the definition of the terms among all researchers.  
 
Despite the fact that much debate in the existing literature is present regarding what 
paradigms/worldviews/beliefs bring to inquiry, researchers seem to agree that the 
major research paradigms that are widely discussed in the literature are the 
following: 
o Post-positivism  
o Constructivism 
o Transformative 
o Pragmatism  
 
Each one of the aforementioned paradigms has its own four core assumptions 
which are: ontology, epistemology, axiology and methodology. In this section, the 
major philosophical paradigms will be explored in order to justify the philosophical 
position of this research along with its own core assumptions.  
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3.3.1.1 Post-positivism 
Several literature sources use the words “positivism” and “post-positivism” 
interchangeably. Nevertheless, there exists some differences between “positivism” 
and “post-positivism”. Chilisa and Kawulich (2012) and Bodgan and Biklen (2003) 
agree on the fact that the term “positivism” was first used by Auguste Compte to 
reflect that knowledge is based on experience. Chilisa and Kawulich (2012) point 
out that “positivism is based upon the view that science is the only foundation for 
true knowledge”. Creswell (2014) draws on this concept and argues that the 
positivism paradigm is sometimes called the scientific method. Crotty (1998) uses 
the evidence presented by physicists Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr to provide 
a rebuttal to the positivism perspective by portraying the scientist as the person who 
builds knowledge instead of just observing the laws of nature. Accordingly, the post-
positivism appeared as a less stringent form of positivism in which the establishment 
of a theory, data collection that either supports or refutes the theory and additional 
tests should be conducted in order to determine the associated effects or outcomes 
(Creswell 2014). According to Chilisa and Kawulich (2012), the positivism/post-
positivism’s position about the four assumptions of this paradigm are:  
 
3.3.1.1.1 Ontology: what is the nature of reality?  
According to positivism, there is only one tangible and objective reality that does not 
change across time and setting (which is considered as naïve realism). The 
researcher’s role is to uncover such reality. On the other hand, according to post-
positivism, reality exists but because of the researcher’s limited human nature, 
reality can never be known perfectly.  
 
3.3.1.1.2 Epistemology: how do we know what we know? What is the evidence?  
Positivists believe that the right data gathering technique is a tool that ensures the 
production of absolute truth. These data gathering techniques are usually 
questionnaires, observations, tests and experiments. Post-positivists believe that 
absolute objectivity cannot be achieved.  
3.3.1.1.3 Axiology: What do we believe is true? 
Positivists believe that the scientific data gathering techniques should be used 
objectively. Post-positivists provided a rebuttal to this perspective by pointing out 
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that the hypothesis, theories and background of the researcher can have an 
influence on what is studied and observed.  
 
3.3.1.1.4 Methodology: How should we study the world? 
Both positivists and post-positivists adopt a quantitative methodology consisting of 
theories and ideas, measurement of variables, scientific data gathering techniques 
and experimental, quasi-experimental, correlational, comparative and quantitative 
research designs.  
 
3.3.1.2 Constructivism 
Chilisa and Kawulich (2012) and Creswell (2014) called constructivism 
“interpretivism”. The major characteristic distinguishing constructivism from post-
positivism is that in post-positivism, researchers start the study with a theory while 
in constructivism, a theory is generated as a research result. Lincoln et al. (2011), 
Mertens (2010) and Crotty (1998) developed robust studies on constructivism in 
which they agree on the fact that the goal of the research for a constructivist is to 
depend on the participants’ backgrounds and views on the studied situation that is 
why constructivists study the interaction process between individuals. According to 
Chilisa and Kawulich (2012), the constructivism’s position about the four 
assumptions of this paradigm are:  
 
3.3.1.2.1 Ontology: what is the nature of reality?  
Chilisa and Kawulich (2012) provided evidence to support the studies presented by 
Creswell (2003) and Mertens (2009) and which state that reality is mind dependent 
depending on how individuals are constructing them. This is a challenge to 
positivists’ point of view which assumes that there is only one tangible reality.  
 
3.3.1.2.2 Epistemology: how do we know what we know? What is the evidence?  
Since knowledge is mind depended, then it is totally subjective. Accordingly, stories 
prevailing in communities can be considered as a legitimate source of knowledge. 
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3.3.1.2.3 Axiology: What do we believe is true? 
Due to the fact that knowledge is mind depended and that knowledge is subjective, 
the researcher’s values will affect the chosen paradigm, topic, data collection, 
analysis methods and interpretation of the findings.  
 
3.3.1.2.4 Methodology: How should we study the world? 
According to Mertens (2009), constructivists do not establish research questions 
until the study starts. The research questions are open-ended. The research 
methodology is quantitative with research designs that include phenomenology, 
biography, case study and grounded theory (Creswell 2003).  
 
3.3.1.3 Transformative 
Creswell (2014) and Mertens (2010) stated that the transformative paradigm “holds 
that research inquiry needs to be intertwined with politics and a political change 
agenda to confront social oppression at whatever level it occurs”. Accordingly, 
issues such as oppression, suppression and alienation are the starting point of the 
study. In order to avoid such issue, participants take part in designing the research 
questions, collect data, perform data analysis and examine the results. According 
to Chilisa and Kawulich (2012), the transformative’s position about the four 
assumptions of this paradigm are:  
 
3.3.1.3.1 Ontology: what is the nature of reality?  
The transformative paradigm is based on the fact that reality is continuously 
changing and that it has multiple layers.  
 
3.3.1.3.2 Epistemology: how do we know what we know? What is the evidence?  
In the case of the transformative paradigm, knowledge is constructed from the 
participants’ frame of reference.  
3.3.1.3.3 Axiology: What do we believe is true? 
The transformative paradigm differs from the constructive paradigm in the fact that 
unlike the constructive paradigm where every opinion is correct, the transformative 
paradigm carries some correct views and other wrong views.  
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3.3.1.3.4 Methodology: How should we study the world? 
The transformative paradigm can be studied using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. The goal of the research is to replace false knowledge by correct one and 
empower people to transform society.  
 
3.3.1.4 Pragmatism 
According to Patton (1990), the major difference between pragmatism and post-
positivism lies in the fact that the former arises out of actions, situations and results 
while the latter depends on previous conditions. Rossman and Wilson (1985) 
argues that in pragmatism, the main emphasis is on the research problem rather 
than on the research method. According to the studies provided by Creswell (2014) 
and Cherryholmes (1992), the pragmatism’s position about the four assumptions of 
this paradigm are:  
 
3.3.1.4.1 Ontology: what is the nature of reality?  
There is no single reality for pragmatists. There is a freedom of research for 
researchers. Cherryholmes (1992) concluded that pragmatists believe that we need 
to stop asking questions about reality and the laws of nature.  
 
3.3.1.4.2 Epistemology: how do we know what we know? What is the evidence?  
Truth varies based on what is applicable at the time of research.  
 
3.3.1.4.3 Axiology: What do we believe is true? 
Pragmatists believe that the door is always open to multiple methods, different 
paradigms, different assumptions and different data collection techniques.  
 
3.3.1.4.4 Methodology: How should we study the world? 
Pragmatists believe that the best research approach for them is the mixed method 
approach as it includes equally quantitative and qualitative assumptions.  
 
3.3.2 Adopted philosophical position for this research 
Based on the aforementioned general background about the most popular and 
known research paradigms, and based on the problem statement as well as the 
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research aims and objectives specified in Chapter One, the adopted philosophical 
position that is appropriate for this research is post-positivist where the 
establishment of a theory, data collection and additional tests should be conducted 
in order to determine the associated effects or outcomes. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
The research design is different from the research approach. Denzin and Lincoln 
(2011) call research design “strategies of inquiry”. Creswell (2014) use the same 
terminology and defines the research design as “types of inquiry within qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed method approaches that provide specific directions for 
procedures in a research design”. Table 7 provides an overview of the various 
research design studies in previous literature sources.  
Table 7 : Various research designs 
 
Source: Creswell (2014) 
 
3.4.1 Adopted research design for this research 
As previously stated, the research approach is mainly quantitative approach with 
some elements of qualitative approach especially in the early stages of the 
research. Regarding the particular research design adopted within the quantitative 
scheme, this research follows a quasi-experimental approach. According to the 
Center of Innovation for Research and Teaching (CIRT), quasi-experimental and 
true experimental research designs both attempt to determine causal relationships 
by applying a condition to one group and comparing the outcome with a control 
group. A true experimental design is the basic standard in assessing causal 
relationship because it depends on the fact that subjects are randomly assigned to 
the groups to avoid bias and it controls all extraneous variables. Accordingly, the 
quasi-experimental research design is referred to as the experimental research 
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experimental research design offers over the purely experimental research design 
is that the former uses a broader and wider array of data collection techniques and 
statistical analyses than true experimental research. Meanwhile, the validity of 
quasi-experimental research design can always be improved by various methods 
that assist in decreasing bias and by using appropriate statistical analyses 
techniques. 
3.5 Research methods 
The research method includes the specific steps of data collection, data analysis 
and data interpretation (Creswell 2014).  
 
3.5.1 Research method adopted for this study 
3.5.1.1 Data pre-processing 
The collected data will have quality if it fits the purpose for which it was collected 
(Han, Kamber and Pei 2012). Before using the collected data, the data will undergo 
extensive steps of preparation. According to Pyle (1999), correct data preparation 
prepares both the data miner and the data. Preparing the data means the model is 
built right. Preparing the miner means the right model is built. Accordingly, pre-
processing the data will enable the modeler to fully understand the collected data. 
Furthermore, it is a crucial step ensuring the success of the model.  
 
The steps that will be followed for data pre-processing are expected to be as follows: 
3.5.1.1.1 Data cleaning 
According to Han et al. (2012), if there are any reasons that make the modeler 
believe that the data collected is “dirty”, it is unlikely for them to trust the results 
emerging from such data. Furthermore, “dirty” data will certainly lead to unreliable 
results. Accordingly, data cleaning is a crucial process performed by filling in 
missing values, smoothing “noisy” data (data with random errors), identifying or 
removing outliers (data falling outside a cluster of other data), and resolving 
inconsistencies.   
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3.5.1.1.2 Data integration 
Data integration is simply merging data from various databases after removing any 
conflicting information from those different sources. Meanwhile, Han et al. (2012) 
points out to the fact that data integration should be done carefully with the aim of 
avoiding redundancies and inconsistencies in the resulting dataset.  
 
3.5.1.1.3 Data transformation 
This is one of the most important steps in the data pre-processing operation. In this 
step, the data collected will be transformed or consolidated as a means to obtain 
more efficient results in the future and in order to make the patterns easier to 
understand.  
3.6 Ethical Consideration 
Data collection is one of the crucial steps in this research. The University of Salford 
has clear and specific requirements and standards concerning research involving 
human participants or sensitive data conducted by research degree candidates. 
One of the major steps is to apply for ethics approval from the relevant Ethics Panel 
before starting data collection and to be subjected to ethics panel´s scrunity.  
Accordingly, in this research and before commencing the data collection process, 
one of the crucial aspects to ensure was to carry out the research ethics in total 
compliance with the policy and approved requirements of the University of Salford. 
Furthermore, the researcher ensured the safety, privacy, dignity and wellbeing of 
participants for this research study.  
3.7 Artificial Neural Networks 
Boussabaine (1996) provided a simplistic but useful definition for Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANNs). He briefly defined ANNs as “systems that can learn”. In other 
words, when studying a particular problem, the Artificial Neural Network system can 
be trained based on a group of “input” and “output” data; it is based on such data 
that the Artificial Neural Network System can “learn”. Then, based on this training, 
the system can use what it “learnt” in order to predict new outcomes. This feature is 
what enables Artificial Neural Networks to be used in complicated problems in 
different disciplines. This section of the research provides an overview of ANN, its 
various applications in civil engineering and construction management in addition 
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to some advantages and limitations. This section also uses this explanation in order 
to provide the justification for using such system for this research.  
 
3.7.1 Background 
Boussabaine (1996) provided a robust study on ANNs and their use in construction 
management. He started by explaining that the ANNs are like the human brain and 
they are designed to operate in the same way. The human brain learns from 
experience and ANNs can do the same. Nevertheless, Boussabaine went back and 
questioned the ability of ANNs to function exactly like the human brain as this 
practically impossible despite the analogies between the way the human brain and 
ANNs function.  In a recent study, Waziri, Bala and Bustani (2017, p.50) defines 
ANNs as “computational mechanisms that have the ability to acquire, represent and 
compute function from one multivariate space of information to another given a set 
of data representing that function”. Figure 24 shows how biological and artificial 
operate and it illustrates the similarity in composition. 
 
Figure 24. Similarity in composition between biological and artificial neural cells (Bhokha & Ogunlana 
1999) 
 
3.7.2 Components of ANNs 
As the Artificial Neural Networks mimic the human brains, their components are 
named after the human brain’s components. ANNs consist of neurons (also named 
as cells, units or nodes) and synaptic transmissions with weight factors 
(Boussabaine 1996).  Usually, an ANN consists of a number of layers, typically three 
layers: (1) Input layer, (2) hidden layer, and (3) output layer. Each layer consists of 
a number of nodes. Each node in a given layer is connected to each node in the 
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next layer. Galkin (2002) points out that the node is considered as processing 
elements of the network. The nodes of the input layer and the nodes of the output 
layer are the nodes through which the communication with the outer world is 
established. The hidden layer, which is the middle layer, is the layer giving the 
“critical computational ability to the system”. The way each node is connected to the 
other units in the network is called “the pattern of connectivity” or “network topology” 
(Boussabaine, 1996). Gunaydin and Dogan (2004) and Rafiq, et al. (2001) provide 
further explanation to the hidden layer highlighting its importance. They point out 
that the main role of the hidden layer is to extract and memorize the useful features 
from the input layers in order to determine the values of the output layer. 
Nevertheless, nothing in the existing literature provides a way to choose the number 
of processing elements or nodes. The conclusion reached by Gunaydin and Dogan 
(2004), Shtub and Versano (1999), Rafiq et al. (2001), Setyawati et al. (2002) and 
Albino and Garavelli (1998) is the same in this regard. These researchers agreed 
on the fact that the only way to determine the optimum number of nodes especially 
for the hidden layer is trial as there is no rule to calculate it. Figure 25 illustrates the 
structure of a typical three-layer neural network system. 
 
Figure 25. The structure of a typical three-layer neural network system (Waziri et al. (2017) 
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3.7.3 How do neural networks work? 
The first attempt for a mathematical representation of a “node” was done in 1943 by 
the Neuro physiologist Warren McCulloch and the Logician Walter Pits (Galkin 
2002). Figure 26 illustrates the activities occurring at each neural network node.  
 
Figure 26. Activities occurring at each neural network node (Galkin 2002) 
 
Each node receives a number of inputs “I” (I1 to In). Each input has its 
corresponding weight factor “W” (W1 to Wn). The weight varies based on the 
relative importance of each input data and it represents “the strength of the 
connection”. Then, the node calculates the weighted sum I(1)W(1) + I(2)W(2) and 
generates an output value. This output value is then delivered to each node of the 
next layer following the same computational technique. This pattern continues for 
each node in each layer until reaching the final node situated in the output layer. At 
this stage, “the output value has reached its final destination” (Boussabaine 1996). 
Figure 27 illustrates how a typical ANN system works.  
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Figure 27. How a typical ANN system works (Boussabaine 1996) 
 
The basis of operation of Artificial Neural Networks depends on two important 
features: 
o Training and testing 
o Validating 
 
3.7.3.1 Training the system 
As it was previously stated in this section, training the system means making the 
system “learn”. There was unanimity among researchers regarding the classification 
of training techniques. According to Bailey and Thompson (1990), Masters (1993) 
and Boussabaine (1996), there are three main types of training: (1) supervised, (2) 
unsupervised, and (3) reinforcement learning. The selection of a specific training 
type depends on the available data as well as on the problem that is being solved. 
Below is an overview of each type of training:  
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3.7.3.1.1 Supervised training  
At the start of the training session, a target value is specified. During the training, 
the nodes in the input layer transmits the pattern to all nodes in the hidden layer 
where all the computations occur. Then, the output value is calculated for each node 
following the weighted average way explained earlier in this sub-sub-section (3.6.3). 
Each output node does its calculation and transmits it to the next output node until 
reaching the final output node where the final actual result is calculated. This 
process is called “feed-forward” (Boussabaine 1996). The final actual output result 
is compared to the target value previously specified by the trainer and the output 




Figure 28. Steps of training the system 
 
If the error is accepted, then, the training is complete. In case the error is not within 
the acceptable ranges, this means that further training is required. According to 
Masters (1993), the “Mean Square Error” (MSE) is the way of evaluating the 
performance of the model during the training process. In this case, the derivatives 
of the error with respect to the weights that were assigned are calculated by the 
output nodes and the result is sent backwards through the hidden nodes in the 
hidden layer. At this stage, each node in both the hidden layer(s) and in the output 
layer adjust their weights in order to conduct the corrections. This process is called 
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over again following the normal feed-forward process explained earlier. The training 
can be done as many times as it is needed until the desired result is obtained, in 
other words, until obtaining a low MSE. At this stage, the training of the system is 
considered complete. When the training of the system is complete, this means that 
the system can be used “to predict the outcome of an input not previously seen by 
the ANN” (Boussabaine 1996) and this is the major aim of using ANNs. The 
supervised training is the type of training used in this research. According to Waziri 
et al. (2017), the backpropagation (BP) training algorithm is the most popular and 
the most used training technique used in ANNs.  
 
3.7.3.1.2 Unsupervised training  
In this type of training, the output target value is not specified. Instead, the training 
method changes the weights using the correlation between the various inputs and 
groups them in a way that similar inputs belonging to the same group will produce 
similar outputs (Boussabaine 1996).  
 
3.7.3.1.3 Reinforcement learning 
In this type of training, a group of inputs is specified in addition to only a grade as 
output (Boussabaine 1996).  
 
Generally, to obtain good and accurate results, it is advised to have a large number 
of training samples. Nevertheless, there is no consensus within the literature on 
what represents a “large” amount of data in order to be able to use Artificial Neural 
Networks. The end of the training phase is an introduction for the start of the testing 
phase. 
 
3.7.3.2 Validating the system 
According to Moody (1991) and Boussabaine (1996), the first step in the validation 
process is to divide the data into training (learning set) which was explained in the 
previous section and test set. Moody (1991) added another step which is performing 
several independent divisions or “splits” and then averaging the results in order to 
determine an overall performance estimate for the whole system. Nevertheless, 
Boussabaine and Cheetham (1995) discussed a different facet regarding the error 
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calculated on the training set, also known as the Root Mean Square error (RMS). A 
low RMS does not always mean that the training system is adequate. Sometimes, 
in case the system has too many nodes, too many hidden layers, the system can 
start memorizing the data and learning “irrelevant details about the individual 
samples rather than the basic structure of the data presented to it”. This problem is 
known as “over-fitting”. In this case, a large difference occurs between the training 
error and the testing error. Based on the previous explanation, Boussabaine and 
Cheetham (1995) provided evidence for the fact that RMS cannot differentiate 
between minor and serious errors. Masters (1992) discussed the same problem and 
suggested extensive solutions in order to avoid the drastic results that the RMS can 
generate. He argued that the absolute error, maximum absolute error and median 
error statistical measures are more robust and reliable than measures based on the 
RMS.   
 
3.7.4 Applications of ANNs in civil engineering and in construction 
management 
The literature review shows that the Artificial Neural Networks have been widely 
used in various domains (Boussabaine 1996) (Asakawa and Takagi 1994) (Widrow, 
et al. 1994). Widrow et al. (1994) provided evidence for such statement by 
explaining that ANNs have been used by banks in order to study the patterns of 
credit card usage for instance, in order to help them to predict any fraudulent 
transactions. Furthermore, ANNs are used by investment and financial firms a way 
to determine financial forecasting. Also, ANNs are used in the marketing domain by 
forecasting the potentially good prospected customers. The purpose in this 
research, since it is conducted in the context of the construction management, is to 
provide an overview of the applications of ANNs in the domain of construction 
management. Waziri et al. (2017) argues that ANNs have not been used in the 
domain of construction engineering until 1989 and ever since, they have been 
successfully used to solve several problems in engineering and management. Jain 
and Pathak (2014) points out that the first journal article on the use of artificial neural 
networks in the domain of civil/structural engineering was published by Adeli and 
Yeh (1989).  
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3.7.4.1 Cost estimation 
According to Boussabaine (1996), ANNs started to be used in the domain of 
construction management from the early nineties. ANNs were widely used in the 
domain of cost estimation in construction management. For instance, according to 
Moselhi, Hegazy and Fazio (1991), an ANN model was developed to estimate the 
optimum markup in different bidding situations. The input layer for the model 
included different nodes representing the following: 
o The different competitors 
o The mean of the distribution of the ratio of the competitor’s bid prices 
compared to the estimated costs by the contractors based on previous 
projects 
o The standard deviation of the distribution of the ratio of the competitor’s bid 
prices compared to the estimated costs by the contractors based on previous 
projects 
 
The desired output (the optimum markup in different bidding situations) was 
determined based on three bidding strategy models and based on ten bid situations 
in training. Moselhi et al. (1991) argue that the ANN model delivered good results. 
Nevertheless, Boussabaine (1996) provided a rebuttal to Moselhi et al.’s (1991) 
perspective by highlighting that due to the fact that data sample used for training is 
relatively small, they may have been an overfitting problem. However, no more 
evidence was presented by Boussabaine (1996) to support his point of view.  
 
Williams (1994) developed another ANN model that helps in predicting the changes 
in construction cost index. The input layer of the model consisted of nodes 
representing the recent trends, the prime lending rate, housing starts and the month 
of the year. The output of the model was compared to a forecast determined by 
linear regression model. Nevertheless, the model gave higher errors than the errors 
obtained by the statistical methods. This in fact contradicts what is stated in other 
literature sources regarding the fact that ANN have the ability of delivering better 
solutions than the conventional statistical methods. Williams (1994) was even more 
forthright and advocated for the results of his model by stating that the failure to his 
model may be caused by a bad selection and design of input data or a bad choice 
of the network topology. Geiger, Knoblach and Backes (1998) developed an ANN 
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to predict the cost of metal sheets from direct material cost and cost of supplied 
parts. The model achieved an overall accuracy ranging from 5% to 15%. Setyawati 
et al. (2002) developed an ANN model in order to estimate the costs associated with 
institutional buildings. The developed model delivered an accuracy of 16%. Sodikov 
(2005) developed an ANN model estimating the total cost of highway projects. 
Based on the developed model, he concluded that ANN is an appropriate tool for 
solving complex problems as it can easily adapt to imprecise data. Yadav, Vyas and 
Vyas (2016) developed a cost estimation ANN model that predicts structural cost of 
residential buildings. Data covering a time span of twenty-three years was collected 
from bill of quantities for training and testing of networks. The data collected 
included several factors such as the cost of cement, sand, steel, aggregates, 
mason, skilled and non-skilled labour.  
 
3.7.4.2 Construction scheduling 
Flood (1989) described the development of an ANN model that was used for 
optimizing the sequence of construction activities in order to decrease the 
production time. The input layer consisted of several nodes representing the time 
spent for each activity and the output is the production of an optimum job sequence. 
Nevertheless, the model showed its limitations in case variance occurs between the 
different patterns. In 1997, Adeli and Karim developed an ANN model in order to 
solve the construction duration of highways. Waziri et al. (2017) stated that this 
method was satisfactory as it provided a basis on which more flexible and accurate 
scheduling systems can be developed. In 1999, Bhokha and Ogunlana developed 
an ANN model predicting the construction duration of high rise buildings in the pre-
design stage. The network has the ability to forecast the construction duration at the 
pre-design stage with an average error of 13.6%.  Yahia, Hosny and Razik (2011) 
employed ANN to develop an ANN model predicting the time contingency that 
should be added to the scheduled project completion time. Golizadeh et al. (2016) 
developed another ANN model which output was to determine the duration of major 
activities relating to the structural elements of concrete frame buildings. 
 
3.7.4.3 Decision making 
Boussabaine (1996) suggested that the use of ANN in the domain of decision making 
will be of great benefit as several managers take decisions based on incomplete 
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knowledge obtained, most of the time, through probability and regression techniques. 
Due to the fact that ANN have the ability to learn and generate solutions from 
incomplete data, ANN can be a useful tool assisting users and managers in taking 
decisions. In fact, two years before Boussabaine’s research, Murtaza and Fisher (1994) 
created an artificial neural network decision making model about construction 
modularization when building an industrial process plant. The decision attributes based 
on which the decision would be made were divided into five categories: plant location, 
environmental and organizational, labor-related, plant characteristics, and project risks. 
Masri et al. (1996) presented a neural network model detecting changes in the 
characteristics of structure systems relying on the use of vibration measurements from 
a "healthy" system to train a neural network for identification purposes. It was found that 
the proposed damage detection methodology is capable of detecting small changes in 
the structural parameters, even in case the vibration measurements are noise polluted 
(Pathak and Agarwal 2014).  
 
3.7.4.4 Dispute resolution and litigation 
Yitmen and Soujeri  (2010) developed an ANN model to predict the effect of change 
orders on the project performance. The aim of the model was to predict the impact 
of projected disputes before they occur and hence avoid the lengthy litigation 
process. The study was mainly concerning projects in North Cyprus. Waziri et al. 
(2017) argued this model was efficient in determining the probability of disputes in 
a given project. In 2014, Fatima, et al. developed an ANN model which optimizes 
the frequency of dispute parameters aiming to minimize construction disputes.  
 
3.7.4.5 Risk assessment 
Odeyinka et al. (2002) developed an ANN model studying the impact of various 
construction risks on the total project cost. Backpropagation ANN model was used 
to develop the risk assessment model. The model was tested on 20 new projects in 
order to predict the impact of risks on those projects at 30%, 70% and 100% stages. 
Maria-Sanchez (2004) used the neural network approach to predict the impact of 
environmental risks on construction projects. Her study was on projects in Puebla, 
Mexico. The system offers the advantage of predicting the possible value of the total 
environmental risks affecting the project. Lhee et al. (2014) developed a two-step 
neural network model predicting the optimal contingency that shall be used in 
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transportation projects. Another risk assessment model was developed by Liu and 
Guo (2014) for project construction quality. The model accuracy was tested using a 
dataset of residential building projects in the Guangzhou development zone. 
 
3.7.4.6 Estimating excavation capacity and excavator efficiency 
Chao and Skigniewski (1994) developed two ANN models. The first model’s output 
was the estimation of excavation capacity based on the site conditions. The output 
of the first model was used as an input for the second model. The second’s model 
output is the excavator’s efficiency measured by hourly productivity. Despite the fact 
that the model was limited as it did not involve any possibility for changing the 
number of hidden layers, this model was considered as a start of application of ANN 
models to the estimation of construction operation productivity.  
 
3.7.4.7 Use of ANN in the domain of PPP projects 
The use of Artificial Neural Networks in the domain of PPP projects is still limited. 
Jin and Zhang (2010) developed an ANN model for modelling optimal risk allocation 
in PPP projects. A questionnaire was distributed among participants working in the 
construction industry in order to obtain the inputs for the model. Then, the model’s 
output was compared to the results obtained from the traditional MLR (Multiple 
Linear Regression) mode. It was found that the ANN model delivered satisfactory 
results. A second attempt at using ANNs in the domain of PPP projects was taken 
by Chou (2012) with the development a model predicting dispute handling 
techniques in PPP projects. The aim of the model was to predict which dispute 
resolution technique shall be used (negotiation, mediation, litigation, arbitration or 
no dispute). The results delivered a total accuracy of 84.65%. Nevertheless, Waziri 
et al. (2017) argues that this method is more applicable at the start of the dispute. 
Nevertheless, it is noticed that the application of the Artificial Neural Networks is still 
at its start as it has not been extensively used in this domain, even less in the field 
of risks associated with PPP projects.  
 
3.7.5 Neural Networks advantages and criticism 
3.7.5.1 Neural Networks advantages 
Providing better solutions for complex problems 
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Rumelhart, et al. (1994) stated that ANNs provide better solutions for problems 
involving complex non-linear relationships than conventional methods. This was the 
same conclusion reached by Boussabaine (1996). In their two studies published in 
1994, Flood and Kartam (1994a, 1994b) provide evidence to the same conclusion 
by stating that the structure of ANNs enable them to easily “adapt” to solve non-
linear complex problems even if the environment or the system being modelled 
changes with time. Jain and Pathak (2014), Adeli and Hung (1995), and Haykin 
(1999) all argue Artificial Neural Networks have high computational abilities 
enabling them to be used in the fields of “prediction and estimation, pattern 
recognition and optimization”. Whilst Bhokha and Ogunlana (1999), espouse ANNs 
can provide accurate results even if the data includes errors or is incomplete. 
Moreover, ANNs have the ability to process information quickly if it is applied to 
solve real world problems.  
 
ANNs have the ability to “learn” 
Flood and Kartam (1994) point out that contrary to the conventional models, ANNs 
have the ability of “learning”, “self-optimizing” and “adapting” to variables. Waziri et 
al. (2017) reached the same conclusion; according to them, ANNs provide the 
advantages of “adaptive learning”, “self-organization”, “real time operation” and 
“fault tolerance” when compared to the conventional statistical methods.  According 
to Bhokha and Ogunlana (1999), ANNs can have a surprising number of the human 
brain’s characteristics, such as learning from past experience and generalizing from 
previous examples to new problems.  
 
ANNs can be used as a strong decision-making tool 
Boussabaine (1996) confirms that ANNs have the ability of adjusting their weights 
automatically to match variables. In a complex industry like the construction 
industry, ANNs can be combined with statistical inference techniques in addition to 
the experts’ experience in order to provide decision support for experts, decision 
makers and even to train inexperienced personnel. Furthermore, ANNs are 
considered as a powerful “what if” tool. In order to benefit from these wide ANNs’ 
benefits, Boussabaine (1996) advised to avoid limiting the use of ANNs to simply 
modelling the decision-making behavior of the user.  
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3.7.5.2 Neural Networks criticism  
Boussabaine (1996) argues that Artificial Neural Networks are similar to “the black-
box”. There seems to be unanimity among various researchers regarding this 
description. Jain and Pathak (2014) describes ANNs as “black-box, model-free and 
adaptive tools to capture and learn significant structures in data”. Such black-box 
nature makes the data go in the model, be processed and then go out in the form 
of an output or prediction without giving the user the chance to understand what 
happens in between. In an attempt to solve such problem and in order to try to 
understand the nature of ANNs, it is important to conduct continuous research 
especially in the domain of construction management and develop several models 
using the ANN system in order to develop a pattern. The same criticism for ANN 
models has been reiterated by Paliwal and Kumar (2011) who suggest that despite 
the numerous advantages that ANN models can provide, there still exists ambiguity 
when it comes to explain the relationships between the parameters used for 
modelling. Consequently the solution Paliwal and Kumar (2011) avocate was that 
further research is needed to understand the framework and internal operation 
within the ANN in order to study the impact of the independent variables on the 
model.  
 
3.7.6 Why ANNs for this research? 
o As it was explained earlier and as the literature shows, ANNs have been 
extensively used in the domain of construction engineering and 
management. It is true that not all the developed models were successful. 
However, in the domain of construction management, the results associated 
with the use of ANNs were satisfactory due to their excellent learning and 
generalizing capabilities (Jin and Zhang, 2010).  
 
o As this research aims to modelling the risks associated with PPP projects 
and related poor management of stakeholders, several variables will be 
inserted into the model. Also, not all the variables (risks) can be measured in 
the same way. Due to the wide mix of variables and their different scales of 
measurement, ANN a more suitable tool that will solve complex relationships. 
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o It is true that the MLR statistical approach is used to study the relative effect 
of several independent variables on a particular output, which is similar, to a 
great extent, to artificial neural networks. The MLR aims to minimizing 
differences between observed and predicted values. Nevertheless, MLR is 
suitable for “linear relationships”. As it will be demonstrated through the next 
chapter, non-linear relationships exist between most of the risks and the 
completion of the project. The MLR will model all the data to a “best-fit” line 




Figure 29. Linear regression model 
 
Artificial Neural Networks, on the other hand, will model the non-linear relationship 
between variables as shown in Figure 30.  
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Figure 30. Non-linear relationship modelling 
o In this research, the relationships between variables cannot be described 
using the conventional approaches. Elhag and Boussabaine (1998) point out 
that ANNs do not require to specify the relationship between the variables. 
This is a major characteristic that discerns ANNs from conventional MLR. In 
this research, due to the complex type of construction projects and especially 
PPP projects, as it will be illustrated in Chapter Four, there are several 
variables that are not directly related to each other. Accordingly, it is expected 
that ANNs will deliver better and more accurate results than classical 
mathematical and traditional procedures. 
 
o As the literature showed, Artificial Neural Networks have been widely used 
since 1989 in the domain of construction management with minimal 
applications in PPP projects. Accordingly, since ANNs proved their success 
over conventional methods in the domain of construction management, 
applying ANNs to PPP projects especially in the domain of risk management 
will be an addition to the existing knowledge. It will be wrongful to expect this 
research and modelling approach to be immediately adopted but the domain 
of construction management is rich and rapidly changing. New studies and 
research are conducted every day. Accordingly, this research shall make an 
original contribution to the already-existing knowledge in this domain and can 
be an assisting tool for future studies.  
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3.8 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has provided details of the research approach adopted in this research. 
A rationale for this approach has been detailed, along with a framework to guide the 
experimental exercise in this research. Based on the above discussion, the overall 
research approach adopted for this research can be summarized as follows: 
o Research Approach: Quantitative with some aspects of qualitative approach 
o Philosophical position: Post-positivist 
o Research design: Quasi-experimental approach 
o Research method: Data pre-processing techniques: 
o Data cleaning 
o Data integration 
o Data transformation 
o Data partitioning 
An overview of artificial neural networks, with various applications in civil 
engineering and construction management such as cost estimation, construction 
scheduling, decision making, dispute resolution and litigation, risk assessment and 
PPP projects has also been provided. Some of the strengths and potential 
weakness of ANN have also been discussed along with the reasons for which ANN 
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Chapter 4 – Research findings 
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction  
This chapter is structured to first explain the steps performed to develop the list of 
risks affecting PPP projects. Then, the data collection and the modelling concept 
are explained with a special emphasis on the modelling philosophy adopted in this 
research. The data used for the modelling is also described as well as the data 
processing techniques used for training and validating the models that will be 
developed. The aim in this chapter is to extract the necessary information from the 
historical project data to build the delay estimation models studying the impact of 
stakeholders and construction related risks on both traditional and PPP projects. 
The actual methodology used in this research is illustrated in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31. Actual methodology used in this research 
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4.2 Defining the influencing factors (Risks) 
4.2.1 Risk identification  
As it was previously stated in Chapter 2, generally, risk management includes: risk 
identification, risk assessment and risk response (AS4360 2004; PMBOK 2004; Al-
Bahar 1989) as illustrated in Figure 32.  
 
Figure 32. General steps of risk management 
 
Wang, et al (2004) points out that identification of risks associated with PPP projects 
is a crucial phase in PPP projects and should be done at the early start of the project. 
Fang, et al (2004) argues that despite being a simple idea but developing a risk 
checklist can be a valid and effective risk identification method. Zou, et al (2007) 
confirms that in addition to risk identification, risk categorization is an important step 
towards sound risk management. Based on a study done by Hwang et al. (2012), 
risks are identified based on literature review and ranked based on “content 
analysis”. In this research, a comprehensive list of risks affecting PPP projects is 
developed following an extensive literature review based on various sources such 
as journals, articles, books, internet sources and informal discussions with experts 
and researchers (Valipour et al. 2016).  
 
In order to ensure the significance and the correctness of this step, the sources 
(such as journals, articles, books, etc.) are chosen to be over a long-time span and 
covering several countries. This will make the list of identified risks as 
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the identified risks can be categorized by country, project and market risk. The 
identified risks can also be classified into Macro, Meso and Micro (Li et al. 2005).   
 
In this research and in order to develop “the risks checklist”, an extensive literature 
review of 30 sources was thoroughly studied in order to develop the list of the risks 
affecting PPP projects. To properly develop a comprehensive list of risks, the journal 
papers, research and publications that were studied covered the time span between 
1998 and 2018. Furthermore, the literature review performed for the sake of 
developing the risk factors was encompassing different countries. Some researches 
were studying the risk factors worldwide and others were dedicated to specifically 
study the risks associated with countries such as: the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, 
Scotland, China, Australia, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Iran, Malysia, Thailand, 
Portugal and South Africa. These countries were chosen to encompass different 
levels of PPP experience as previously explained in Chapter Two (Section 2.2.5: 
PPP around the world: success and failure stories). For instance, the United 
Kingdom is an experienced country with a long history in PPPs, China and India are 
considered countries with limited PPP experience while Portugal is considered a 
country with moderate PPP experience. The risks extracted from this literature 
review are the outcomes of previous research, interviews and questionnaires. 
Accordingly, a comprehensive list of 118 risks was developed. The list of risks 
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Table 8. List of 118 risks affecting PPP projects developed from an extensive literature review 
# Risk factor # Risk Factor 
1 
Lack of support from 
government 
16 Inconsistent legal framework 
2 Unstable government 17 Change in tax regulation 
3 Strong political interference 18 Public opposition 
4 Corruption and bribery 19 Environment 
5 Nationalization/Expropriation 20 Force Majeure 
6 Poor financial market 21 Weather 
7 Inflation 22 Geological conditions 
8 Interest rate 23 Construction delays 
9 
Lack of legal/regulatory 
framework 
24 Site safety and security 
10 Poor quality workmanship 25 Design deficiency 
11 Construction cost overrun 26 Scope variation 
12 Excessive contract variation 27 Unproven engineering techniques 
13 Material availability 28 Level of demand for project 
14 Availability of finance 29 Site availability 
15 High finance cost 30 Operation cost overrun 
31 
Financial attraction of project to 
investors 
61 Low operation productivity 
32 Delay in approval and permits 62 Maintenance cost higher than expected 
33 
Maintenance more frequent 
than expected 
63 Labor availability 
34 Residual asset risk 64 Construction/design changes 
35 Inadequate PPP experience 65 Labor disputes/strikes 
36 
Lack of communication between 
stakeholders 
66 Land use 
37 
Inadequate distribution of 
responsibilities 
67 Waste of materials 
38 
Inadequate distribution of 
authorities 
68 Construction completion 
39 
Lack of commitment between 
parties 
69 Supporting utilities risk 
40 Differences in working methods 70 Protection of geological and historical objects 
41 
Termination of concession by 
government 
71 Operator default 
42 Change in law 72 Quality of operation 
43 Influential economic events 73 Condition of facility 
44 
Change in industrial code of 
practice 
74 Contractual risk 
45 Insolvency of Subcontractors 75 Third party tort liability 
46 Ownership assets 76 Need for land acquisition 
47 
Insolvency of Concession 
company 
77 
Delay in resolving litigation or arbitration 
dispute 
48 Insufficient income 78 Influential economic events 
49 
Fluctuation of material cost (by 
government) 
79 Poor public decision-making process 
50 
Fluctuation of material cost (by 
private sector) 
80 Sanction 
51 Tariff change 81 
Arbitrary definition of tariff of services by 
government 
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53 Exclusivity 83 Operating revenues below expectation 
54 Foreign currency exchange 84 Lack of coordination and commitment 
55 Residual risk 85 Need for environmental approval 
56 
Changes in value of granted 
land due to development 
86 Third party delays 
57 
Changes in value of granted 
land due to inflation 
87 Government intervention 
58 
Financial problems due to 
environmental protection 
88 Government reliability 
59 Need for land appraisal 89 Third-party reliability 
60 Limited capital 90 Immature juristic system 
91 
Delay in resolving contractual 
dispute 
104 Improper contract 
92 
Inadequate study and 
insufficient data 
105 Delay in supply 
93 
Lack of standard model for PPP 
agreements 
106 Technological risk 
94 Payment risk 107 Constructability 
95 Uncompetitive tender 108 Defects in construction 
96 Consortium inability 109 Delay in operation 
97 Private investor change 110 Excessive maintenance and refurbishment 
98 Subjective evaluation 111 Failure/delay in commissioning test 
99 Insufficient financial audit 112 Technical obsolescence 
100 Change in output specification 113 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders 
101 Innovative design 114 Misinterpretation of contract 
102 Design complexity 115 Stakeholder management 
103 
Low financial attraction of 
project to investors 
116 Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation 
117 Staff crisis 118 
Cultural differences between main 
stakeholders 
 
4.2.2 Risk classification 
The 118 identified risks were classified into various categories based on the source 
of each risk and on lifecycle perspective (Li and Zou 2012).  Based on the research, 
the risks affecting PPP projects are classified into 16 different categories. Among 
the 16 categories, 6 categories are related to the life cycle of the PPP project which 
are: feasibility study, financing, design, construction, operation and commissioning.  
In this research, the specific stage in the lifecycle of the project where the risk 
appears is specified. However, some risks should be managed throughout the 
lifecycle of the project from the start till the end such as legal, political and 
stakeholders’ related risks. The various risk categories along with the associated 
risks under each category are as follows:  
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1. Commissioning risks  
Table 9. Commissioning risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Failure/delay in commissioning test Commissioning risks  
 
2. Construction risks 
Table 10. Construction risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Geological conditions Construction 
Construction delays Construction 
Site safety and security Construction 
Poor quality workmanship Construction 
Construction cost overrun Construction 
Excessive contract variation Construction 
Material availability Construction 
Availability of finance Construction 
High finance cost Construction 
Site availability Construction 
Insolvency of Subcontractors Construction 
Labor availability  Construction 
Labor disputes/strikes Construction 
Land use Construction 
Waste of materials Construction 
Construction completion Construction 
Supporting utilities risk Construction 
Protection of geological and historical objects Construction 
Third party delays Construction 
Government reliability Construction 
Third-party reliability Construction 
Delay in supply Construction 
Constructability Construction 
Defects in construction Construction 
 
3. Construction and design risks 
Table 11. Construction and design risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Unproven engineering techniques Construction and design 





Page 140 of 313 
 
4. Design risks 
Table 12. Design risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Design deficiency Design 
Scope variation Design 
Change in output specification Design 
Innovative design Design 
Design complexity Design 
 
5. Economic and financing risks 
Table 13. Economic and financing risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Poor financial market Economic and Financing  
Inflation Economic and Financing 
Interest rate Economic and Financing 
Change in tax regulation Economic and Financing 
Financial attraction of project to investors Economic and financing 
Foreign currency exchange Economic 
Changes in value of granted land due to 
development  Economic 
Changes in value of granted land due to inflation Economic 
Financial problems due to environmental 
protection Economic 
Need for land appraisal Economic 
Limited capital Economic 
Payment risk Economic and financing 
Insufficient financial audit Economic and financing 
Low financial attraction of project to investors Economic and Financing 
 
6. Feasibility study 
Table 14. Feasibility study risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Level of demand for project Feasibility study 
 
7. Legal  
Table 15. Legal risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Lack of legal/regulatory framework Legal 
Inconsistent legal framework Legal 
Contractual risk Legal 
Ownership assets Legal 
Insolvency of Concession company Legal 
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Risk factors  Risk group  
Inadequate study and insufficient data Legal 
Lack of standard model for PPP agreements Legal 
Delay in resolving litigation or arbitration dispute Legal 
Need for environmental approval Legal 
Immature juristic system Legal 
Improper contract Legal 
 
8. Market 
Table 16. Market risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Insufficient income Market 
Fluctuation of material cost (by government) Market 
Fluctuation of material cost (by private sector) Market 
Tariff change Market 
Market demand change/Demand below 
anticipation Market/Operation 
Exclusivity Market 
Arbitrary definition of tariff of services by 
government Market 
Competition Market 
Operating revenues below expectation Market/Operation 
Technical obsolescence  Market 
 
9. Natural 
Table 17. Natural risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Environment Natural 




Table 18. Operation risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Operation cost overrun Operation 
Low operation productivity Operation 
Maintenance cost higher than expected Operation 
Maintenance more frequent than expected Operation 
Residual asset risk Operation 
Operator default Operation 
Quality of operation Operation 
Condition of facility Operation 
Residual risk Operation 
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Risk factors  Risk group  
Technological risk Operation 
Consortium inability Operation 
Delay in operation Operation 
Excessive maintenance and refurbishment Operation 
 
11. Organization and coordination 
Table 19. Organization and coordination risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Lack of coordination and commitment Organization and coordination  
 
12. Political 
Table 20. Political risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Unstable government Political 
Strong political interference Political  
Corruption and bribery Political 
Nationalization/Expropriation Political 
Delay in approval and permits Political 
Termination of concession by government Political 
Influential economic events Political 
Influential economic events Political 
Sanction Political 
Government intervention Political 
Uncompetitive tender Political 
 
13. Stakeholders’ issue 
Table 21. Stakeholders related risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Lack of support from government  Stakeholders' issue  
Public opposition Stakeholders' issue  
Inadequate PPP experience Stakeholders' issue 
Lack of communication between stakeholders Stakeholders' issue  
Inadequate distribution of responsibilities Stakeholders' issue  
Inadequate distribution of authorities Stakeholders' issue  
Lack of commitment between parties Stakeholders' issue  
Delay in resolving contractual dispute Stakeholders' issue 
Need for land acquisition Stakeholders' issue 
Private investor change Stakeholders' issue  
Subjective evaluation Stakeholders' issue  
Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders Stakeholders' issue 
Misinterpretation of contract Stakeholders' issue 
Stakeholder management Stakeholders' issue 
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In addition to the above classification of risks, in some cases the classification of 
the risks can be mixed. In other words, the same risk can fall under several risk 
groups such as the following risks:  
 
14. Political and construction 
Table 22. Political and construction risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Change in industrial code of practice Political and construction 
 
15. Political and feasibility study 
Table 23. Political and Feasibility study risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Poor public decision-making process Political/Feasibility study 
 
16. Political, legal and financial 
Table 24. Political, legal and financial risks 
Risk factors  Risk group  
Change in law Political/Legal/Financial 
 
 
4.2.3 Risk assessment  
4.2.3.1 Risk ranking 
As previously specified, the ranking of the risks identified through the literature 
review was done using the “content analysis”. According to Fellows and Liu (2003), 
content analysis is often adopted to determine the major aspects of a set of data 
and it is performed by simply counting how many times an activity occurs, or a topic 
is depicted.  Weber (1990) argues that the content analysis method assists in 
classifying textual material to make it more manageable. In other words, in order to 
rank the risks identified through the extensive literature review, different sources are 
examined and studied in order to determine how many times the same risk was 
stated among the sources.  
 
A complete table including the number of times each risk was repeated and 
mentioned in the literature in addition to the risk group to which each risk belongs is 
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included in Appendix A. Appendix B includes a ranking of all risks based on the 
literature review. Appendix C includes the 30 different sources of the literature 
review from which the risks are extracted. Appendix D includes a definition for the 
risks identified in the risk checklist based on the literature review. Below is a 
summarized table showing the risk ranking and the top 50 risks out of the 118 
identified risks: 
 
Table 25. Risk ranking of the top 50 risks out of the 118 identified risks 








1 Inflation 24 82.76 
Economic and 
Financing 
2 Interest rate 24 82.76 
Economic and 
Financing 
3 Force Majeure 20 68.97 Natural 
4 Operation cost overrun 20 68.97 Operation 
5 Material availability 19 65.52 Construction 
6 Design deficiency 19 65.52 Design 
7 Public opposition 18 62.07 Stakeholders' issue 
8 Delay in approval and permits 18 62.07 Political 
9 Change in tax regulation 16 55.17 
Economic and 
Financing 
10 Construction cost overrun 16 55.17 Construction 
11 Change in law 16 55.17 Political/Legal/Financial 
12 Weather 15 51.72 Natural 
13 
Market demand change/Demand 
below anticipation 
15 51.72 Market/Operation 
14 Nationalization/Expropriation 14 48.28 Political 
15 Geological conditions 14 48.28 Construction 
16 High finance cost 14 48.28 Construction 
17 Construction/design changes 14 48.28 Construction/Design 
18 Availability of finance 13 44.83 Construction 
19 Unproven engineering techniques 13 44.83 Construction and design 
20 Construction completion 13 44.83 Construction 
21 Environment 12 41.38 Natural 
22 Level of demand for project 12 41.38 Feasibility study 
23 Site availability 12 41.38 Construction 
24 Residual asset risk 12 41.38 Operation 
25 Poor quality workmanship 11 37.93 Construction 
26 Low operation productivity 11 37.93 Operation 
27 Labor availability 11 37.93 Construction 
28 Unstable government 10 34.48 Political 
29 
Maintenance cost higher than 
expected 
10 34.48 Operation 
 
Page 145 of 313 
 









Maintenance more frequent than 
expected 
10 34.48 Operation 
31 Exclusivity 10 34.48 Market 
32 Residual risk 10 34.48 Operation 
33 Site safety and security 9 31.03 Construction 
34 
Lack of communication between 
stakeholders 
9 31.03 Stakeholders' issue 
35 Insolvency of Subcontractors 9 31.03 Construction 
36 Foreign currency exchange 9 31.03 Economic 
37 Poor financial market 8 27.59 
Economic and 
Financing 
38 Inconsistent legal framework 8 27.59 Legal 
39 Operator default 8 27.59 Operation 
40 Third party tort liability 8 27.59 Stakeholders' issue 
41 Ownership assets 8 27.59 Legal 
42 Insolvency of Concession company 8 27.59 Legal 
43 Need for land acquisition 8 27.59 Stakeholders' issue 
44 
Operating revenues below 
expectation 
8 27.59 Market/Operation 
45 Lack of support from government 7 24.14 Stakeholders' issue 
46 Strong political interference 7 24.14 Political 
47 Construction delays 7 24.14 Construction 
48 
Termination of concession by 
government 
7 24.14 Political 
49 Influential economic events 7 24.14 Political 
50 Supporting utilities risk 7 24.14 Construction 
 
As table 25 shows, based on the literature and researches, the top ten risks affecting 
PPP projects are: the inflation risk, interest rate fluctuation, Force Majeure, 
operation cost overrun, material availability, design deficiency, public opposition, 
delay in approvals and permits, change in tax regulation and construction cost 
overrun.  
 
4.2.3.2 Risk mapping to different countries 
In addition to the ranking and classification of risks into various risks categories, 
each one of the identified risks was mapped to its corresponding country. Appendix 
E includes the list of risks and each one of them is mapped to its corresponding 
country. The purpose of this step is to know the critical risks that the literature 
identified for each country in order to establish a cross-country comparison. An 
extract of the mapping step is highlighted in table 26.  
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Table 26. Extracts of the outcomes of the risk mapping (Complete table in Appendix E) 
 
 
4.2.3.3 Risk groups studied in this research 
Based on the aforementioned risk identification and categorization, only the risks 
falling under the categories of “stakeholders’ issue” and “construction risks” are the 
subject of the study. Those risks were extracted, and the below tables show a 
separate ranking for the risks related to stakeholders’ issues and construction risks 
based on the “content analysis”. 
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4.2.3.3.1 Stakeholders’ related risks  




Risk factors Total 
% of times 
cited 
Risk group 
7 Public opposition 18 62.07 Stakeholders' issue 
34 
Lack of communication between 
stakeholders 
9 31.03 Stakeholders' issue 
40 Third party tort liability 8 27.59 Stakeholders' issue 
43 Need for land acquisition 8 27.59 Stakeholders' issue 
45 Lack of support from government 7 24.14 Stakeholders' issue 
57 
Inadequate distribution of 
responsibilities 
6 20.69 Stakeholders' issue 
73 Inadequate PPP experience 4 13.79 Stakeholders' issue 
74 
Lack of commitment between 
parties 
4 13.79 Stakeholders' issue 
76 
Inadequate distribution of 
authorities 
3 10.34 Stakeholders' issue 
77 
Differences in working 
methods/Knowhow between 
parties 
3 10.34 Stakeholders' issue 
86 
Delay in resolving contractual 
dispute 
2 6.90 Stakeholders' issue 
89 
Lack of coordination and 
commitment 
2 6.90 Stakeholders' issue 
91 Private investor change 2 6.90 Stakeholders' issue 
97 Third party delays 1 3.45 Stakeholders' issue 
104 Subjective evaluation 1 3.45 Stakeholders' issue 
113 
Misunderstanding the role of 
stakeholders 
1 3.45 Stakeholders' issue 
114 Misinterpretation of contract 1 3.45 Stakeholders' issue 
115 Stakeholder management 1 3.45 Stakeholders' issue 
116 
Inadequate negotiation period 
prior to initiation 
1 3.45 Stakeholders' issue 
117 Staff crisis 1 3.45 Stakeholders' issue 
118 
Cultural differences between main 
stakeholders 
1 3.45 Stakeholders' issue 
 
It is worth mentioning that the public opposition risk, which has the highest ranking 
among the stakeholders related risks also occupies ranking # 7 among the overall 
risk ranking. Based on the assessment technique used in this research, the top 5 
risks related to stakeholders’ issues and affecting PPP projects are: the public 
opposition, lack of communication between stakeholders, third party tort liability, 
need for land acquisition and lack of support from government.  
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4.2.3.3.2 Construction risks 




Risk factors Total 
% of times 
cited 
Risk group 




16 55.17 Construction 
15 Geological conditions 14 48.28 Construction 
16 High finance cost 14 48.28 Construction 
18 Availability of finance 13 44.83 Construction 
20 Construction completion 13 44.83 Construction 




11 37.93 Construction 
27 Labor availability 11 37.93 Construction 




9 31.03 Construction 
47 Construction delays 7 24.14 Construction 
50 Supporting utilities risk 7 24.14 Construction 
59 Labor disputes/strikes 6 20.69 Construction 
60 Land use 6 20.69 Construction 
61 Waste of materials 6 20.69 Construction 
62 
Protection of geological 
and historical objects 
6 20.69 Construction 
65 Government reliability 6 20.69 Construction 




5 17.24 Construction 
101 Delay in supply 1 3.45 Construction 
109 Constructability 1 3.45 Construction 
110 Defects in construction 1 3.45 Construction 
 
It is worth mentioning that the material availability risk, which has the highest ranking 
among the construction risks also occupies ranking # 5 among the overall risk 
ranking. Based on the assessment technique used in this research, the top 5 risks 
related to construction and affecting PPP projects are: material availability, 
construction cost overrun, geological conditions, high finance cost/availability of 
finance and construction completion risks. 
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4.2.4 Risk checklist used in this study 
In this research, and since the main focus of the research is the risks related to 
stakeholders and their impact on PPP projects especially during the construction 
phase in developing countries, out of the 118 risks obtained from the literature 
review, only the risks related to construction and stakeholders’ issues are extracted 
for further investigation. From the analysis performed, the stakeholders’ related 
risks are 21 risks while the construction risks are 23 risks. Accordingly, a total of 44 
risks will be studied in this research. It is worth mentioning that 18 risks of those 44 
risks (approximately 41%) fall within the top 50 risks identified and ranked in the risk 
checklist previously explained in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3.1. The ranking of each of 
those risks within the comprehensive risk checklist is specified in the first column of 
tables 27 and 28.  
 
4.2.5 Stage of PPP project studied in this research 
As it was previously identified earlier in this Chapter and in Chapter Two (specifically 
in Section 2.2.3 titled “Stages of PPP”), the lifecycle of any PPP project can be 
divided into the following stages: 
o Feasibility 
o Financing stage 
o Design stage 
o Construction stage  
o Operation stage 
o Transfer stage 
 
In order to obtain more accurate results and in order to maintain the consistency, 
the risks that will be investigated in this research and that will be later included in 
the neural network model will be studied for the period of construction. The 
construction period is chosen in particular as it is considered as an intermediate 
pivotal period in the lifetime of the PPP project, occurring between the pre-
construction period (including the feasibility stage, financing stage and design 
stage) and the operation and maintenance period. It is a critical period in the 
project’s lifecycle in which the impact of any risk event can be at its peak and could 
affect the commercial and technical feasibility of a project (Badala et al. 2018). 
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Figure 33 illustrates the impact of risks during the three main stages of any PPP 
project: pre-construction, construction and operation and maintenance (shown in 
years) and displays how the risks during the construction stage of the project reach 
their highest overall impact on the project.  
 
 
Figure 33. Impact of risks during the three main stages of any PPP project: pre-construction, 
construction and operation- and maintenance (Badala et al. 2018) 
 
This conclusion is similar to a great extent to the one reached by Eldrup and Schutze 
(2013). Eldrup and Schutze demonstrated, based on qualitative analysis done for 
previous PPP projects, that PPP project risks are right skewed over time. This 
means that the majority of the risks occur at the beginning of the project’s long 
lifecycle, and more specifically during the construction phase. Figure 34 illustrates 
that with the extended life span of any PPP project, the risks with the highest cost 
occur at the start of the PPP project and namely during the construction phase, 
then, they typically decrease significantly during the startup and operation phases.  
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Figure 34. Illustration of project risk over the PPP project's lifecycle (Eldrup and Schutze 2013) 
 
Accordingly, building the mathematical model to study the effect of stakeholders 
related risks and the construction risks in the construction period on the project’s 
schedule will be of a significant importance as it studies the risks in the period when 
they occur the most and when they have the highest impact.  
4.3 Collecting and preparing the data 
4.3.1 Setting the sample size for the datasets 
Since the mathematical model is focusing on determining the impact of the 
stakeholders-related risks and the construction risks on both conventional projects 
and on PPP projects in developing countries, data will be collected for real case 
traditional and PPP projects.  
The data used in this research was collected as follows: 
 
Dataset 1: Ten traditional projects, with a total value of $2,531,554,644.00 
completed in Egypt between 2014 and 2019. The size of the sample was not very 
large because for all projects chosen, and in order to provide a common ground and 
a valid comparative study with PPP projects, the client in all projects in Dataset 1 is 
the Public Sector. The nature of these projects varies ranging from infrastructure, 
water treatment plant and power generation plants and other. The original duration 
for the projects in this dataset varies from 8 months and until 45 months.  
 
 
Page 152 of 313 
 
Dataset 2: Two PPP projects, with a total value of $ 520,000,000.00 completed in 
Egypt between 2010 and 2019. Due to the fact that the number of executed PPP 
projects is far less than the number of traditional projects, accordingly, it was 
expected for the sample size related to PPP projects to be smaller than the sample 
size related to traditional projects. Nevertheless, as the number of potential and 
future PPP projects in Egypt and in developing countries is in continuous increase, 
the mathematical model is expected to be enhanced in the future to have a more 
comprehensive database.  
 
The data collection process for both datasets involved an initial shadowing of the 
execution team for the various projects as a quasi-member of the team. This 
provided the opportunity to gain an initial understanding of how the data to be used 
for the modelling was generated and what different variables meant. It was followed 
by extracting the following details about each project: 
1- The primary purpose of the project where the different categories are: 
a- infrastructure including roads development as well as building networks of 
piping (storm water, potable water, sewage) and electrical.  
b- electricity where the project is the establishment of a power plant 
c- wastewater where the project consists of the construction of a wastewater 
treatment plant or other projects required for the transport or treatment of 
waste effluent from homes and industries though combined or sanitary 
sewer.  
d- other where the project consists of any other type than the aforementioned 
types (such as the establishment of a hospital for instance or minor projects 
that would not merit the classification of major infrastructure, electricity or 
wastewater projects).  
2- The project scope which differs from the primary purpose of the project as it 
means the scope of work of the particular project type and which is divided into 
the following categories: 
a- Upgrade: which means that the facility already exists while the project 
consists of interventions regarding the evaluation of the existing structure, 
electromechanical installation, enhancement of surrounding area, etc. The 
upgrade can also include adding new buildings within the vicinity of the 
existing project.  
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b- Refurbishment: which includes the process of repairing existing structures 
having some issues that are preventing their “fit for purpose” from taking 
place. It also means repairing and restoring the plant or facility to sound 
working condition after it has been rendered unsafe or unfit for service by wear 
and tear, damage, failure of parts and the like. Refurbishment does not, 
however, include the replacement of any plant, facility or equipment or the 
improvement of any plant, facility or equipment by replacing material which is 
still in sound working condition with materials or equipment of a new or 
different kind, quality or design (Code of Federal Regulations 1984).  
c- Replacement: means altering, modernizing, renovating or otherwise changing 
a building over in a different way. It can also include the replacement and/or 
installation of components of a building which prolongs the life and/or increase 
the value of the building (NYSED 2009).  
d- New-build: means establishing a wholly new construction that was not present 
before.  
3- The project cost which is the project’s final cost. 
4- The project duration divided into the following: 
a- The original project duration which is the initial duration as stated within 
the Contract documents as well as the baseline schedule.  
b- The final project duration which is the actual completion time of the 
project; taking into account all delays and variation orders that the project 
was subject to. 
5- The construction years which is the period during which the actual project 
execution/construction took place. 
6- For Dataset 2, which includes PPP projects, other information was specified 
regarding the PPP type in addition to a brief description of the Private Sector´s 
role in the partnership as well as the concession period.  
4.3.1.1 Dataset 1 
Dataset 1 includes the ten traditional projects included in the study. The major 
common aspect between these projects is the nature of the owner which is always 
a public/governmental entity. The first analysis of the projects included quantitative 
details such as the final cost, original and final durations, delay in months and 
construction year. On the other hand, qualitative information includes the primary 
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purpose, project scope and location. Table 29 includes a summary of the major 
aspects for the projects in Dataset 1. 
 
Table 29. Major information concerning Dataset 1: Traditional projects 

















1 infrastructure  Upgrade 25,657,895.00 16 22 2015-2017 6 37.5 
2 infrastructure  Refurbishment 13,589,460.00 13 18 2014-2016 5 38.5 
3 infrastructure  Replace  347,751,310.00 45 54 2015-2018 9 20 
4 Electricity New-build  776,500,000.00 9 10 2014-2015 1 11.1 
5 Electricity New-build  343,500,000.00 8 10 2014-2015 2 25 
6 Electricity Upgrade 233,433,089.00 29 32 2015-2018 3 10.3 
7 Electricity Upgrade 527,687,890.00 30 32 2015-2018 2 6.7 
8 wastewater New-build  130,000,000.00 26 32 2016-2019 6 23.1 
9 wastewater New-build  118,000,000.00 24 26 2017-2019 2 8.3 
10 other  Upgrade 15,435,000.00 20 30 2015-2018 10 50 
 
Further explanation for the different columns in Table 29 is provided below:   
 
4.3.1.1.1 Primary purpose of the projects 
The nature of these projects were rather varied, ranging from infrastructure projects 
concerned with roads development and different networks underneath (such as 
potable water, storm water, electricity and sewage) which form 30% of the project 
cases used in this research, electrical power plants (which represent 40% of the 
project cases used in this research) and wastewater treatment plants (representing 
20% of dataset 1) as illustrated in the histogram in figure 35.  
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Figure 35. Histogram showing Primary purpose of projects 
 
4.3.1.1.2 Project Scope 
The dataset was chosen as to encompass various scopes of work. Figure 36 
illustrates the different scopes of work for the different projects where four projects 
are upgrades, four are newly constructed projects, one project includes replacement 
while another one includes refurbishment as illustrated in the histogram in Figure 
36. 
 
Figure 36. Histogram showing Project Scope 
 
Table 30 includes a summary for the projects of Dataset 1 including their primary 
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Infrastructure Wastewater Electricity Other 
3 2 4 1 
Project Scope  
Upgrade Replace Refurbishment New-build 
4 1 1 4 
 
4.3.1.1.3 Projects cost 
The final cost for the projects is ranging from $20 million and reaching more than 
$100 million.  As shown in the frequency table 31, Dataset 1 includes ten project 
cases with a total value of $2,531,554,644.00 executed between 2014 and 2019. 
The project costs range from $13 million for a refurbishment project to $700 million 
for new mega electrical power plants.  
 
Table 31. Frequency table of final cost of projects 
Frequency 











0˂x≤20M 2 2 20 
20M˂x≤40M 1 3 10 
40M˂x≤60M 0 3 0 
60M˂x≤80M 0 3 0 
80M˂x≤100M 0 3 0 
x≥100M 7 10 70 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 37, about 70% of the total number of project cases cost more 
than $100 million with only two projects costing less than $20 million. On a cursory 
level, this might suggest that the models developed from the database will be more 
sensitive to projects costing more than $100 million. 
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Figure 37. Final cost of projects- Dataset 1 
 
4.3.1.1.4 Projects duration 
As shown in Table 29, the original duration of the projects is ranging from 8 months 
until 45 months with an average initial duration of 22 months. It is worth mentioning 
that all projects included in Dataset 1 were subject to delays and their execution 
time was extended. The delays affecting the projects range from one month on a 9-
month project and until ten months of delay on a 20-month project. Figure 38 






Final Cost of projects
0˂x≤20M 20M˂x≤40M 40M˂x≤60M 60M˂x≤80M 80M˂x≤100M x≥100M
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Figure 38. Initial vs. Final project duration for Dataset 1 
 
Furthermore, Figure 39 shows the difference (in months) between the initial and 




Figure 39. Project delays (in months) 
A plot of project initial duration compared to project delays in Figure 40 does not 
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linear modeling techniques such as linear regression might not be an appropriate 
modelling type for this data.  
 
 
Figure 40. Project delays vs. original duration 
 
4.3.1.2 Dataset 2 
Dataset 2 includes two PPP mega projects which both are new-builds. These are 
actually the only PPP projects achieved in Egypt.  
 
The first project is a wastewater treatment plant realized between 2010 and 2012. 
In this project, the private sector´s role is to design, finance, construct, start-up, 
operate, maintain and repair the plant (DFCOM). The PPP contract is expected to 
end on 28 June, 2029. The project´s capacity is an average daily flow of 250,000 
m³/day. The Construction duration was extended from 21 months (initial duration) 
to 23 months. The total project cost is $140,000,000 million.  
The second project is a Non-Conventional Renewable Energy (NCRE) wind project 
with an installed capacity of 262.5 MW. It is aligned with the Egyptian governmental 
policies to increase NCRE to 20% of total energy demand by 2020. The type of PPP 
for this project is COO (Construct, Own, Operate). The Construction started in 2015 





















Project delays vs. Initial duration
Original duration (months) Delays (months)
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duration of 50 months. The total project cost is $380,000,000 million. Both projects 
have a concession period of 20 years.  
 
Table 32 summarizes the general PPP projects information including each project´s 
primary purpose, scope of work, cost, original duration, final duration, construction 
years, concession period, PPP type and brief description of the private partner´s 
role. 
 
Table 32. Major information concerning Dataset 2: PPP projects 








































4.3.2 Data pre-processing 
The collected data will have quality if it fits the purpose for which it was collected 
(Han et al. 2012). Before using the collected data, the data will undergo extensive 
steps of preparation. According to Pyle (1999), correct data preparation prepares 
both the data miner and the data. Preparing the data means the model is built right.  
Preparing the miner means the right model is built. Accordingly, pre-processing the 
data will enable the modeler to fully understand the collected data. Furthermore, it 
is a crucial step ensuring the success of the model. In order to ensure that the data 
collected have quality, several factors should be taken into account such as: 
accuracy, completeness, consistency, timeliness, believability, and interpretability 
(Han et al. 2012). 
 
The steps that will be followed for data pre-processing are expected to be as follows: 
 
 
Page 161 of 313 
 
4.3.2.1 Data cleaning 
According to Han et al. (2012), if there are any reasons that make the modeler 
believe that the data collected is “dirty”, it is unlikely for them to trust the results 
emerging from such data. Furthermore, “dirty” data will certainly lead to unreliable 
results. Accordingly, data cleaning is a crucial process performed by filling in 
missing values, smoothing “noisy” data (data with random errors), identifying or 
removing outliers (data falling outside a cluster of other data), and resolving 
inconsistencies. In this research, the outliers (any data outside the predefined 
domain set between the 5th and 95th percentiles of distributions) was removed. In 
this research, the procedure of data cleaning is performed twice as follows:  
 
4.3.2.1.1 Data cleaning results for Original, final durations, delay and delay 
percentage 
The first step in the data cleaning was performed right after data for Datasets 1 and 
2 was collected. In each project and for schedule-related data, the mean (µ), 
standard deviation (σ) and median are determined.  
 
Accordingly, statistical calculations were performed for the following factors: 
o Original duration 
o Final duration 
o Delay 
o Percentage of delay  
Then, the Minimum severity value and Maximum values are obtained for each 
factor.  
Also, the minimum set value is obtained through the following formula: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 − (2 ×
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)                                                    (1 )  
The maximum set value is obtained through the following formula: 
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝑺𝒆𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 = 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 + (𝟐 × 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                        
(2 ) 
 
If the minimum value for each of the aforementioned factors is smaller than the 
minimum set value or if the maximum value for each of the aforementioned factors 
is larger than the maximum set value by more than 5%, then, the data contains 
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outliers that should be removed. After the outliers’ removal, the mean (µ), standard 
deviation (σ) and median are calculated again to guarantee its improvement and 
hence the data cleaning procedure.  
Finally, after the outlier removal, an average severity and standard deviation are 
obtained for each risk factor. These results are the ones which will be used in the 
future calculations of this study. This procedure is illustrated in the tables in 
Appendix F.  
 
4.3.2.1.2 Data cleaning results for risk factors  
This is the second time the data cleaning procedure is performed. After all the risk 
factors for each project are inserted into the overall risk matrix illustrated in Appendix 
G-A (for traditional projects) and Appendix G-B (for PPP projects), statistical 
calculations were performed on the magnitude of each risk. The magnitude of each 
risk is represented by the contribution of each risk to the overall project delay.  
 
For each project, the mean (µ), standard deviation (σ) and median are determined 
for the risk factors associated with this specific project.  
 
Accordingly, statistical calculations were performed for the following factors: 
Then, the Minimum severity value and Maximum values are obtained for each 
factor.  
Also, the minimum set value is obtained through the following formula: 
𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝑺𝒆𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆
= 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 − (𝟐 × 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                       
The maximum set value is obtained through the following formula: 
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝑺𝒆𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆
= 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 + (𝟐 × 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                           
 
If the minimum value for each of the aforementioned factors is smaller than the 
minimum set value or if the maximum value for each of the aforementioned factors 
is larger than the maximum set value by more than 5%, then, the data contains 
outliers that should be removed. After the outliers’ removal, the mean (µ), standard 
deviation (σ) and median are calculated again to guarantee its improvement and 
hence the data cleaning procedure.  
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Finally, after the outlier removal, an average risk magnitude and standard deviation 
are obtained for each group of risks affecting a specific project. These results are 
the ones which will be used in the future calculations of this study. 
 
It is worth mentioning that extremely large (or extremely small) values can create 
biases in data analysis as they might appear more important as they really are. For 
example, in Dataset 1, there are projects which value exceed three-hundred million 
Us dollars while others are only between ten to fifteen million US dollars. This 
disparity in costs might have the potential of resulting in inconsistent predictions if 
included in the model. Such problem was overcome by not considering “cost” as a 
parameter in this study. In order to develop a model that adequately capture all 
possible ranges of cases when it comes to studying the cost necessitates sample 
data of different nature where the variance between costs is not significant. On the 
other hand, excluding the high-value projects from the study in such case may 
increase the chances that the model will not be representative for the real-case 
projects.  
 
4.3.2.2 Data integration 
Data integration is simply merging data from various databases after removing any 
conflicting information from those different sources. Since the data in this research 
will be collected from different databases and sources, the data integration in this 
case is an essential step. For instance, for each project, data will be collected from 
three different databases as follows:  
o The first database is recording the general project information  
o The second database is recording the project’s schedule-related information. 
(Ahiaga-Dagbui 2014) (Han et al. 2012).  
o The third database is the one including all progress reports (monthly and 
weekly), minutes of meeting, resolved claims and approved variation orders 
in order to determine the sources of delay and link them to their root cause. 
The root cause of each delay event is then attributed to the specific risk it 
falls under. This step in particular should be done carefully because it is the 
basis on which the model is built. In fact, Han et al. (2012) points out to the 
fact that data integration should be done carefully with the aim of avoiding 
redundancies and inconsistencies in the resulting dataset. All the above 
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three sources were merged-up, hence ‘integrated” while removing duplicated 
or aggregated information.  
 
After the projects general and schedule-related information were collected, each 
project was studied in detail in order to study the causes of delay. The causes of 
delay were determined and illustrated in the following documents: 
o Claims and responses to claims 
o Monthly and weekly reports (the “critical issues” section in particular) 
o Minutes of Meetings 
o Baseline schedule compared to updated schedules 
o Variation Orders 
o Correspondences between different parties 
 
In addition to the aforementioned documentation, and as it was previously 
mentioned in section 4.3.1, the data collection process included an initial shadowing 
of the execution team for the various projects as a quasi-member of the team in 
order to determine and get a detailed explanation for each source of delay.  
 
4.3.2.2.1 Real-case example of data integration in the research 
This section includes an example for the mechanism of data integration in this 
research. This example is for project # 1 which is an infrastructure upgrade project 
which construction took place between 2015 and 2017. The project’s cost is 
25,657,895.00 US Dollars. The project’s initial duration is 16 months and was 
subject to 6 months of delay, equal to 37.5% of delay.  
 
The delay events for this project were extracted by studying the project’s documents 
and integrating them together as it is illustrated in table 33.  
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Table 33. Extract of data integration performed for project # 1 in Dataset # 1 
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In the first column, the delay events that the project was subject to are presented. 
These delay events are extracted from the different project documents (claims, 
letters, reports, etc.) in addition to execution experts that worked on the execution 
of the project. The next section titled “effect”, includes the result of each delay event 
in two dimensions: 
a- Direct effect which means the number of days of delay such event causes to 
the time schedule.  
b- Compiled effect which means, when compiled and analyzed with the other 
delay event, the net result by which each delay event affects the overall 
project schedule.  
c- The delay analysis method that was used in the project to calculate the delay. 
 
The next section titled “cause” explains in detail the root cause of each delay event.  
 
The purpose of the next section is to translate the “cause and effect” of each delay 
event into “risk factors”. Through the detailed explanation of each delay event, it is 
then linked to its corresponding “risk” and “risk group”. The list of “risks” and “risks 
group” are basically the ones that were chosen to be used in this study and which 
were previously stated in section 4.2.3.3. The next section includes an allocation of 
each risk to determine which party is responsible for such risk. Then, in order to be 
able to track each delay events, the corresponding documents justifying the delay 
are specified (whether the delay event was determined through letters, minutes of 
meeting, claim, variation order, report, etc.). Finally, the last column shows the 
percentage of contribution of each delay event to the total project delay. This 
number represents the magnitude of each risk and will be one of the major factors 
in this research.  
 
The list of tables showing each delay event with its corresponding details including 
cause and effect, risk groups and risk factors along with the percentage of 
contribution of each risk to the overall project delay for each project of Dataset 1 
and Dataset 2 are illustrated in Appendix H-A and Appendix H-B respectively.  
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4.3.2.2.2 Real-case example of result of data integration in the research 
From the aforementioned data integration procedure that was performed for the first 
project in Dataset 1, it is found that for this specific project, there were 3 stakeholder 
risks that caused time-overrun for the project in addition to 6 construction risks 
forming respectively a percentage of 33.3 to 66.67%. This is illustrated in Figure 41.  
 
  
Figure 41. Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage in Project 1 
 
4.3.2.2.3 Overall results of Data Integration 
After performing the Data Integration for the entirety of the projects forming Dataset 
1 and Dataset 2 following the steps explained in sections 4.3.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.2.2 
mentioned above, the outcomes were consolidated to show the percentage of 
contribution of stakeholder and construction risks to total project delay in addition to 
the respective percentage of stakeholder and construction risks. The result of such 
consolidation is illustrated in Table 34. The complete results of Data Integration for 
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1 6 37.5 48.33 33.33 66.67 
2 5 38.5 96 50 50 
3 9 20 92.22 36.84 63.16 
4 1 11.1 96.67 41.18 58.82 
5 2 25 91.67 37.5 62.5 
6 3 10.3 91.11 37.04 62.96 
7 2 6.7 93.33 40.91 59.09 
8 6 23.1 85.56 30.77 69.23 
9 2 8.3 80 25 75 
10 10 50 88 42.86 57.14 
 
Figures 42 and 43 illustrate the contribution percentage of stakeholder and 
construction risk tot total project delay along with the detailed respective percentage 
of stakeholder and construction risks for each project. Figure 42 shows that for 90% 
of the projects, stakeholder and construction risks constitute 80% or more of the 
sources of delay for each project. In six of the projects, they constitute 90% or more 
of the sources of delay. This in fact goes in line with the importance attributed to 
construction and stakeholder risks in the Literature review and highlights the 
importance of studying such risks in order to minimize cost overrun that occur mainly 
during the construction period.  
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Figure 43 shows the respective percentage of stakeholder risks compared to 
construction risks which varies according to the project. In 90% of the projects, the 
percentage of construction risks that occur in the project is higher than the 
percentage of stakeholder risks which may be due to the fact that the risk analysis 
in this research is conducted for projects during the execution phase, the phase in 
which the construction-related risks reach their peak.  
 
 
Figure 43. % of Stakeholders risks and Construction risks for each project 
 
Furthermore, this data integration process shows that two construction-related risks 
occur in all projects which are the following risks: 
 
1- Construction completion: the occurrence of such risk in all projects forming 
Dataset 1 is a natural result of all risks that the project was facing during 
execution. The magnitude of this risk is in fact the summation of all other 
risks that affected the project as the occurrence of delay events will have the 
natural effect of delaying the overall completion period of the project. In other 
words, to quantify this risk, the value of the delay it causes to the project is 
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2- Additional incurred costs: This risk is associated with the additional costs 
incurred during construction. Costs overrun occur when the costs being 
incurred are in excess of the amounts that have been budgeted for. This risk 
is also a natural result of all the delays that occurred, it does not have a 
magnitude in terms of time, but it occurs as a collateral effect associated with 
delays.  
 
4.3.2.3 Data transformation 
This is one of the most important steps in the data pre-processing operation. In this 
step, the data collected will be transformed or consolidated into a small specified 
range as a means to obtain more efficient results in the future and in order to make 
the patterns easier to understand. One of the most common data transformation 
techniques is “the normalization” or “standardization” used to avoid depending on 
the choice of measurements units and in order to give all attributes an equal weight. 
It is a way of “standardization” of the data. After standardization, the data will fall 
within a smaller range such as [-1, 1] or [0.0, 1.0]. The “standardization” is discussed 
here in particular as it will be used in this research as a way to deal equally with the 
data collected. Usually, the standardization process is used in neural network 
backpropagation algorithm. Han et al. (2012) confirms that standardizing the input 
values for each attribute measured in the training tuples will help speed up the 
learning phase. This is the same conclusion reached by Ahaga-Dagbui (2014). 
Ahaga-Dagbui points out that several modelling techniques specifically Artificial 
Neural Networks “require” input data to be “standardized” before starting the training 
procedure. There has been unanimity in the literature regarding the standardization 
of the data used in neural network modelling. According to Squeria (1999), Flood 
and Kartam (1994) and Hegazy, et al. (1994), the standardization of the training 
data is proven to improve the overall performance of the network. Furthermore, 
standardization allows the time-related values to be comparable across different 
years.  
Despite the fact that the terms “Normalization” and “Standardization” are sometimes 
used interchangeably, they in fact refer to two different things. Normalization is 
performed by scaling the variables to have values between 0 and 1. Its associated 
formula is as follows: 
 
Page 171 of 313 
 
 
𝑿 (𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅) =  
𝒙−𝒙 𝒎𝒊𝒏
𝒙 𝒎𝒂𝒙 − 𝒙 𝒎𝒊𝒏
                                                                                                             (3) 
 
Where: X is the actual value that needs to be normalized  
             X max is the maximum value of the set of values that will be normalized 
             X min is the minimum value of the set of values that will be normalized. 
 
Standardization, on the other hand, means to scale a variable to a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of 1. In other words, standardized value, or “z-score” 
measure how much a score deviates from the mean value of the distribution. For 
instance a z-score of 2.0 for the contribution of the risk of lack of coordination to the 
total project’s delay means that this risk affects this particular project twice more 
than the average in the database. Standardization was performed using the 
following rule: 
𝒁 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 =  
𝒙𝒊−µ
𝝈
                                                                                                                                                                                    (4) 
 
Where:  Z score is the standardized value of a numerical input, xi 
              Xi is the actual value needing standardization 
              µ is the mean of the dataset 
              σ is the standard deviation of the dataset 
 
The Data transformation is performed three times, as follows: 
1- For the whole dataset: For all projects forming Dataset 1, statistical 
calculations and data cleaning are performed; then, normalization is 
performed for the projects’ general data.  
2- Per project: For each project, after the data cleaning is performed, in other 
words, after the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum set 
values are obtained and the outliers are removed, normalization and 
standardization are performed for each risk affecting each project. This is 
considered as “vertical” data transformation. 
3- Per risk factor: For each one of the 44 risk factors that are considered in 
this research, after the same data cleaning procedures are done and after 
the outliers are removed, the normalized and standardized values are 
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obtained for each risk factor across the whole dataset. This is considered as 
“horizontal” data transformation.  
 
4.3.2.3.1 Normalization results for Original, final durations, delay and delay 
percentage 
Similar to the statistical calculations that were performed in step 4.3.2.1, 
normalization was done on the same factors that were subject to data cleaning and 
which are: 
1- Original duration 
2- Final duration 
3- Delay 
4- Percentage of delay  
Table 35 shows the results of normalization of those 4 factors. 












































delay %  
1 16 0.216 22 0.273 6 0.556 37.5 0.712 
2 13 0.135 18 0.182 5 0.444 38.5 0.734 
3 45 1.000 54 1.000 9 0.889 20 0.308 
4 9 0.027 10 0.000 1 0.000 11.1 0.103 
5 8 0.000 10 0.000 2 0.111 25 0.423 
6 29 0.568 32 0.500 3 0.222 10.3 0.085 
7 30 0.595 32 0.500 2 0.111 6.7 0.000 
8 26 0.486 32 0.500 6 0.556 23.1 0.379 
9 24 0.432 26 0.364 2 0.111 8.3 0.038 
10 20 0.324 30 0.455 10 1.000 50 1.000 
 
4.3.2.3.2 Normalization and standardization results for risk factors  
Based on the Data Integration results obtained in section 4.3.2.2, all the risk factors 
associated with stakeholders and construction risk groups are inserted into the 
overall risk matrix illustrated in Appendix G-A and Appendix G-B. This risk matrix 
includes the occurrence of each one of the 44 risks along with its magnitude 
(represented by the contribution of each risk to the total project’s delay). The risk 
magnitude is determined by the effect this risk has on the overall delay of the project. 
At this stage, and after data cleaning is performed as specified in section 4.3.2.1.2, 
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normalization and standardization occurs for each risk factor on two levels and in 
the following order: 
 
1- On the project’s level “Vertical data transformation” occurs. After the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum set values are obtained and the 
outliers are removed, normalization and standardization are performed for 
each risk affecting each project.  This is illustrated in table 36 and the 
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Table 36. Extract of the Data transformation on the project’s level (the complete table is in Appendix G-A for Dataset 1 and Appendix G-B for Dataset 2) 
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2- On the risks level “Horizontal” data transformation occurs. For each one of the 44 risk factors that are considered in this 
research, after the same data cleaning procedures are done and after the outliers are removed, the normalized and 
standardized values are obtained for each risk factor across the whole dataset. Table 37 is an extract illustrating this step. 
Appendix J-A and J-B show the normalization and standardization performed for traditional and PPP projects respectively.  
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Based on the above data transformation procedure, it is noticed that there are some 
risks which are not present at all in the data collected for Dataset 1 which are: 
Stakeholder risks: 
a- Public opposition 
b- Lack of commitment between parties 
c- Inadequate PPP experience 
d- Lack of commitment between parties 
e- Private investor change 
f- Subjective evaluation 
g- Misunderstanding of the role of stakeholders 
h- Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation 
i- Cultural differences between main stakeholders 
        
Construction risks  
a- Protection of geological and historical objects  
b- Constructability 
 
The absence of such risks from Dataset 1 (Traditional Projects) makes sense as 
the data collected is for traditional projects while the risks such as public opposition, 
inadequate PPP experience, private investor change, subjective evaluation, 
misunderstanding the role of stakeholders and inadequate negotiation period prior 
to initiation are typical for PPP projects.  
 
4.3.2.4 Data partitioning  
It is not useful to design a neural network that simply memorizes a set of data. 
Instead, the neural network should have the ability to accurately perform on new 
data which will make the model able to “generalize”. In order to achieve that, the 
collected data shall be divided into different subsets: training, selection (or testing) 
and validation.  
The data for the ANN model shall be divided into three independent groups in the 
ratio of 66.7:16.7:16.7% as follows: 
 
1- The first group is the training dataset: used to develop the ANN model and to 
identify the patterns and correlations 
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2- The second group is the testing (or selection) dataset: used to evaluate the 
performance of the ANN model, while it is still undergoing the training, to select 
the best model. Testing ensures that a robust network performance can be 
obtained (Flood and Kartam 1994). The testing (or selection) phase is used for 
choosing the ANN with best generalization properties. In this way, different 
models with the training subset are constructed and then, the one that works 
best on the selection subset is selected.  
3- The third group is the validation dataset: used to establish the final assessment 
on the overall performance of the ANN model. The performance of the model is 
assessed by its ability to predict new data that has neither been used for training 
nor testing. Usually, as the iterative learning continues, the error decreases. 
However, at a certain point, the error may start to increase and this is when 
overfitting begins (Heravi and Eslamdoost 2015).  
 
In other words, different models are trained with the training instances from the first 
group, the model with the “best performance” on the selection instances from the 
second group is chosen then its capabilities are validated using the validation 
dataset from the third group.   
 
In this research, two validation methods were created: one automated verification 
of the performance of the model after training and one manual validation of the 
model through interviews. Further details of how training, testing and validation are 
performed will be provided at the actual modelling stage. 
 
Out of the twelve project cases, eight projects (the traditional projects) forming 
Dataset 1 was selected as the training dataset. The remaining projects inn Dataset 
1 (two projects) were selected for the testing and selection phase. The two major 
PPP projects forming Dataset 2 were selected for validation. Further details on the 
datasets used for the modelling is found in Table 38. 
 
Table 38. Data partitioning details 
Dataset Percentage split Number of cases (Total size =12) 
Training 66.7 8 
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Dataset Percentage split Number of cases (Total size =12) 
Testing (Selection) 16.7 2 
Validation 16.7 2 
 
The following pie chart is extracted from the actual ANN model and details the uses 
of all the instances in the datasets (1 and 2). The total number of instances is 12. 
The number of training instances is 8 (66.7%), the number of testing instances is 2 
(16.7%) and the number of validation instances is 2 (16.7%).  
 
Figure 44. The uses of all the instances in the datasets (1 and 2) 
 
4.4 The Artificial Neural Network in practice 
The model was developed using Neural Designer ® Software. This software was 
used in particular as it is a powerful user-friendly interface able to make complex 
operations and build predictive models in an intuitive way with a graphical user 
interface. When any task is run, the results can be instantly visualized in tables, 
graphs or charts. The objective is that the user can understand and interpret each 
step in the analytics process. Also, it is compatible with the most common data files 
and databases and can operate the biggest datasets. During the selection phase of 
the software, the use of a user-friendly software was of utmost importance as it is 
meant for the model to be used and applied by users that may not specifically be 
experts in the domain of artificial intelligence and programming. With this software, 
there is no need for programming or building complicated block diagrams. Its 
interface guides the user through a sequence of well-defined steps, in order to 
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simplify data entry. Furthermore, Neural Designer ® is outstanding in terms of 
performance when compared with other data mining platforms such as R ® and 
Java ®. As it is shown in the below graphs in Figure 45, Neural Designer ® is able 
to analyze datasets that are up to 1000 times bigger, nine times faster and 100 
times more accurate than other software.  
 
Figure 45. Neural Designer capacities in terms of datasets size, training speed and accuracy compared to other 
data mining tools 
It is developed in C++ language for better memory management and higher 
processing speed. Nevertheless, the user still can export the resulting ANN model 
in any other programming language such as R or Python. One of the major 
advantages of Neural Designer ® for this research, is the inclusion of an advanced 
model selection framework, which allows the user to obtain the most relevant 
variables in a given process.  
 
In this research, different models and networks were developed in a trial and error 
manner to identify the optimum network parameters and network performance. 
 
4.4.1 Application type 
The first thing to do when constructing the model is to decide whether this is an 
approximation or a classification project. This model is always an approximation 
project since the variable to be predicted is continuous (total project delay). The 
basic goal here is to model the total project delay as a function of the contribution 
of the 44 risk factors (divided into stakeholders and construction risks). 
 
4.4.2 Dataset 
To build the model, the first step is to prepare the dataset, which is the source of 
information for the approximation model. This step has already been performed in 
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the previous sections of Chapter 4. In that way, this model has the following 
parameters: 
1- The 44 risk factors used as input variables 
2- Schedule Growth (or total project delay) used as target variables 
3- The dataset contains 12 instances (or 12 projects). As per section 4.3.2.4 
“Data portioning”, they are divided into: 
a. Training comprising 66.7% of the projects (8 traditional projects) 
b. Selection (testing) comprising 16.7% of the projects (2 traditional 
projects) 
c. Validation comprising 16.7 of the projects (2 PPP projects) 
Once all the dataset information has been set, some analytics are performed in 
order to check the quality of the data and which will be explained in the next sub-
sections.  
 
4.4.2.1 Histograms for data distribution  
Histograms are plotted for each one of the 44 input variables in order to depict how 
continuous variables are distributed. For instance, the below graph shows the 
distribution of the contribution of the government reliability risk to the total project 
delay. The abscissa represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their 
corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is 8.33333%, which 
corresponds to the bins with centers 4, 6.11, 13.33, 17.78, 18.52. The maximum 
frequency is 25%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. The complete plotted 
histograms and data distributions are present in Appendix K.  
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Figure 46. Government reliability distribution 
 
4.4.2.2 Box plots for data distribution  
Box plots are developed for each one of the 44 input variables which display 
information about the minimum, maximum, first quartile, second quartile or median 
and third quartile of each variable. They consist of two parts: a box and two 
whiskers. 
 
The length of the box represents the interquartile range (IQR), which is the distance 
between the third quartile and the first quartile. The middle half of the data falls 
inside the interquartile range. The whisker below the box shows the minimum of the 
variable while the whisker above the box shows the maximum of the variable. Within 
the box, it will also be drawn a line which represents the median of the variable. 
 
For instance, the below box plot shows the box plot for the contribution of the third 
part tort liability risk to the total project delay. The minimum of the variable is 0, the 
first quartile is 4.165, the second quartile or median is 8.61, the third quartile is 
13.145 and 
the maximum is 20. 
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Figure 47. Box plot for the contribution of the third part tort liability risk to the total project delay 
 
The complete plotted box plots for all risk factors are present in Appendix L. 
 
4.4.3 Choosing the network architecture 
The choice of the Neural Network architecture is a major step in the modelling 
phase. Determining the network architecture consists of establishing the internal 
structure and rules (Gunaydin and Dogan 2004). One of the first questions about 
choosing the network architecture is “in order to have an adequate model, how large 
should the network be?” In other words, how many nodes and hidden nodes should 
the network consist of?  
 
There is no unanimity in the literature regarding the criteria based on which the 
“size” of the neural network should be designed. However, all perspectives in the 
literature were revolving around the same concept “the size and architecture of the 
neural network depends on the model that is being designed and depends on the 
desired model output as well as on the available data in terms of quantity and 
quality” (Anderson 1995).  
 
In a feedforward neural network, the layers are grouped into a sequence so that 
neurons in any layer are connected only to neurons in the next layer. In fact, Demuth 
et al. (2009) recommends starting with three layers then gradually increasing the 
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number of layers (increasing the hidden layers from one layer to two layers) in case 
the performance of the model is not acceptable.  
 
4.4.3.1 Input layer 
The input layer contains the input variables which are the independent variables in 
the model. They are also called “features” or “attributes”. Neurons at the input layer 
present values for the input variables used for predicting the project delay. In this 
study, the neurons of the input layer represent the 44 risks that will be investigated.  
Each node is for each one of the 44 risks. The risks are inserted as per their 
magnitude represented by the contribution of each risk to the total project delay. 
Table 39 shows the list of risks along with the corresponding node number in the 
input layer. 
 
Table 39. List of risks that will be inserted in the model along with the corresponding node number in 




Risk factors Risk group 
X1 Public opposition Stakeholders' issue 
X2 
Lack of communication 
between stakeholders 
Stakeholders' issue 
X3 Third-party tort liability Stakeholders' issue 
X4 Need for land acquisition Stakeholders' issue 
X5 




Inadequate distribution of 
responsibilities 
Stakeholders' issue 
X7 Inadequate PPP experience Stakeholders' issue 
X8 












Delay in resolving 
contractual dispute 
Stakeholders' issue 
X12 Lack of coordination Stakeholders' issue 
X13 Private investor change Stakeholders' issue 
X14 Third party delays Stakeholders' issue 
X15 Subjective evaluation Stakeholders' issue 
X16 








Risk factors Risk group 
X17 Misinterpretation of contract Stakeholders' issue 
X18 Stakeholder management Stakeholders' issue 
X19 
Inadequate negotiation 
period prior to initiation 
Stakeholders' issue 
X20 Staff crisis Stakeholders' issue 
X21 
Cultural differences between 
main stakeholders 
Stakeholders' issue 
X22 Material availability Construction 
X23 Construction cost overrun Construction 
X24 Geological conditions Construction 
X25 High finance cost Construction 
X26 Availability of finance  Construction 
X27 Construction completion Construction 
X28 Site availability Construction 
X29 Poor quality workmanship Construction 
X30 Labor availability Construction 





X33 Construction delays  Construction 
X34 Supporting utilities risk Construction 
X35 Labor disputes/strikes Construction 
X36 Land use  Construction 
X37 Waste of materials Construction 
X38 
Protection of geological and 
historical objects 
Construction 
X39 Government reliability Construction 
X40 Third-party reliability Construction 
X41 Excessive contract variation Construction 
X42 Delay in supply Construction 
X43 Constructability Construction 
X44 Defects in construction Construction 
 
4.4.3.2 Output layer 
The output layer contains the Target Variable. The Target Variable is the dependent 
variable in the model. The neuron at the output layer provides an estimate of the 
project delay. The delay shall be calculated from the difference between original 
contract completion time and final contract time of completion.  
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𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉 =  
𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆−𝑰𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆 
𝑰𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆
                                                                     
(5) 
 
In approximation (or function regression) models, the main issue is to fit a function 
from data. By training a dataset consisting of input-target examples, the ANN learns 
from knowledge. The basic goal in an approximation is to model one or several 
target variables, conditioned on the input variables. Accordingly, the targets are 
usually continuous variables. The major objective in this section of the research is 
to produce a model which exhibits good generalization, or in other words, a model 
which makes good predictions for new data.  
 
The next chart extracted from the actual ANN model illustrates the variables use for 
the model. It depicts the number of inputs (44), target (one) and unused variables 
(zero).  
 
Figure 48. Variables bar chart 
 
4.4.3.3 Hidden layer 
As it was previously specified in section 3.6.2, the most important layer of an ANN 
is the “hidden layer” consisting of what is so-called “perceptron layers or dense 
layers”. This is the layer that allows the ANN to “learn”. These layers consist of 
“neurons”, which are the basic units of perceptron layers or hidden layers.  As per 
MY et al. (2001), the role of the hidden layer is to extract and remember the useful 
characteristics and features from the input layer in order to forecast the output layer. 
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As shown in Figure 49, the perceptron neuron receives the information as a set of 
numerical inputs x1, x2,….xn. Such information is then combined with a bias “b” and 
a set of weighs w1, w2,….wn. “C” represents the combination function.  
The set of input values (x1, x2,….xn) is transformed using the combination function 
“C” in to produce a single combination or net input value through the following 
equation: 
 
𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝒃𝒊𝒂𝒔 +  ⅀𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔. 𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒔                                                                                 (6) 
 
The activation function “a” defines the output of the perceptron layer in terms of its 
combination through the following rule: 
 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕 = 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 (𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                                                         (7) 
 
The aim of such arrangement is to produce a message in the form of a single 
numerical output “y”. The parameters of the neuron involve the weighs as well as 
the bias. 
 
Figure 49. Components of a perceptron neuron 
 
The optimal number of neurons in the hidden layer shall be kept as a parameter to 
be changed. Ahiaga-Dagbui (2014) points out that the number of hidden nodes 
should be as small as possible to avoid overfitting or memorizing which can affect 
the results. Demuth et al. (2009) had a different opinion by pointing out that the 
power of the network increases by increasing the number of neurons in the hidden 
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layer. Nevertheless, the only drawback is that increasing the number of neurons in 
the hidden layer may increase the chance of overfitting. For the purpose of 
overcoming such issue, Lhee, Raja, Issa and Flood (2012) proposed to find the 
optimal number of hidden neurons during the training process by varying the 
number of hidden neurons and calculating the average error each time as illustrated 
in Figure 50.   
 
Figure 50. Finding the optimal number of hidden neurons during the training process (Lhee et al. 
2012) 
 
As per the above example, the optimal number of hidden neurons is 15 neurons for 
this particular model. This point is where the average error is minimum before 
starting to increase again.  
 
4.4.4 Training strategy 
The procedure used to carry out the learning process is called training (or learning) 
strategy. According to Heravi and Eslamdoost (2015), training the neural network is 
essential in tuning the values of the weights in order to optimize the network’s 
performance. In other words, the training strategy is applied to the neural network 
in order to obtain the minimum loss possible. This is done by searching for a set of 
parameters that fit the neural network to the data set. The backpropagation training 
technique will be used in this model as, based on the literature, it has been used for 
problems of a similar nature and there are evidence, as per the literature, that such 
models were successful and delivered adequate results (Gunaydin and Dogan 
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2004) (Hegazy and Ayed 1998) (Al-Tabtabai, Alex and Tantash 1999) (Squeira 
1999) (Setyawati, Sahirman and Creese 2002) and (Rumelhart 1986).  In the initial 
model, all 44 risk factors will be initially considered. Heravi and Eslamdoost (2015) 
points out that multilayer feedforward neural networks use several training 
techniques and the most popular technique among them is the backpropagation. 




Figure 51. Training process of Artificial Neural Networks with backpropagation algorithm (Heravi and 
Eslamdoost 2015) 
 
During the training phase, as it was previously explained, the neuron calculates the 
sum of the weighed inputs, subtracts its threshold from the sum and transfers the 
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results by a transformation function or “activation function” (Gunaydin and Dogan 
2004) explained by the following equation: 
𝒀𝒊 = 𝒇𝒊 (∑ 𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒙𝒋 − 𝒔𝒊)𝒏𝒋=𝟏                                                                                                                 (8) 
 
Where Yi is the output of the neuron which is the output in terms of the combination 
function, Wij is the weight assigned to the input value j, Si is the threshold value of 
the neuron and 𝒇𝒊 is the transformation function.  
 
The above equation explains the concept in Section 4.4.3.3 which specifies that the 
activation function defines the perceptron output in terms of its combination as 
follows:  
 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
Thus                                    𝒀𝒊      = 𝒇𝒊                  (∑ 𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒙𝒋 − 𝒔𝒊)𝒏𝒋=𝟏  
 
 
4.4.4.1 Activation functions 
The activation function “𝒇𝒊" determines the type of function that the ANN represents.  
In other words, the activation function controls the behavior of the ANN during 
training. These mathematical functions determine the nature of the ANN weights 
that are transferred from one neuron to another. The activation functions are iterated 
in this research and are detailed in Table 40: 
 
Table 40. Activation functions used in the research 
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Figure 52. Linear activation function 
 
 
Page 190 of 313 
 




The most used 
activation 
functions in 
ANNs. It is a 
sigmoid curve. It 






=  𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒉𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 












that discerns it 
from the 
hyperbolic 
tangent is that it 
varies between 










Figure 54. Logistic activation function 
 
 
4.4.4.2 Components of training strategy 
In general, training strategy consists of two major concepts which are explained and 
subdivided through the chart in Figure 55: 
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Figure 55. Training Strategy 
 
4.4.4.2.1 Loss index  
The loss index plays an important role in the use of a neural network. It defines the 
task the neural network is required to do and provides a measure of the quality of 
the representation that the neural network is required to learn. The choice of a 
suitable loss index depends on the particular application.  Training an ANN can then 
be stated as finding a neural network function for which the loss index has a 
minimum value.  
 
The loss index depends on the function represented by the neural network, and it is 
measured on the data set. It can be visualized as a hyper-surface with the 
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Figure 56. Illustration of loss index 
When setting a loss index, two different terms must be chosen: an error term and a 
regularization term. 
 
𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 = 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎 + 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎                                                                                                   (12) 
 
a. Error term  
The error is the most important term in the loss expression. It measures how the 
neural network fits the training instances in the data set. 
 
All that errors can be measured over different subsets of the data. In this regard, 
the training error refers to the error measured on the training instances of the data 
set, the selection (testing) error is measured on the selection instances and the 
validation error is measured on the validation instances. Next the most important 
errors used in the field of neural networks are described. 
 
• Mean Squared Error (MSE) 
The mean squared error calculates the average squared error between the outputs 
from the neural network and the targets in the data set. During the training, the 
weights are continuously changed until the Mean Square Error (MSE) error between 
the desired output and the model output is minimized. The MSE is a general 
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indicator on the overall performance of the training (Al-Tabtabai and Alex 2000) 
(Albino and Garavelli 1998) and (Al-Tabtabai and Alex, 2000). Masters (1993) 
points out that the best measure to determine the model’s reliability is the Mean 
Square Error.  
 






                                                                                                                                            
(13) 
 
Where: n is the number of samples to be evaluated in the training phase,  
           Xi is the model output related to the sample,  
           E(i) id the target output, i.e., the estimated time of completion of the project.  
 
The training of all cases in a training set is called an epoch (Kalogirou 2001) 
(Gunaydin and Dogan 2004). In order to overcome the problem of memorizing and 
overfitting, the training will stop when the MSE remain the same for a certain number 
of epochs as illustrated in Figure 57.  
 
Figure 57. Learning curve (Gunaydin and Dogan 2004) 
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MSE is considered as the most suitable and used way to test the network reliability. 
Figure 58 shows a performance diagram illustrating the MSE calculated for training, 
testing and validation sets based on which the iteration where the best validation 
performance occurs is specified.  
 
 
Figure 58. Performance diagram showing the iteration at which the best network performance occurs 
(Heravi and Eslamdoost 2015) 
• Normalized Squared error (NSE) 
The normalized squared error divides the squared error between the outputs from 
the neural network and the targets in the data set by a normalization coefficient. If 
the normalized squared error has a value of unity then the neural network is 
predicting the data 'on the mean', while a value of zero means perfect prediction of 
the data. 
 
b. Regularization term  
A solution is considered regular when small changes in the input variables lead to 
small changes in the outputs. A solution for non-regular problems is to control the 
effective complexity of the neural network. This can be achieved by using a 
regularization term into the loss index. Regularization terms usually measure the 
values of the parameters in the neural network. Adding that term to the error will 
cause the neural network to have smaller weights and biases, and this will force its 
response to be smoother. 
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4.4.4.2.2 Optimization algorithm  
There is a number of optimization algorithms that can be used in ANNs, with the 
most popular being “the back-propagation” (Fausett 1994). Optimization algorithms 
are mathematical procedures used in order to automatically adjust the network´s 
weights and biases during training. The optimization algorithm determines the way 
in which the adjustment of the parameters in the neural network takes place.  
 
The optimization algorithm stops when a specified condition is satisfied. Some 
stopping criteria commonly used are: 
➢ The parameters increment norm is less than a minimum value. 
➢ The loss improvement in one epoch is less than a set value. 
➢ Loss has been minimized to a goal value. 
➢ The norm of the loss index gradient falls below a goal. 
➢ A maximum number of epochs is reached. 
➢ A maximum amount of computing time has been exceeded. 
➢ The error on the selection subset increases during a number of epochs. 
A brief summary of the training algorithms deployed within Neural Designer ®, the 
software used in this research are presented below:  
 
• Gradient descent  
It is considered as the simplest optimization algorithm. With this method, the 
parameters are updated at each epoch in the direction of the negative gradient of 
the loss index. In other words, it is a first order optimization algorithm that moves 
incrementally to succesively lower points in search space until being able to locate 
a minimum.  
new_parameters = parameters − loss_gradient ∗ learning_ratenew_parameters
= parameters − loss_gradient ∗ learning_rate 
 
• Conjugate gradient 
It is a fast converging generic learning algorithm. The method iterates a series of 
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• Quasi-Newton method  
This is also called Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS). The Newton's 
method uses the Hessian of the loss function, which is a matrix of second 
derivatives, to calculate the learning direction. Since it uses high order information, 
the learning direction points to the minimum of the loss function with higher 
accuracy. The drawback is that calculating the Hessian matrix is very 
computationally expensive. The quasi-Newton method is based on Newton's 
method, but does not require calculation of second derivatives. Instead, the quasi-
Newton method computes an approximation of the inverse Hessian at each iteration 




The learning rate is adjusted here at each epoch using line minimization. 
 
4.4.4.3 Model selection (Testing) 
The objective of model selection is to find the network architecture with best 
generalization properties, that is, that which minimizes the error on the selection 
instances of the data set. 
 
There are two types of model selection algorithms, order selection and inputs 
selection algorithms. This is illustrated in Figure 59.  
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Figure 59. Model selection 
 
a- Order selection 
There are two major problems in the design of a neural network which are: 
underfitting and overfitting. The best generalization is achieved by using a model 
which complexity is the most appropriate to produce an adequate fit of the data. 
 
Underfitting is defined as the effect of a selection error increasing due to a too simple 
model. Overfitting, on the other hand, is defined as the effect of a selection (testing) 
error increasing due to a too complex model. Over-fitted models perform very well 
on training and testing data but fail to generalize satisfactorily when new or “unseen” 
cases are used for validation of performance. Order selection algorithms are in 
charge of finding the complexity of the neural network which yields the best 
generalization properties. Two of the most used order selection algorithms are 
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• Incremental order 
Incremental order is the simplest order selection algorithm. This method starts with 
a small number of neurons and increases the complexity until some stopping criteria 
is met. The algorithm returns the neural network with the optimal order obtained. 
 
• Decremental order 
A similar order selection algorithm is decremental order. It starts with a big number 
of neurons and decreases the complexity until a stopping criterion is reached. 
b- Inputs selection 
 
The role of the input selection algorithms is to automatically extract the features that 
should be used to create a sound predictive model in the data set that provide the 
best generalization capabilities. In order to realize this purpose, they search for the 
subset of inputs that minimizes the selection error. The inputs selection algorithm 
stops when a specified condition is satisfied. Some stopping criteria used are: 
 
• Growing inputs 
The growing inputs method calculates the correlation of every input with every 
output in the data set. Then it starts with a neural network that only contains the 
most correlated input and calculates the selection error for that model. It keeps 
adding the most correlated variables until the selection error increases. The 
algorithm returns the neural network with the optimal subset of inputs found. 
 
• Pruning inputs 
The pruning inputs method starts with all the inputs in the data set. It keeps 
removing those inputs with smallest correlation with the outputs until the selection 
error increases. 
 
• Genetic algorithm 
A different class of inputs selection method is the genetic algorithm. This is a 
stochastic method based on the mechanics of natural genetics and biological 
evolution. Genetic algorithms usually include fitness assignment, selection, 
crossover and mutation operators. The process is illustrated in the below figure:  
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Figure 60. Genetic algorithm process 
4.4.4.4 Training the models 
This section includes the major model trials. All three activation functions in Table 
40 were used with the three activation training algorithms already described (i.e. 
Gradient descent, conjugate gradient and Quasi-Newton). All 44 risk factors were 
used initially with Total Project Delay (Schedule Growth) as model output.  
 
Early stopping was used in order to avoid model overfitting. Early stopping is simply 
described by halting or “stopping” training once the model error stops decreasing. 
The major benefit of early stopping is to overcome “memorizing” or “over-fitting. This 
shall improve generalization. In this case, each trial was repeatedly trained as long 
as testing (or selection) error was decreasing. Figure 61 shows an illustration of 
training a model with early stopping. In this case, the model training continues as 
long as the testing error decreases and is stopped once the testing error starts to 
increase.  
 
Page 200 of 313 
 
 
Figure 61. Neural Network training with early stopping 
 
Model performance was detected using Mean Squared Error (MSE) and Normalized 
Squared Error (NSE) over the training, testing and validation datasets. Table 41 
shows details of the ten best retained models, in no particular order of superiority. 
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Table 41. Best retained models 
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For each model, the MSE and NSE are calculated during training and testing and 
the proposed optimum network architecture is specified.   
 
Each trial illustrated in this table is detailed in the following sub-sections.  
 
4.4.4.4.1 Trial one     
Below are the details associated with the choice of the first trial of the ANN model: 
 
Table 42. Details associated with the choice of the first trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44 Risk factors 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Hyperbolic tangent 
Optimization algorithm Quasi-Newton method 
Order selection Incremental order  
Inputs selection Growing inputs 
 
The following plot shows the training and selection Normalized Squared errors in 
each iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the orange line 
represents the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability of the 
neural network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures the ability 
of the neural network to generalize to new data. The initial value of the training error 
is 3.38992, and the final value after 181 epochs is 0.00352405. The initial value of 
the selection error is 0.0571335, and the final value after 181 epochs is 1.5625. 
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Figure 62. Normalized square error- Quasi-Newton errors history 
 
The following plot extracted from the actual model shows the training and selection 
Mean Squared errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the training error 
and the orange line represents the selection error. The higher the MSE value, the 
poorer the network at generalization. The initial value of the training error is 1.41001, 
and the final value after 109 epochs is 0.000285763. The initial value of the selection 
error is 1.16286, and the final value after 109 epochs is 0.265803. 
 
Figure 63. Mean square error- Quasi-Newton errors history 
 
Table 43 provides a summary of the errors obtained from this model setup: 
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Table 43. Summary of the errors obtained from the first model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest value Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 3.38992 0.00352405 1.41001 0.000285763 
Testing 0.0571335 1.5625 1.16286 0.265803 
 
Table 44 specifies the features relative to the hidden neurons. The minimum number 
of hidden neurons is 1 and the maximum number is 10 with an increase of 1 hidden 
neuron for each iteration. The tolerance for the testing error is 0.01 while the goal 
value for testing error is zero.  
 
Table 44. Characteristics and features of the chosen optimum ANN in terms of order 
 
 
• Incremental Order plot  
The next chart shows the error history for the different subsets during the 
incremental order selection process. The blue line represents the training error and 
the orange line symbolizes the selection error. 
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Figure 64. Incremental order plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
 
Based on the aforementioned, it is found that based on the chosen parameters for 
trial one, the choice of six hidden neurons is the optimal number where the least 
NSE occurs in both training and testing. The NSE for training and testing are equal 
to zero. This was based on nine iterations.  
 
Table 45 displays the order selection results by the incremental order algorithm. 
They include some final states from the neural network, the error functional and the 
order selection algorithm. 
 
Table 45. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 1 
 
 
After performing the testing and training and based on the ANN model´s operation, 
in order to obtain a testing error of zero and after doing nine iterations until the 
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testing error increases, it was chosen for the model to have an optimum number of 
six hidden neurons and 39 inputs which are: 
1- Delay in resolving contractual dispute 
2- Lack of communication between stakeholders 
3- Material availability 
4- Misinterpretation of contract 
5- Site availability 
6- Waste of materials 
7- Supporting utilities risk 
8- Delay in supply 
9- Labor availability 
10- Geological conditions 
11- Construction completion 
12- Third-party reliability 
13- Government reliability 
14- Availability of finance 
15- High finance cost 
16- Inadequate PPP experience 
17- Inadequate negotiation prior to initiation 
18- Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders 
19- Labor disputes 
20- Site safety 
21- Lack of coordination 
22- Stakeholder management 
23- Inadequate distribution of authorities 
24- Inadequate distribution of responsibilities 
25- Difference in working methods 
26- Staff crisis 
27- Third-party delays 
28- Construction delays 
29- Need for land acquisition 
30- Insolvency of subcontractors 
31- Excessive contract variation 
32- Third-party tort liability 
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33- Subjective evaluation 
34- Lack of commitment between parties 
35- Cultural differences  
36- Defects in construction 
37- Poor quality workmanship 
38- Land use 
39- Lack of support from government 
 
4.4.4.4.2 Trial two  
For the second trial of the ANN model, a change was made for the testing algorithm 
used. This time, Genetic Algorithm was used as a testing algorithm for model 
selection instead of Growing Inputs method. Table 46 provides details associated 
with the choice of the second trial of the ANN model. 
 
Table 46. Details associated with the choice of the second trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44 Risk factors 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Hyperbolic tangent 
Optimization algorithm Quasi-Newton method 
Order selection Incremental order  
Inputs selection Genetic algorithm 
 
The following plot shows the training and selection Normalized Squared errors in 
each iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the orange line 
represents the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability of the 
neural network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures the ability 
of the neural network to generalize to new data. The initial value of the training error 
is 3.00586, and the final value after 160 epochs is 0.000109559. The initial value of 
the selection error is 0.00294441, and the final value after 160 epochs is 
0.00469793. 
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Figure 65. Normalized square error- Quasi-Newton errors history 
 
The following plot extracted from the actual model shows the training and selection 
Mean Squared errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the training error 
and the orange line represents the selection error. The higher the MSE value, the 
poorer the network at generalization. The initial value of the training error is 
0.428456, and the final value after 192 epochs is 0.00283195. The initial value of 
the selection error is 0.00272551, and the final value after 192 epochs is 
0.00273038. 
 
Figure 66.  Mean square error- Quasi-Newton errors history 
 
Page 209 of 313 
 
Displayed in table 47 is a summary of the errors obtained from this model setup: 
 
Table 47. Summary of the errors obtained from the second model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest value Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 3.00586 0.000109559 0.428456 0.00283195 
Testing 0.00294441 0.00469793 0.00272551 0.00273038 
 
• Genetic Algorithm error plot  
The chart in figure 67 shows the error history for the different subsets during the 
incremental order selection process. The blue line represents the training error, its 
initial value is almost zero and the final value after 100 generations is also almost 
zero. The orange line symbolizes the selection error its initial value is 0.299061 and 
the final value after 100 generations is 0.00210002.  
 
Figure 67. Genetic Algorithm error plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
 
The history of the mean of the selection error in each generation during the genetic 
algorithm inputs selection process is illustrated in figure 68. The initial value is 
1.05101, and the final value after 100 generations decreased to 0.051. 
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Figure 68. Genetic Algorithm generation mean plot 
The next table (table 69) shows the order selection results by the Genetic algorithm. 
They include some final states from the neural network, the error functional and the 
order selection algorithm. Based on the second trial, the optimum number of inputs 
is 21 inputs. 
 
Figure 69. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 2 
 
 
The inputs which are chosen to be selected for this trial are: 
1- Public opposition 
2- Lack of coordination 
3- Private investor change 
4- Third-party delays 
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5- Subjective evaluation 
6- Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders 
7- Misinterpretation of contract 
8- Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation 
9- Material availability 
10- Construction cost overrun 
11- Geological conditions 
12- High finance cost 
13- Availability of finance 
14- Construction completion 
15- Insolvency of subcontractor 
16- Supporting utilities risk 
17- Land use 
18- Third-party reliability 
19- Excessive contract variation 
20- Delay in supply 
21- Defects in construction  
 
• Incremental Order plot  
Figure 70 shows the error history for the different subsets during the incremental 
order selection process. The blue line represents the training error and the orange 
line symbolizes the selection error. 
 
Figure 70. Incremental order plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
 
The selected optimum number of hidden neurons in this ANN are reported in table 
48.  
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Table 48. Optimal number of hidden neurons- trial 2 
 
 
4.4.4.4.3 Trial three   
Table 49 displays details associated with the choice of the third trial of the ANN 
model: 
 
Table 49. Details associated with the choice of the third trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44 (Risk factors) 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Linear 
Optimization algorithm Gradient descent  
Order selection Simulated annealing 
Inputs selection Genetic algorithm  
 
Whilst the training and selection Normalized Squared errors in each iteration for this 
tial ANN are shown in figure 71. The blue line represents the training error and the 
orange line represents the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the 
ability of the neural network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error 
measures the ability of the neural network to generalize to new data. 
The initial value of the training error is 11.5539, and the final value after one epoch 
is almost 0.914513. The initial value of the selection error is 0.654893, and the final 
value after remained almost the same after one epoch. 
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Figure 71. Normalized square error- Gradient descent errors history 
Figure 72 is extracted from the actual model, the figure shows the training and 
selection Mean Squared errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the 
training error and the orange line represents the selection error. The higher the MSE 
value, the poorer the network at generalization. In this case, the initial value of the 
training error is 39.3855, and the final value after one epoch is almost 0.345018. 




Figure 72. Mean square error- Gradient descent history 
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Table 50. Summary of the errors obtained from the third model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest value Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 11.5539 0.654893 39.3855 0.345018 
Testing 0.914513 0.654893 5.34302 1.35471 
 
• Incremental Order plot  
The error history for the different subsets during the incremental order selection 
process are shown in figure 73. The blue line represents the training error and the 
orange line symbolizes the selection error. 
 
Figure 73: Incremental order plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
 
Based on the aforementioned, it is found that based on the chosen parameters for 
trial one, one hidden neuron is the optimal number where the least MSE occurs in 
both training and testing. The MSE for training and testing are respectively 0.241224 
and 0.596911 which are acceptably low error values. This was based on ten 
iterations.  
 
Table 51 shows the order selection results by the incremental order algorithm. They 





Page 215 of 313 
 
 
Table 51. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 3 
 
The next chart (figure 74) shows the error history for the different subsets during the 
incremental order selection process. The blue line represents the training error, its 
initial value is 0.240624 and the final value after 100 generations is 0.265463. The 
orange line symbolizes the selection error its initial value is 0.124255 and the final 
value after 100 generations is 0.00478892.  
 
Figure 74. Genetic Algorithm error plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
 
The history of the mean of the selection error in each generation during the genetic 
algorithm inputs selection process is provided in figure 75. The initial value is 
0.596716, and the final value after 100 generations decreased to 0.496. 
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Figure 75. Genetic Algorithm generation mean plot 
Whilst the order selection results by the Genetic algorithm are shown in table 52. 
They include some final states from the neural network, the error functional and the 
order selection algorithm. Based on the second trial, the optimum number of inputs 
is 21 inputs. 
 
Table 52. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 3 
 
Based on the third model trial, the proposed network architecture is illustrated in 
Figure 76. In this figure the optimum number of inputs is chosen to be 15 which are 
illustrated below.  
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Figure 76. Resulted deep architecture for trial 3 
 
4.4.4.4.4 Trial four     
Below in table 53 are details associated with the choice of the fourth trial of the ANN 
model: 
 
Table 53. Details associated with the choice of the fourth trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44 (Risk factors) 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Logistic  
Optimization algorithm Conjugate Gradient  
Order selection Simulated annealing 
Inputs selection Genetic algorithm  
 
The following plot (figure 77) shows the training and selection Normalized Squared 
errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the orange 
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line represents the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability 
of the neural network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures 
the ability of the neural network to generalize to new data. 
 
The initial value of the training error is 0.422026, and the final value after 63 epochs 
is almost 0.183545. The initial value of the selection error is 1.02484, and the final 
value decreased to 0.766333 after 63 epochs. 
 
Figure 77. Normalized square error- Conjugate Gradient errors history 
 
Figure 78, extracted from the actual model shows the training and selection Mean 
Squared errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the 
orange line represents the selection error. The higher the MSE value, the poorer 
the network at generalization. In this case, the initial value of the training error is 
0.0650897, and the final value after 206 epochs is 0.0128799. The initial value of 
the selection error is 1.10045, and the final value after 206 epochs is 0.73764. 
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Figure 78. Mean square error- Conjugate Gradient history 
In  table 54, the reader is provided with a summary of the errors obtained from this 
model setup: 
 
Table 54. Summary of the errors obtained from the fourth model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest value Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 11.5539 0.654893 0.0650897 0.0128799 
Testing 0.914513 0.654893 1.10045 0.73764 
 
• Incremental Order plot  
Figure 79 shows the error history for the different subsets during the incremental 
order selection process. The blue line represents the training error and the orange 
line symbolizes the selection error. 
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Figure 79. Incremental order plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
 
Based on the aforementioned, it is found that based on the chosen parameters for 
trial one, three hidden neurons is the optimal number where the least MSE occurs 
in both training and testing. The MSE for training and testing are respectively zero 
and 0.00546449 which are acceptably low error values. This was based on ten 
iterations.  
Figure 80 shows the order selection results by the incremental order algorithm. They 
include some final states from the neural network, the error functional and the order 
selection algorithm. 
 
Figure 80. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 4 
 
• Genetic Algorithm error plot  
The next chart (figure 81) shows the error history for the different subsets during the 
incremental order selection process. The blue line represents the training error, its 
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initial value is zero and the final value after 100 generations is also zero. The orange 
line symbolizes the selection error its initial value is 0.029363 and the final value 
after 100 generations is 0.0025417.  
 
Figure 81. Genetic Algorithm error plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
 
The history of the mean of the selection error in each generation during the genetic 
algorithm inputs selection process are shown in figure 82. The initial value is 
0.282275, and the final value after 100 generations decreased to 0.00302. 
 
Figure 82. Genetic Algorithm generation mean plot 
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Whilst the order selection results by the Genetic algorithm are reported in table 55. 
They include some final states from the neural network, the error functional and the 
order selection algorithm. Based on the second trial, the optimum number of inputs 
is 18 inputs 
 
Table 55. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 4 
 
 
Based on the fourth model trial, the proposed network architecture is illustrated in 
Figure 83. In this figure the optimum number of inputs is chosen to be 18. The blue 
circles represent the perceptron (hidden) neurons.  
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Figure 83. Resulted deep architecture for trial 4 
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4.4.4.4.5 Trial five   
Details associated with the choice of the fifth trial of the ANN model are provided in 
table 56. 
 
Table 56. Details associated with the choice of the fifth trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44 (Risk factors) 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Logistic  
Optimization algorithm Gradient descent  
Order selection Incremental Order 
Inputs selection Genetic algorithm  
 
Figure 84 shows the training and selection Normalized Squared errors in each 
iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the orange line represents 
the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability of the neural 
network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures the ability of the 
neural network to generalize to new data. 
 
The initial value of the training error is 2.49161, and the final value after one epoch 
is almost 1.54628. The initial value of the selection error is 1.41821, and the final 
value remained the same after one epoch. 
 
Figure 84. Normalized square error- Gradient descent errors history 
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The plot extracted from the actual model and shown in figure 85 depicts the training 
and selection Mean Squared errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the 
training error and the orange line represents the selection error. The higher the MSE 
value, the poorer the network at generalization. In this case, the initial value of the 
training error is 0.927188, and the final value after one epoch is almost 0.505086. 
The initial value of the selection error is 1.71003, and the final value after one epoch 
is 1.71003. 
 
Figure 85. Mean square error- Gradient descent history 
Table 57 provides a summary of the errors obtained from this model setup. 
 
Table 57. Summary of the errors obtained from the fifth model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest 
value 
Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 0.927188 0.505086 2.49161 1.54628 
Testing 1.71003 1.71003 1.41821 1.41821 
 
• Incremental Order plot  
The error history for the different subsets during the incremental order selection 
process is shown in figure 86. The blue line represents the training error and the 
orange line symbolizes the selection error. 
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Figure 86: Incremental order plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
Based on the aforementioned, it is found that based on the chosen parameters for 
trial one, one hidden neuron is the optimal number where the least MSE occurs in 
both training and testing. The MSE for training and testing are respectively 0.241224 
and 0.596911 which are acceptably low error values. This was based on ten 
iterations.  
Table 58 shows the order selection results by the incremental order algorithm. They 
include some final states from the neural network, the error functional and the order 
selection algorithm. 
 
Table 58. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 5 
 
Again the error history for the different subsets during the incremental order 
selection process are shown in figure 87. The blue line represents the training error, 
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its initial value is 0.240624 and the final value after 100 generations is 0.265463. 
The orange line symbolizes the selection error its initial value is 0.124255 and the 
final value after 100 generations is 0.00478892.  
 
Figure 87. Genetic Algorithm error plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
Figure 88 shows the history of the mean of the selection error in each generation 
during the genetic algorithm inputs selection process. The initial value is 0.596716, 
and the final value after 100 generations decreased to 0.496. 
 
Figure 88. Genetic Algorithm generation mean plot 
Table 59 shows the order selection results by the Genetic algorithm. They include 
some final states from the neural network, the error functional and the order 
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selection algorithm. Based on the second trial, the optimum number of inputs is 21 
inputs 
 
Table 59. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 5 
 
Based on the fifth model trial, the proposed network architecture is illustrated in 
Figure 89. In this figure the optimum number of inputs is chosen to be 15 which are 
illustrated below.  
 
Figure 89. Resulted deep architecture for trial 5 
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4.4.4.4.6 Trial six     
Table 60 provides details associated with the choice of the sixth trial of the ANN 
model. 
 
Table 60. Details associated with the choice of the sixth trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44 (Risk factors) 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Hyperbolic tangent 
Optimization algorithm Gradient descent 
Order selection Simulated annealing 
Inputs selection Genetic algorithm  
 
Training and selection Normalized Squared errors in each iteration are provided in 
figure 90. The blue line represents the training error and the orange line represents 
the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability of the neural 
network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures the ability of the 
neural network to generalize to new data. 
 
The initial value of the training error is 13.9394, and the final value after one epoch 
is almost 1.93558. The initial value of the selection error is 0.745152, and the final 
value after one epoch decreased to 0.330551. 
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Figure 90. Normalized square error- Gradient descent errors history 
 
Figure 91 shows a plot extracted from the actual model shows the training and 
selection Mean Squared errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the 
training error and the orange line represents the selection error. The higher the MSE 
value, the poorer the network at generalization. In this case, the initial value of the 
training error is 0.492519, and the final value after one epoch is 0.357687. The initial 
value of the selection error is 1.5966, and the final value after one epoch remained 
the same. 
 
Figure 91. Mean square error- Gradient descent history 
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Table 61 is a summary of the errors obtained from this model setup: 
 
Table 61. Summary of the errors obtained from the sixth model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest 
value 
Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 13.9394 1.93558 0.492519 0.357687 
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• Genetic Algorithm error plot  
Figure 92 shows the error history for the different subsets during the incremental 
order selection process. The blue line represents the training error, its initial value 
and its final value after 100 generations is zero. The orange line symbolizes the 
selection error its initial value is 0.029363 and the final value after 100 generations 
is 0.0024517.  
 
Figure 92. Genetic Algorithm error plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
 
Figure 93 shows the history of the mean of the selection error in each generation 
during the genetic algorithm inputs selection process. The initial value is 0.282275, 
and the final value after 100 generations decreased to 0.00302. 
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Figure 93. Genetic Algorithm generation mean plot 
Table 62 shows the order selection results by the Genetic algorithm. They include 
some final states from the neural network, the error functional and the order 
selection algorithm. Based on the second trial, the optimum number of inputs is 18 
inputs 
 
Table 62. Incremental error results and optimal number of hidden neurons for trial 6 
 
 
Based on the sixth model trial, the proposed network architecture is illustrated in 
Figure 94. In this figure the optimum number of inputs is chosen to be 18 which are 
illustrated below.  
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Figure 94: Resulted deep architecture for trial 6 
 
4.4.4.4.7 Trial seven     
Table 63 provides details associated with the choice of the seventh trial of the ANN 
model: 
 
Table 63. Details associated with the choice of the seventh trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44  (Risk factors) 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Linear 
Optimization algorithm Conjugate Gradient  
Order selection Simulated annealing 
Inputs selection Pruning inputs 
 
The following plot (figure 95) shows the training and selection Normalized Squared 
errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the orange 
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line represents the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability 
of the neural network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures 
the ability of the neural network to generalize to new data. 
 
The initial value of the training error is 39.3573, and the final value after 151 epochs 
is almost 0.127478. The initial value of the selection error is 11.8303, and the final 
value after 151 epochs became 0.394828. 
 
Figure 95: Normalized square error- Conjugate Gradient errors history 
 
The following plot extracted from the actual model shows the training and selection 
Mean Squared errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the training error 
and the orange line represents the selection error. The higher the MSE value, the 
poorer the network at generalization. In this case, the initial value of the training 
error is 0.0650897, and the final value after 206 epochs is 0.0128799. The initial 
value of the selection error is 1.10045, and the final value after 206 epochs is 
0.737464. 
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Figure 96: Mean square error- Conjugate Gradient history 
 
Below in table 64 is a summary of the errors obtained from this model setup. 
 
Table 64. Summary of the errors obtained from the seventh model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest 
value 
Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 39.3573 0.127478 0.0650897 0.0128799 
Testing 11.8303 11.8303 1.10045 0.737464 
 
Based on the seventh model trial, concerning the proposed network, the optimum 
number of inputs is chosen to be 25 which are:  
1- Lack of communication between stakeholders 
2- Third party tort liability 
3- Lack of support from government 
4- Inadequate distribution of responsibilities 
5- Inadequate PPP experience 
6- Lack of commitment between parties 
7- Delay in resolving contractual dispute 
8- Lack of coordination 
9- Private investor change 
10- Third-party delays 
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11- Subjective evaluation 
12- Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders 
13- Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation 
14- Construction cost overrun 
15- Geological conditions 
16- Construction completion 
17- Poor quality workmanship 
18- Labor availability 
19- Insolvency of subcontractors 
20- Construction delays 
21- Labor disputes 
22- Land use 
23- Government reliability 
24- Excessive contract variation 
25- Constructability 
 
4.4.4.4.8 Trial eight     
Table 65 provides are the details associated with the choice of the eighth trial of the 
ANN model. 
 
Table 65. Details associated with the choice of the eight trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44 (Risk factors) 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Linear 
Optimization algorithm Quasi-Newton  
Order selection Simulated annealing 
Inputs selection Growing inputs 
 
Training and selection Normalized Squared errors in each iteration are shown in 
figure 97. The blue line represents the training error and the orange line represents 
the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability of the neural 
network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures the ability of the 
neural network to generalize to new data. 
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The initial value of the training error is 8.28199, and the final value after 198 epochs 
is almost zero. The initial value of the selection error is 3.87898, and the final value 
after 198 epochs is 1.06001. 
 
Figure 97. Normalized square error- Quasi-Newton method 
Training and selection Mean Squared errors in each iteration are provided in figure 
98. The blue line represents the training error and the orange line represents the 
selection error. The initial value of the training error is 0.428456, and the final value 
after 192 epochs is 0.00283195. The initial value of the selection error is 
0.00272551, and the final value after 192 epochs is 0.00273038.  
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Figure 98. Mean square error- Quasi-Newton method 
Below in table 66 is a summary of the errors obtained from this model setup. 
 
Table 66. Summary of the errors obtained from the eight-model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest 
value 
Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 8.28199 0 0.428456 0.00283195 
Testing 3.87898 1.06001 0.0027255 0.0027304 
 
• Simulated annealing error plot 
The next chart (figure 99) shows the error history for the different subsets during the 
simulated annealing order selection process. The blue line represents the training 
error and the orange line symbolizes the selection error.  
 
Figure 99: Incremental order plot for the number of neurons in hidden layer 
Based on the eight-model trial, the proposed network architecture is consisting from 
17 input nodes and one hidden node.  
 
4.4.4.4.9 Trial nine    
Below (table 67) are the details associated with the choice of the ninth trial of the 
ANN model. 
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Table 67. Details associated with the choice of the ninth trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44 (Risk factors) 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Logistic 
Optimization algorithm Quasi-Newton  
Order selection Incremental 
Inputs selection Growing inputs 
 
The plot shown in figure 100 shows the training and selection Normalized Squared 
errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the orange 
line represents the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability 
of the neural network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures 
the ability of the neural network to generalize to new data. The following plot shows 
the training and selection errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the 
training error and the orange line represents the selection error. The initial value of 
the training error is 1.84748, and the final value after 4 epochs is 1.64443. The initial 
value of the selection error is 0.00294441, and the final value after 4 epochs is 
0.00294441.  
 
Figure 100. Normalized square error- Quasi-Newton method 
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The following plot (figure 101) shows the training and selection errors in each 
iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the orange line represents 
the selection error. The initial value of the training error is 0.428456, and the final 
value after 192 epochs is 0.00283195. The initial value of the selection error is 
0.00272551, and the final value after 192 epochs is 0.00273038.  
 
Figure 101. Mean square error- Quasi-Newton method 
Below in table 68 is a summary of the errors obtained from this model setup. 
 
Table 68. Summary of the errors obtained from the ninth model setup 
 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest 
value 
Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 1.87478 1.64443 0.428456 0.00283195 
Testing 0.0029444 0.0029444 0.0027255 0.0027304 
 
Based on the ninth model trial, the proposed network architecture is illustrated in 
Figure 102. In this figure the optimum number of inputs is chosen to be 15 with one 
hidden neuron. 
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4.4.4.4.10 Trial ten     
Below (table 69) are the details associated with the choice of the tenth trial of the 
ANN model. 
 
Table 69. Details associated with the choice of the tenth trial of the ANN model 
Parameter Choice 
Inputs 44  (Risk factors) 
Outputs One (Project delay) 
Activation function Hyperbolic tangent 
Optimization algorithm Conjugate Gradient  
Order selection Incremental  
Inputs selection Pruning inputs  
 
Figure 103 shows the training and selection Normalized Squared errors in each 
iteration. The blue line represents the training error and the orange line represents 
the selection (testing) error. The training error measures the ability of the neural 
network to fit the data that it sees. But the selection error measures the ability of the 
neural network to generalize to new data. 
 
Figure 103 also shows the training and selection errors in each iteration. The initial 
value of the training error is 39.3573, and the final value after 151 epochs is 
0.127478. The initial value of the selection error is 11.8303, and the final value after 
151 epochs is 0.394828. 
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Figure 103. Normalized square error- Conjugate Gradient errors history 
The following plot extracted from the actual model shows the training and selection 
Mean Squared errors in each iteration. The blue line represents the training error 
and the orange line represents the selection error. The higher the MSE value, the 
poorer the network at generalization. The following plot shows the training and 
selection errors in each iteration. The initial value of the training error is 4.85305, 
and the final value after 211 epochs is 0.170278. The initial value of the selection 
error is 2.6571, and the final value after 211 epochs is 0.127035. 
 
Figure 104. Mean square error- Conjugate Gradient history 
Below in table 70 is a summary of the errors obtained from this model setup. 
 
Table 70. Summary of the errors obtained from the tenth model setup 
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 Normalized-square error Mean Square error 
Highest 
value 
Lowest value Highest value Lowest value 
Training 4.85305 0.170278 39.3573 0.127478 
Testing 2.6571 0.127035 11.8303 0.394828 
 
Based on the tenth model trial, the proposed network architecture is chosen to be 
with 39 input nodes and one hidden node.  
 
4.4.4.5 Conclusions and observations based on models ´performance  
Table 41 (this can be seen on p. 196 of this thesis) includes a summary of the best 
models and their performance which were detailed in the previous section. Based 
on the different trials output, it is concluded that Model 4 delivers the smallest range 
of error (MSE and NSE) for training and testing. The architecture of this particular 
model is: 18 input nodes, three hidden neurons on two layers and one output. It was 
trained using a logistic function. The training was set to continue until there is no 
more improvement in test error over 10 cycles to prevent model over-fitting. The 
optimum model architecture is illustrated in figure 83 (this can be seen on p. 220 of 
this thesis) showing which risk factors to include.  
 
The next best model delivering the smallest errors is trial N. 6 (with the architecture 
18-2-1-1). For this specific model, the activation function was chosen to be the 
hyperbolic tangent, the optimization algorithm is the gradient descent, simulated 
annealing is used for order selection and genetic algorithm is used for inputs 
selection. Trials one and two delivered also results with relatively low error ranges 
for both training and testing. For both models, hyperbolic tangent was the activation 
function used, quasi-newton was used as the optimization algorithm and the order 
selection was incremental. The only difference lies in the input’s selection where 
growing inputs and genetic algorithm were respectively used for trial one and two. 
Nevertheless, the optimum architecture for both models differed where for the first 
trial the optimum architecture was to have 39 input nodes, 6 hidden nodes in one 
layer and one output. On the other hand, the second trial’s architecture was 21 
nodes in the input layer, two hidden nodes on one layer and one output node. 
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Accordingly, based on the performance of the model in the different trials, some 
observations can be drawn which are: 
1- As previously stated in the literature review, the hidden nodes’ role is crucial 
in extracting and memorizing the useful features from the input layers in order 
to determine the values of the output layer.  
2- In this particular research, with the application of “early stopping” to avoid 
over-fitting, the number of hidden nodes was ranging between one and 6.  
3- In this particular research, it is noticed that having the hidden perceptron on 
two layers improved the model’s performance significantly and decreased 
errors for both training and testing.  
4- After performing training and testing of all models, and in all trials, it was 
noticed that the error decreased considerably by decreasing the number of 
input nodes. 
5- Using the hyperbolic tangent activation function delivered relatively low 
errors compared to linear and logistic.  
 
In addition to the MSE calculation proposed in almost all sources in the literature 
implementing ANN models (Gulcicek, et al. 2013, Gunaydin and Dogan 2004, 
Boussabaine 1996, Lhee et al. 2012, Heravi and Eslamdoost 2015), there are other 
ways to test the validity of the ANN such as: 
1- Consistency: Checked when the executions are repeated several times with 
the same data and checking the results. If the same data delivers the same 
results each time, then the network is consistent. 
2- Accuracy: This done by comparing the known data with the model’s 
predictions.  
3- Sensitivity analysis: It consists of varying each parameter, while holding all 
other parameters constant and observing how changing each parameter 
alone affects the output result. It will be explained in more details in the next 
sub-sub-section.  
 
4.4.5 Performing sensitivity analysis  
Patel and Jha (2014) points out that the aim of sensitivity analysis is to determine 
the cause and effect relationship between inputs and outputs of the ANN model. 
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According to Gunaydin and Dogan (2004), sensitivity analysis helps in determining 
the effect of each of the network inputs on the network output. This determines 
which input parameters are the most significant to the model’s output. It is important 
to disable the network learning during the sensitivity analysis.  
 
Sonmez and Rowings (1998) explain the procedure necessary to perform the 
sensitivity analysis in a simple yet clear way. The value of each factor will be varied 
will the values of all other factors will be fixed. Lhee et al. (2012) points out that 
performing the sensitivity analysis will help in ranking the variables based on their 
significance. This will help in determining how the output vary as a function of a 
single input. In this case, sensitivity analysis was performed on the input factors 
used in each of the best retained models from the previous stage. Table 71 shows 
the relative influence of the various risks on the predictive performance of the 
models. The variables (risks) are then arranged in order of contribution to the total 
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3.37917 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.37917 0.676 
34 Delay in supply 1.25 1.25 0 1.25 0 0 0 1.25 0 1.25 0.625 
35 Public opposition  0 6.08333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.608 
36 Staff crisis 1.08083 0 1.08083 0 1.08083 0 0 0 1.08083 1.08083 0.540 




0.944167 1.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.944167 0.314 








0.833333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.833333 0.167 
42 Labor availability 0.2775 0 0 0.2775 0 0.2775 0.2775 0 0 0.2775 0.139 










Page 251 of 313 
 
It is noticed, based on this table that the most significant risk factor is “the lack of 
coordination” as it is the most important contributor to the model´s ability to predict 
total project´s delay. On the other hand, the least significant risk factor in this case 
is the “constructability” and the “protection of geological and historical objects”.  The 
results of this sensitivity analysis and its comparison to the outcomes of the risk 
ranking based on the literature review are further discussed in section 4.5.  
 
4.5 Final validation of the Artificial Neural Network model 
4.5.1 Automated verification of the performance of the model after training  
After the sensitivity analysis will be performed in order to determine the effect of 
each one of the 44 risks on the project’s completion time, a new risk ranking will be 
developed based on the outcomes of the model.  
 
Based on the model´s outcomes, the below table shows the value of the correlations 
between all input and target variables ranked in descending order based on the best 
model out of the ten models. The maximum correlation (0.803336) is yield between 
the input variable “Delay in resolving contractual dispute” and the target variable 
“Schedule growth”. 37 risk factors out of the 44 have a high correlation factor (more 
than 0.1) with the total project´s delay.  
 
The following factors have “zero” correlation with the overall project delay:  
• Constructability 
• Protection of geological and historical objects 
• Construction cost overrun 
• Private investor change 
• Public opposition 
 
Despite the fact that “zero” correlation in fact means that the input and output 
variables are independent from each other, this is not true for this particular 
research. The reason for these variables having the value of zero is that these risk 
factors were not present in the projects forming Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 from the 
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data collection phase. The absence of occurrence of these risks is the main reason 
that they showed “no correlation” with the output variable.  
 
Table 72. Schedule Growth correlation table 
Risk 
number 
Risk name Correlation 
value 
1 Delay in resolving contractual dispute 0.803336 
2 Lack of communication between 
stakeholders 
0.550436 
3 Material availability 0.52233 
4 Misinterpretation of contract 0.52233 
5 Site availability 0.473285 
6 waste of materials 0.468641 
7 supporting utilities risk 0.440892 
8 Delay in supply 0.440886 
9 Labor availability 0.440884 
10 Geological conditions 0.431428 
11 Construction completion 0.410046 
12 Third-party reliability 0.356261 
13 Government reliability 0.331109 
14 Availability of finance 0.331109 
15 High finance cost 0.331109 
16 Inadequate PPP experience 0.320319 
17 Inadequate negotiation period prior to 
initiation 
0.303625 
18 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders 0.303625 
19 Labor disputes 0.260199 
20 Site safety 0.260198 
21 Lack of coordination 0.259285 
22 Stakeholder management 0.258581 
23 Inadequate distribution of authorities 0.258581 
24 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities 0,258581 
25 Differences in working methods 0.224261 
26 Staff crisis 0.20182 
27 Third-party delays 0.186922 
28 Construction delays 0.182161 
29 Need for land acquisition 0.180697 
30 Insolvency of subcontractors 0.175718 
31 Excessive contract variation 0.160275 
32 Third-party tort liability 0.150971 
33 Subjective evaluation 0.148367 
34 Lack of commitment between parties 0.148352 
35 Cultural differences 0.121717 
36 Defects in construction 0.117501 
37 Poor quality workmanship 0.117501 
38 Land use 0.062796 
 




Risk name Correlation 
value 
39 Lack of support from government 0.003338 
40 Constructability 0 
41 Protection of geological and historical 
objects 
0 
42 Construction cost overrun 0 
43 Private investor change 0 
44 Public opposition 0 
 
The correlation between each input variable (the percentage of contribution of each 
risk factor) to the output value (overall project delay) is illustrated in the graph shown 
in figure 105.  
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Figure 105: Schedule growth correlation chart 
 
At this stage, a comparison will be established between this new ranking and the 
ranking previously obtained from the literature review based on content analysis 
and on the ranking obtained from the sensitivity analysis in section 4.4.5. Comments 
and recommendations will be drawn. The three different rankings are detailed in 
Table 73.  
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Table 73. Comparison between the new ranking, the ranking from the literature and the ranking obtained from 
the sensitivity analysis 
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38 13 36 
 
Based on the data provided in table 73, the following observations can be drawn: 
• Based on the literature review, the material availability risk occupies the 
first position in terms of the most critical risks. This ranking is similar to a 
great extent to its ranking based on the correlation calculations according 
to which this risk occupies the third position. On the other hand, the 
ranking of this same risk is 31 based on the sensitivity analysis in terms 
of its effect and contribution to the total project delay.  
 
• The “Delay in resolving contractual dispute” occupies the highest rank in 
terms of correlation with the total project delay based on the ANN model’s 
outputs. This ranking is also similar to the results of the sensitivity analysis 
where it occupies the second position in terms of the risks having the 
highest contribution to the total project’s delay. On the other hand, the 
same risk is ranked 31st based on the results of the analysis of the 
literature review. Since the ANN model was based on real case projects, 
it makes more sense that this particular risk can be of detrimental effect 
to the project’s completion time. The same goes for the risk “Inadequate 
negotiation period prior to initiation”. This risk, based on the model’s 
deliverables, is ranking 11th and 17th in sensitivity analysis and correlation 
to the total project’s delay while, based on the literature review, is ranking 
42nd out of 44.  
 
• The “Public opposition” risk is one of the most severe risks facing PPP 
projects based on the literature review as it occupies the second position 
based on the various sources taken into account. Nevertheless, based on 
the sensitivity analysis and on the correlation analysis, this risk occupies 
the 35th and 44th positions respectively. This difference in ranking can be 
caused by the relatively small sample size of PPP projects studied in this 
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research. The dataset studied was not encompassing such risk as it was 
not faced in the projects that were analyzed. However, this does not mean 
that this risk is not significant especially for PPP projects. As it was 
previously discussed in section 2.3.8 the general public has a 
considerable power especially when it comes to PPP projects. The same 
goes for “poor quality workmanship” risk which ranks 9th based on the 
literature review and has less contribution to the total project’s delay 
based on the sensitivity and correlation analysis where it occupies 21st 
and 37th positions respectively.  
 
• For other risks such as “Constructability”, “staff crisis” and “subjective 
evaluation”, the literature review and the model deliverables produced 
very close results.  
 
 4.5.2. Manual validation of the model through interviews 
After the model development was performed, as a second way to test the model’s 
reliability, ease of use and clarity of outcomes, the model was circulated among 25 
experts in the domain of construction engineering. As there was no predetermined 
written format for the interview questions and in order to obtain the proper and 
unified response to the interview from the various experts, the following strategy 
was followed: 
1- Individual meetings were held with each one of the experts in order to provide 
detailed information and background about the purpose and objectives of the 
research.  
2- The list of risks (construction and stakeholders risks) were handed to the 
experts.  
3- Further explanation was provided regarding artificial intelligence and Artificial 
Neural Network models development.  
4- The use of Artificial Neural Network to develop the model was explained with 
a special emphasis on the major aim of the model which is to determine the 
effects of stakeholders and construction risks on the total project delay in a 
comparison between PPP projects and traditional projects.  
5- The operation principles of the software were explained.  
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6- After all clarifications needed by the experts were provided, each expert was 
invited to use and test the pre-developed model and visualize the outcomes 
of the model.  
7- The experts were also invited and guided on how to change the different 
parameters such as the activation function, the order selection and the 
optimization algorithm and monitor the contributions of such parameters on 
the training and testing errors, on the number of hidden nodes and on the 
risk factors contributing to the project´s delay.  
For all of the aforementioned steps, the experts were closely guided by the 
researcher. The following sections provide some information regarding the 
respondents to the interview.  
 
4.5.2.1 Background information of the interviewees  
Among the respondents, 72 % (18 respondents out of 25) have a more than 10 year 
experience in the domain of Construction Engineering: 36% of the respondents 
have more than 15 years of experience in the domain of Construction Engineering 
and 36 % of the respondents have an experience in the domain of Construction 
Engineering ranging from 10 to 15 years. 28% of the respondents have an 
experience ranging from 0 to 10 years. This is illustrated in figure 106: 
 
Figure 106. Experience of the respondents in the domain of Construction Engineering 
 
 
Page 260 of 313 
 
Concerning the domain of work of the respondents, 92 % of them have worked or 
are working in the private sector. 20 % of them have worked in the public sector and 
20 % have worked in the Academic sector as illustrated in figure 107 below:  
 
Figure 107. Domain of work of the respondents 
 
All the respondents to the interview have worked and are currently working in Egypt 
as shown in the table 74 and figure108. 
 
Table 74. Work location of the respondents 






Egypt 100.0% 25 
Other  10 
Total Number 25 
 
Figure 108. Work location and background of the respondents 
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However, 10 out of the 25 respondents have worked in other countries such as 
Australia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, United States, The United Kingdom, Canada, 
Africa, etc.  as shown in table 75. 
 
Table 75. Other countries in which the respondents have worked 
Number Other  countries in which the respondents have worked 
1 United Kingdom 
2 Saudi 
3 International 
4 previous experience at the states of Qatar and Kuwait 
5 Algeria, USA 
6 Canada 
7 Africa 




Concerning the experience of the respondents in PPP projects, 44% of the 
respondents (11 respondents out of 25) have an experience in PPP projects ranging 
from 2 to 4 years. 12% of the respondents have more than 6 years of experience in 
PPP projects. 8% of the survey respondents have an experience ranging from 4 to 
6 years while 36% of the respondents (9 respondents out of 25) have a recent 
experience in PPP projects which is ranging from 0 to 2 years. 
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Figure 109. PPP experience of the interview respondent 
 
The respondents have worked in different types of PPP projects such as 
educational, transportation, health, wastewater treatment, housing, power, etc. 
Approximately, 80 % of the respondents have worked in transportation PPP 
projects, 56 % of the respondents have worked in health PPP projects and 45% of 
the respondents have worked in educational projects as it is shown in figure 110: 
 
Figure 110. Types of PPP projects that the respondents have worked in 
 
On the other hand, 20 respondents out of the 25 have worked in other PPP project 
types than the above-mentioned transportation, educational and health projects as 
shown in table 76: 
 
Table 76. Other PPP project types that the respondents have been involved with 
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Number Other  PPP project types 
1 Water Treatment 
2 Water Treatment 
3 Wastewater 
4 Sewage Treatment 
5 Sewage Treatment Plant 
6 Water Treatment Projects 
7 Infrastructure-Waste Water Treatment 
8 Water 
9 Wastewater Treatment 
10 Infrastructure 
11 Infrastructure (wastewater Treatment Plant) 
12 Sewage treatment Plant 
13 Waste Water Treatment 
14 Waste Water 
15 Waste and Airports 
16 Housing 
17 Residential 
18 Affordable Housing project 
19 Utilities 
20 Utilities and power 
 
All the respondents have been involved in PPP projects in Egypt while 5 
respondents have been involved in PPP projects in other countries such as Canada, 
Australia, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. This is illustrated in table 77: 
 
Table 77. Other countries in which the respondents have worked in the domain of PPP 
Number Other  
1 Canada 
2 Australia 
3 Saudi Arabia 
4 Malaysia (Conference) 
5 Regional 
 
4.5.2.2 Observations of the interviewees regarding the ANN model 
After the ANN model and its deliverables were discussed with each one of the 
interviewees as explained in the previous section, the following observations were 
provided by the interviewees: 
 
1- The software Neural Designer ® is a user-friendly software which does not 
require any programming knowledge. This will be encouraging for different 
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users to try inserting the different risks for any given new project in order to 
determine the contribution of each risk to the total project delay. 
2- 100% of the interviewees confirmed that this model will be more beneficial if 
it is possible to provide a cost-modelling as well.  
3- Regarding the risk ranking based on sensitivity analysis and input-output 
correlation, the ranking of some risks is in line with real life such as Delay in 
resolving contractual dispute, lack of coordination, availability of finance. 
However, in other cases, and due to the size of the dataset, the ranking of 
some risks is not in line with real life. For instance, the need for land 
acquisition and public opposition are severe risks which have great 
implications on the project’s time for completion. Their ranking based on the 
ANN model does not truly reflect their importance in real-case projects. 
4.6 Chapter Summary  
A lot of project time and cost information are usually available on any particular 
construction project. If proper document control is performed over time, a vast 
database of valuable and retrievable asset can result. This can be converted into 
useful models and decision-support systems that can, in the future, help 
construction practitioners and decision-makers during the lifetime of the project.  
 
This chapter presents a practical means of transforming information embedded in 
existing construction projects into data-modelling information for more reliable delay 
analysis. Using Artificial Neural Networks, and using data extracted from traditional 
projects, the model was developed determining the effects of construction and 
stakeholders risks on the project completion time. Then, in order to test the model’s 
performance, the same concept was applied on PPP projects. Ten trials have been 
presented and the model  that was delivering the smallest range of errors shall be 
retained for future research.  
 
In order to validate the model’s performance, sensitivity analysis helped in 
determining the effect of each of the network inputs on the network output. 
Furthermore, based on the model´s outcomes, the value of the correlations between 
all input and target variables ranked in descending order based on the best model 
out of the ten models was determined. 
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As another way to test the model’s reliability, ease of use and clarity of outcomes, 
the model was circulated among 25 experts in the domain of construction 
engineering. 
 
The results from the models show significant promise for future work on construction 
data mining, thereby potentially producing more reliable and realistic estimates. The 
model will be particularly useful in the construction stage of the project. The method 
and approach adopted to develop the models can be extended to even more 
detailed and holistic estimation including the “cost” aspect as well as long as 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Chapter Introduction  
There has been a continuous increase in the demand for public services and 
infrastructure all over the world especially in developing countries. Accordingly, the 
attention towards the PPP scheme increased as it is a way for the public authorities 
to improve their infrastructure and provide better services to the end users with the 
help and expertise of the private sector. However, due to the complexity of such 
scheme, it has not always been successful. It has been noticed that in several 
cases, the “failure” of such scheme was due to underestimation of stakeholders’ 
effects on the project. Consequently, proper risk management in PPP projects 
necessitates a clear understanding and thorough study especially when it comes to 
stakeholders and construction risks occurring during the whole project’s lifecycle 
especially during construction period.  
 
This Chapter illustrates the key findings and results of the study by tying the results 
reached to the aims and objectives in the introductory chapter. Also, in this chapter, 
the research questions shall be answered to identify the theoretical and practical 
implications of the study.  
5.2 Review of original aims and objectives 
Based on the research conducted in Chapter Two, Three and Four, the following 
conclusions were reached regarding the objectives previously stated in Chapter 
One.  
 
1- Develop a mathematical approach modelling the expected total effect of risks 
associated with poor stakeholder management during the construction phase 
on PPP projects’ schedule based on historical details of previous PPP 
projects in a comparative study with traditional construction projects using 
ANNs.  
 
The main aim of the research has been achieved. The model was developed using 
Neural Designer ® Software. This software was used in particular as it is a powerful 
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user-friendly interface able to make complex operations and build predictive models 
in an intuitive way with a graphical user interface. 
 
To build the model, the following parameters were used: 
1- The 44 risk factors used as input variables 
2- Schedule Growth (or total project delay) used as target variables 
 
The dataset contains 12 instances (or 12 projects) and was divided into: 
d. Training comprising 66.7% of the projects (8 traditional projects) 
e. Selection (testing) comprising 16.7% of the projects (2 traditional 
projects) 
f. Validation comprising 16.7 of the projects (2 PPP projects) 
Once all the dataset information has been set, some analytics were performed in 
order to check the quality of the data.  
 
During the training phase, as it was previously explained, the neuron calculates the 
sum of the weighed inputs, subtracts its threshold from the sum and transfers the 
results by a transformation function or “activation function”.  Early stopping was used 
in order to avoid model overfitting. Early stopping is simply described by halting or 
“stopping” training once the model error stops decreasing. The major benefit of early 
stopping is to overcome “memorizing” or “over-fitting. 
Model performance was detected using Mean Squared Error (MSE) and Normalized 
Squared Error (NSE) over the training, testing and validation datasets. 
 
Ten trials of the ANN model were performed using different training and testing 
strategies in order to be able choose the optimum model that has the best learning 
capabilities and delivering the least possible errors during the training and testing 
without falling in the trap of “overfitting” or “underfitting”.  
 
Based on the different trials output, it is concluded that Model 4 delivers the smallest 
range of error (MSE and NSE) for training and testing. The architecture of this 
particular model is: 18 input nodes, three hidden neurons on two layers and one 
output. It was trained using a logistic function. The training was set to continue until 
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there is no more improvement in test error over 10 cycles to prevent model over-
fitting. 
 
it is noticed that having the hidden perceptron on two layers improved the model’s 
performance significantly and decreased errors for both training and testing. After 
performing training and testing of all models, and in all trials, it was noticed that the 
error decreased considerably by decreasing the number of input nodes. 
Using the hyperbolic tangent activation function delivered relatively low errors 
compared to linear and logistic.  
 
2- Provide a better conceptual understanding of the PPP scheme and different 
types of PPP. 
 
The PPP model is complex model involving long-term relationships. PPPs are 
categorized into contractual and institutionalized PPPs. Also, there are different 
degrees of partnership between the public and the private partner based on the role 
of the private partner. The degrees range from the design Build contract until 
reaching the privatization. Nevertheless, in all cases, PPP projects involve bringing 
two different milieus to operate in a single project organization. The extreme 
challenge facing PPP project is the paradox between the concepts of “public”, 
concerned about the community as a whole, and “private” concerned about the 
Value for Money, the profit and the market competitiveness. 
 
3- In light of the PPP history, study, evaluate previous failure and success 
stories in different countries that used PPP delivery method and critically 
appraise existing international literatures relating to PPP to identify the 
common key success factors and major causes of failure of PPP projects. 
 
Some countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union have 
a strong and well established PPP scheme. Other countries, such as the Middle 
East countries, Turkey and China are taking serious steps by establishing PPP laws 
and PPP central units affiliated to its governments to study PPP projects. From the 
literature, it has been found that in general the critical success factors are: 
o Adequate risk identification and allocation 
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o Good stakeholder management 
o Paying attention to the role of the general public (the 4th P) 
 
4. Provide a better conceptual understanding of “Risk Management” and 
“Stakeholder Management” and ascertain, through a critical review of the 
literature, how both concepts are related.  
 
The quality of the relationship between public and private sector on one side and 
the end users on the other side has been shown to be a key contributor to the 
success of a PPP project. In fact, the real case projects that were discussed can be 
considered as clear evidence to support the following statement “Many of the risks 
affecting PPP projects arise due to poor management of stakeholders”. Therefore, 
minimizing the risks caused by inadequate management of stakeholders is a way 
of mitigation of a significant number of risks affecting PPP projects which is step 
towards better Risk Management for PPP projects.  
 
5. Develop from existing literature a comprehensive list including all the risks 
affecting PPP projects and determine to which risk group each individual risk 
is associated (For instance: economic, political, etc.), map each identified risk 
to its root cause and establish a cross-country comparison between different 
risks.  
 
In this research and in order to develop “the risks checklist”, an extensive literature 
review of 30 sources was thoroughly studied in order to develop the list of the risks 
affecting PPP projects. To properly develop a comprehensive list of risks, the journal 
papers, research and publications that were studied covered the time span between 
1998 and 2018. Furthermore, the literature review performed for the sake of 
developing the risk factors was encompassing different countries. Some researches 
were studying the risk factors worldwide and others were dedicated to specifically 
study the risks associated with countries such as: the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, 
Scotland, China, Australia, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Iran, Malysia, Thailand, 
Portugal and South Africa. These countries were chosen to encompass different 
levels of PPP experience as previously explained in Chapter Two (Section 2.1.6: 
PPP around the world: success and failure stories). For instance, the Unites 
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Kingdom is an experienced country with a long history in PPPs, China and India are 
considered countries with limited PPP experience while Portugal is considered a 
country with moderate PPP experience. The risks extracted from this literature 
review are the outcomes of previous research, interviews and questionnaires. 
Accordingly, a comprehensive list of 118 risks was developed. The 118 identified 
risks were classified into various categories based on the source of each risk and 
on lifecycle perspective (Li and Zou 2012). Based on the research, the risks 
affecting PPP projects are classified into 16 different categories. Among the 16 
categories, six categories are related to the life-cycle of the PPP project which are: 
feasibility study, financing, design, construction, operation and commissioning.  In 
this research, the specific stage in the lifecycle of the project where the risk appears 
is specified. However, some risks should be managed throughout the lifecycle of 
the project from the start till the end such as legal, political and stakeholders’ related 
risks.  
 
In addition to the ranking and classification of risks into various risks categories, 
each one of the identified risks was mapped to its corresponding country. The 
purpose of this step is to know the critical risks that the literature identified for each 
country in order to establish a cross-country comparison. From this mapping, it is 
found that most of the risks affecting PPP projects around the world are political, 
legal, stakeholder and construction risks. The inadequate PPP experience, lack of 
support from government, force majeure and permits delays are affecting PPP 
projects in all the countries included in this research. It is also noticed that risks 
affecting developed countries such as Hong Kong, China and UK are of similar 
nature to the risks affecting developing countries.  
 
6. Develop a ranking for the identified risks based on the literature review with 
a special emphasis on risks related to construction and poor stakeholder 
management.  
 
From this ranking regarding the stakeholders related risks, it was found that the 
public opposition risk, which has the highest ranking among the stakeholders 
related risks also occupies ranking # 7 among the overall risk ranking. Based on the 
assessment technique used in this research, the top five risks related to 
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stakeholders’ issues and affecting PPP projects are: the public opposition, lack of 
communication between stakeholders, third party tort liability, need for land 
acquisition and lack of support from government.  
From this ranking regarding the construction risks, it was found that the material 
availability risk, which has the highest ranking among the construction risks also 
occupies ranking # 5 among the overall risk ranking. Based on the assessment 
technique used in this research, the top 5 risks related to construction and affecting 
PPP projects are: material availability, construction cost overrun, geological 
conditions, high finance cost/availability of finance and construction completion 
risks. 
 
7. Using data collected from real case projects, design the Neural Network 
approach modelling the effect of construction risks and poor stakeholder 
management risks (previously identified in step (4)) on the project’s schedule 
and time for completion. The data will be collected for both traditional and 
PPP projects. 
 
This objective has also been achieved. Several ANN models were trained for this 
research using different activation functions (i.e. Gradient descent, conjugate 
gradient and Quasi-Newton). All 44 risk factors were used initially with Total Project 
Delay (Schedule Growth) as model output. Early stopping was used in order to avoid 
model overfitting. Model performance was detected using Mean Squared Error 
(MSE) and Normalized Squared Error (NSE) over the training, testing and validation 
datasets. 
 
8. Determine, based on the model’s outputs, a new ranking for the risks 
affecting the project’s time for the completion. 
 
The aim of sensitivity analysis is to determine the cause and effect relationship 
between inputs and outputs of the ANN model. In this case, sensitivity analysis was 
performed on the input factors used in each of the best retained models from the 
previous stage. It is noticed, based on this table that the most significant risk factor 
is “the lack of coordination” as it is the most important contributor to the model´s 
ability to predict total project´s delay. On the other hand, the least significant risk 
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factor in this case is the “constructability” and the “protection of geological and 
historical objects”.  The results of this sensitivity analysis and its comparison to the 
outcomes of the risk ranking based on the literature review are further discussed in 
section 4.5.  
 
9. Compare the risk ranking generated through the Neural Network model to 
the risk ranking previously developed though the literature review in step (7). 
 
At this stage, a comparison was established between this new ranking and the 
ranking previously obtained from the literature review based on content analysis 
and on the ranking obtained from the sensitivity analysis. The following observations 
can be drawn: 
 
• Based on the literature review, the material availability risk occupies the 
first position in terms of the most critical risks. This ranking is similar to a 
great extent to its ranking based on the correlation calculations according 
to which this risk occupies the third position. On the other hand, the 
ranking of this same risk is 31 based on the sensitivity analysis in terms 
of its effect and contribution to the total project delay.  
 
• The “Delay in resolving contractual dispute” occupies the highest rank in 
terms of correlation with the total project delay based on the ANN model’s 
outputs. This ranking is also similar to the results of the sensitivity analysis 
where it occupies the second position in terms of the risks having the 
highest contribution to the total project’s delay. On the other hand, the 
same risk is ranked 31st based on the results of the analysis of the 
literature review. Since the ANN model was based on real case projects, 
it makes more sense that this particular risk can be of detrimental effect 
to the project’s completion time. The same goes for the risk “Inadequate 
negotiation period prior to initiation”. This risk, based on the model’s 
deliverables, is ranking 11th and 17th in sensitivity analysis and correlation 
to the total project’s delay while, based on the literature review, is ranking 
42nd out of 44.  
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• The “Public opposition” risk is one of the most severe risks facing PPP 
projects based on the literature review as it occupies the second position 
based on the various sources taken into account. Nevertheless, based on 
the sensitivity analysis and on the correlation analysis, this risk occupies 
the 35th and 44th positions respectively. This difference in ranking can be 
caused by the relatively small sample size of PPP projects studied in this 
research. The dataset studied was not encompassing such risk as it was 
not faced in the projects that were analyzed. However, this does not mean 
that this risk is not significant especially for PPP projects. As it was 
previously discussed in section 2.3.8 the general public has a 
considerable power especially when it comes to PPP projects. The same 
goes for “poor quality workmanship” risk which ranks 9th based on the 
literature review and has less contribution to the total project’s delay 
based on the sensitivity and correlation analysis where it occupies 21st 
and 37th positions respectively.  
 
• For other risks such as “Constructability”, “staff crisis” and “subjective 
evaluation”, the literature review and the model deliverables produced 
very close results.  
 
10. Critically evaluate the mathematical model’s performance based on: 
 
i. The percentage error the model will deliver  
Based on the different trials output, it is concluded that Model 4 delivers the smallest 
range of error (MSE and NSE) for training and testing. The architecture of this 
particular model is: 18 input nodes, three hidden neurons on two layers and one 
output. It was trained using a logistic function. The training was set to continue until 
there is no more improvement in test error over 10 cycles to prevent model over-
fitting. 
 
ii. The discrepancies in the risk ranking between the model and 
the literature review. 
Based on the literature review, the material availability risk occupies the first position 
in terms of the most critical risks. This ranking is similar to a great extent to its 
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ranking based on the correlation calculations according to which this risk occupies 
the third position. On the other hand, the ranking of this same risk is 31 based on 
the sensitivity analysis in terms of its effect and contribution to the total project delay. 
The “Delay in resolving contractual dispute” occupies the highest rank in terms of 
correlation with the total project delay based on the ANN model’s outputs. This 
ranking is also similar to the results of the sensitivity analysis where it occupies the 
second position in terms of the risks having the highest contribution to the total 
project’s delay. The “Public opposition” risk is one of the most severe risks facing 
PPP projects based on the literature review as it occupies the second position based 
on the various sources taken into account. Nevertheless, based on the sensitivity 
analysis and on the correlation analysis, this risk occupies the 35th and 44th positions 
respectively.  
 
5.3 Limitations of study 
1. This research is mainly focusing only on the contribution of construction and 
stakeholders’ risks to the total project’s delay during the construction period 
without taking into account other risk groups.  
2. This research is mainly concerned with the impact of construction and poor 
stakeholder management related risks on PPP projects in comparison to 
traditional projects with a special emphasis on developing nations. Despite 
the benefits of PPP projects for developing countries in particular, the 
number of PPP projects achieved and/or under construction is limited. 
Accordingly, the dataset was not very large to encompass various projects. 
Nevertheless, future expansions can occur to enhance the model when the 
number of projects is larger. This will help in creating a larger database that 
will be of help in the future.  
3. This research is studying the impacts of the risks only during the construction 
period. It is true that the construction period is when most of the risks occur. 
However, being able to study the PPP project and the associated risks during 
the pre-construction and operation phase will be also beneficial.  
4. The ANN models that were developed are totally dependent on the data 
extracted from the projects time schedule. Fake or manipulated schedules 
may lead to either earlier than estimated or delayed than expected results.  
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5. In order to determine the various sources of delays in different projects during 
data collection, the delay analysis used for the projects in the datasets were 
not the same. For example, in some projects Time Impact Analysis was used, 
in other projects, impacted-as-planned was the tool determining the delays. 
This may cause some discrepancies in the collected data as the delay 
analysis tools were not the same.  
6. The success of the models depends heavily on the availability of project data 
which should be stored in retrievable manner. For many construction 
companies, relevant data is not stored in an organized way, making the 
access to useful data practically difficult, or sometimes, impossible. The poor 
warehousing and protection of data is expected to be one of the major 
limitations of using such data and developing models in practice.  
7. When developing the ANN model, there are no set rules on the nature of the 
network architecture or the number of neurons or layers to use. Each problem 
should be treated separately using a trial and error approach until optimum 
network performance is reached. This means that if the current model is 
expanded or if a similar model will be built, there will be no rules to follow. 
This can be challenging in some cases.  
 
5.4 Recommendations for Future research 
1. Expanding the risk groups studied  
This research is mainly focusing on the contribution of construction and 
stakeholders’ risks to the total project’s delay. The ANN model can be expanded to 
include other types of risks such as: economic and financing, operation, market, 
political, legal, etc.  
 
2. Studying other periods during the project’s lifecycle 
This research is studying the risks that are born during the construction period. It is 
true that the construction period is pivotal during the project’s lifetime. However, in 
order to ensure the success of a project, the whole project’s lifecycle should be 
studied. Accordingly, this research can be expanded to cover other phases such as 
the feasibility study, financing stage, design stage, operation and transfer stages.  
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3. Taking Risk allocation into account 
Risk allocation was briefly discussed in this research in section 2.2.2 and was 
included in the data analysis and integration steps in Chapter 4 in order to determine 
which party is responsible for each risk. Nevertheless, risk allocation was not 
included in the actual model. Risk allocation is a crucial topic playing a major role in 
reducing disputes during the whole lifespan of the project, if studied properly. 
Several studies proved that most of the claims and disputes occurring in the 
construction industry are caused by improper risk allocation. Moreover, allocating 
the risk to the wrong party can cause the contractors to add high contingency (risk 
premium) to their bids or deliver low quality of work. The key is to find the “optimum 
level of risk allocation”. Including risk allocation in a future expansion of the model 
can be an asset of a great importance.  
 
4. Validation in practice 
In this research, the different model trials that were produced have gone through 
the validation process using a sample data that was kept aside for this purpose 
(PPP projects used for validation). A further stage of validating the models would 
be to test them against a new project that has not been undertaken yet.  
 
5. Developing a stakeholder management framework 
Using the model’s outcomes to develop a framework for adequate management of 
stakeholders throughout the lifetime of the PPP project.  
 
6. Modelling the “cost-related” aspect of the projects 
This research is mainly concerned with the time aspect of the project as the project 
delays are directly related to the cost’s overruns. Nevertheless, there are other 
causes for cost overruns such as inflation, legal changes, etc. Building another 
mathematical approach modelling the impacts of the risks on PPP projects’ “cost” 
can be a considerable addition to this study.  
 
7. Data warehousing is crucial 
The real value of the data lies in being able to extract it and use it when needed. A 
proper and sound document control and data warehousing systems should be 
established in construction companies. This will help in improving the learning curve 
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and avoiding, as much as possible, previous mistakes by mitigating already known 
risks.  
 
8. Decision Support System 
The ultimate aim of this research and a future destination for this study is to provide, 
in addition to the ANN model determining the contribution of the risks to the overall 
project delay, a tool assisting the public sector to choose and determine whether 
the PPP scheme in a particular project is the optimum scheme to use or not. This 
can be achieved at a later stage after building a more robust database using a large 
sample size (which can consist of PPP projects performed in other countries). This 
Decision Support System can be built using a software like “Crystal Ball” which can 
be easier to use as it is integrated to Microsoft Excel.  
 
A broad image of this Decision Support System suggests depending on two 
concepts: the first one is the “Experts Opinion” which is the Opinion that was 
obtained through the ANN model (or through surveys). The second one is the “End 
user’s opinion” which is the opinion of the user who is going to use the Decision 
Support System. The idea of the Decision Support System is based on the fact that 
the end user starts by selecting the weighing of his opinion with respect to the 
expert’s (or database) opinion.  If the end user has a considerable background about 
risk management and about investment in PPP projects, then, he/she can assign a 
large weight to his/her opinions. On the other hand, if the end user does not have 
an experience about risk management or cannot determine the probability and the 
impacts of the risks, therefore, he/she should depend more on the experts’ opinion. 
 
Figure 111 shows a screen shot showing an example for the drop-down menu 
including the experts’ opinion weight. Based on the weight assigned to the experts, 
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Figure 112. View of a potential DSS for future research 
 
Moreover, experts’ opinions can regularly be updated if the conditions change in the 
country through the development of new surveys or through distributing a second 
round of questionnaires or through the establishment of new projects. Figure 112 
and 113 provide another screen shot for the model, with the area required to be 
filled by the end user: 
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Figure 113. Screen shot for the model 
 
In this case, the severity of the project is obtained through the model, by getting an 
end user acquainted with the project’s conditions fill the part related to the end user 
as it is shown in figure 114 extracted from the model: 
 
Figure 114. Extract from the Decision Support System-end user’s opinion 
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The Decision Support System’s output can be the following: 
• The overall risk level for the whole project 
• The Contingency percentage for the whole project based on the most critical 
risks included in the questionnaire and based on the severity obtained. 
Based on the severity of the project and based on the contingency percentage 
associated with the risks in this specific project, the end user can decide whether 
this specific project should be accepted under the PPP scheme or not. The flowchart 
in figure 114 shows the steps that can be followed in order to develop the DSS.  
 
Figure 115. Steps that can be followed in order to develop the DSS 
 
5.5 Making sense of the research contribution to knowledge 
The aims and objectives have been achieved and research questions have been 
answered. However, it is also crucial to place this research within the wider 
spectrum of construction management and practice.  
 
 
Develop or depend on the already developed ANN model
Insert the collected data into the Crystal Ball model
Design the model so as to have a weight for the "experts" or 
"already collected projects database" and " end user" opinion
The "end user" will choose the weight of his/her opinion 
compared to the weight of the database
Insert the probability and impacts of the various risks and run the 
model to dertemine the overall project's contingency and decide 
whether the PPP scheme is optimum for this project
 




A mathematical Artificial Neural Network approach modelling the impact of 
construction and stakeholders related risks on the project’s schedule and 
completion time based on a comparative analysis between traditional 
projects and PPP projects in developing nations. 
 
This research attempts to highlight the importance of risks affecting traditional and 
PPP projects during the construction period especially stakeholders and 
construction-related risks. In order to build the ANN models, data was collected from 
real case projects and not on questionnaire results in order to add a “practical” 
perspective to the research which will make the developed model “closer” to the end 
user as it is based on real-case problems faced in actual projects. Adding the 
comparative aspect between traditional and PPP projects proved the similarity 
between the two project types especially during the construction period and proved 
that applying the traditional models’ outcomes on PPP projects is doable. This can 
make the end users more comfortable to use this model especially the ones who 
are less familiar with the PPP scheme. The presentation of a neural network model 
for solving schedule-related problems in terms of risks affecting the projects can be 
viewed as a contribution of the study to practice. Also, the use of ANN models has 
been demonstrated as a possible opportunity for converting existing data within 
construction firms into decision support tools, especially where information is 
lacking or inadequate. The use of such models can help the public owners, 
contractors and project managers to: 
• Be proactive in predicting the contribution of various risks to the project’s 
delay 
• Enhance early identification of potential problems on a project 
• Minimize disputes, delays and additional costs 
• Help in having better contract management and better relationship among 
parties 








A comprehensive definition of Stakeholder Management and Stakeholder 
Involvement (including the importance of the “People” (general public/end 
users) as a major PPP project stakeholder) 
 
In order to ensure the success of the PPP projects, the public sector, the private 
sector and the public should be involved.  Stakeholder engagement means involving 
and building relationships with different stakeholders as early as possible in the 
project’s lifetime. Getting early feedback from the stakeholders can help avoiding 
doing many changes afterwards during the project’s lifetime which can reduce cost 
overruns and poor VFM. It was also proved that PPP projects that paid attention to 
public needs resulted in less changes during operation.  
 
In light of the complex nature of PPP projects and with the disputes that may arise 
between the private and public, people will act as the “cementing agent” or “the link” 
connecting the public to the private partner. It will be in the project’s benefit to 
engage the general public as early as possible in the project in order to unify the 
goals, objectives and benefits of all the stakeholders as marginalizing the general 
public could lead to detrimental results. 
 
Understanding of the relationship between Risk Management and 
Stakeholder Management 
As it has been shown, the quality of the relationship between public and private 
sector on one side and the end users on the other side has been shown to be a key 
contributor to the success of a PPP project. In fact, the real case projects that were 
discussed can be considered as clear evidence to support the following statement 
“Many of the risks affecting PPP projects arise due to poor management of 
stakeholders”. Therefore, analyzing the risks caused by inadequate management 
of stakeholders and determining their effect on PPP projects compared to their 
effect on traditional projects is a way of mitigation of a significant number of risks 
affecting PPP projects which is step towards better Risk Management for PPP 
projects.  
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5.6 Final thoughts 
The problem of delays in construction projects (traditional and PPP projects) occurs 
irrespective of the size or type of project, its location, procurement method or 
duration.  
 
It is not expected that the public sector will be able to adequately deal with the 
problem of project delays right away especially when it comes to choosing whether 
the traditional method or the PPP scheme is the most suitable scheme for this 
particular project. The only way to improve the decision-support tools to help the 
public sector in developing countries is fresh thinking and continuous work in both 
academia and industry. The contribution of this research lies in its ability to provide 
a way of practically linking the contribution of construction and stakeholders’ risks 
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APPENDIX A: RISK IDENTIFICATION IN THE LITERATURE 
AND RISK GROUPS 
  
# Risk factors Total
% of times 
cited
Risk group 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A1 B1 C1 C2
1 Lack of support from government * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Stakeholders' issue 
2 Unstable government * * * * * * * * * * 10 34.48            Political
3 Strong political interference * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Political 
4 Corruption and bribery * * * * * * 6 20.69            Political
5 Nationalization/Expropriation * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 14 48.28            Political
6 Poor financial market * * * * * * * * 8 27.59            Economic and Financing 
7 Inflation * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 24 82.76            Economic and Financing
8 Interest rate * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 24 82.76            Economic and Financing
9 Lack of legal/regulatory framework * * * * 4 13.79            Legal
10 Inconsistent legal framework * * * * * * * * 8 27.59            Legal
11 Change in tax regulation * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 16 55.17            Economic and Financing
12 Public opposition * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 18 62.07            Stakeholders' issue 
13 Environment * * * * * * * * * * * * 12 41.38            Natural
14 Force Majeure * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 20 68.97            Natural
15 Weather * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 15 51.72            Natural
16 Geological conditions * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 14 48.28            Construction
17 Construction delays * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Construction
18 Site safety and security * * * * * * * * * 9 31.03            Construction
19 Poor quality workmanship * * * * * * * * * * * 11 37.93            Construction
20 Construction cost overrun * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 16 55.17            Construction
21 Excessive contract variation * * * * * 5 17.24            Construction
22 Material availability * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 19 65.52            Construction
23 Availability of finance * * * * * * * * * * * * * 13 44.83            Construction
24 High finance cost * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 14 48.28            Construction
25 Financial attraction of project to investors * * 2 6.90              Economic and financing
26 Delay in approval and permits * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 18 62.07            Political
27 Design deficiency * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 19 65.52            Design
28 Scope variation * * * * * 5 17.24            Design
29 Unproven engineering techniques * * * * * * * * * * * * * 13 44.83            Construction and design
30 Level of demand for project * * * * * * * * * * * * 12 41.38            Feasibility study
31 Site availibility * * * * * * * * * * * * 12 41.38            Construction
32 Operation cost overrun * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 20 68.97            Operation
33 Low operation productivity * * * * * * * * * * * 11 37.93            Operation
34 Maintenance cost higher than expected * * * * * * * * * * 10 34.48            Operation
35 Maintenance more frequent than expected * * * * * * * * * * 10 34.48            Operation
36 Residual asset risk * * * * * * * * * * * * 12 41.38            Operation
37 Indequate PPP experience * * * * 4 13.79            Stakeholders' issue
38 Lack of communication between stakeholders * * * * * * * * * 9 31.03            Stakeholders' issue 
39 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities * * * * * * 6 20.69            Stakeholders' issue 
40 Inadequate distribution of authorities * * * 3 10.34            Stakeholders' issue 
41 Lack of commitment between parties * * * * 4 13.79            Stakeholders' issue 
42 Differences in working methods/Knowhow between parties * * * 3 10.34            Stakeholders' issue 
43 Termination of concession by government * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Political
44 Change in law * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 16 55.17            Political/Legal/Financial
45 Influential economic events * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Political
Risk identification in PPP projects
References 
# Risk factors Total
% of times 
cited
Risk group 
Risk identification in PPP projects
References 
46 Change in industrial code of practice * * * * * * 6 20.69            Political and construction
47 Insolvency of Subcontractors * * * * * * * * * 9 31.03            Construction
48 Labor availability * * * * * * * * * * * 11 37.93            Construction
49 Construction/design changes * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 14 48.28            Construction/Design
50 Labor disputes/strikes * * * * * * 6 20.69            Construction
51 Land use * * * * * * 6 20.69            Construction
52 Waste of materials * * * * * * 6 20.69            Construction
53 Construction completion * * * * * * * * * * * * * 13 44.83            Construction
54 Supporting utilities risk * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Construction
55 Protection of geological and historical objects * * * * * * 6 20.69            Construction
56 Operator default * * * * * * * * 8 27.59            Operation
57 Quality of operation * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Operation
58 Condition of facility * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Operation
59 Contractual risk * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Legal
60 Third party tort liability * * * * * * * * 8 27.59            Stakeholders' issue 
61 Ownership assets * * * * * * * * 8 27.59            Legal
62 Insolvency of Concession company * * * * * * * * 8 27.59            Legal
63 Insufficient income * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Market
64 Fluctuation of material cost (by government) * * * * * * 6 20.69            Market
65 Fluctuation of material cost (by private sector) * * * * * * 6 20.69            Market
66 Tariff change * * * * * * * 7 24.14            Market
67 Market demand change/Demand below anticipation * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 15 51.72            Market/Operation
68 Exclusivity * * * * * * * * * * 10 34.48            Market
69 Foreign currency exchange * * * * * * * * * 9 31.03            Economic
70 Residual risk * * * * * * * * * * 10 34.48            Operation
71 Changes in value of granted land due to development * * 2 6.90              Economic
72 Changes in value of granted land due to inflation * * 2 6.90              Economic
73 Financial problems due to environmental protection * * 2 6.90              Economic
74 Need for land appraisal * * 2 6.90              Economic
75 Limited capital * * 2 6.90              Economic
76 Delay in resolving contractual dispute * * 2 6.90              Stakeholders' issue
77 Inadequate study and unsufficient data * * 2 6.90              Legal
78 Lack of standard model for PPP agreements * * 2 6.90              Legal
79 Need for land acquisition * * * * * * * * 8 27.59            Stakeholders' issue
80 Delay in resolving litigation or arbitration dispute * * * 3 10.34            Legal
81 Influencial economic events * 1 3.45              Political
82 Poor public decision making process * * * * 4 13.79            Political/Feasibility study
83 Sanction * 1 3.45              Political
84 Arbitrary definition of tariff of services by government * 1 3.45              Market
85 Competition * * * 3 10.34            Market
86 Operating revenues below expectation * * * * * * * * 8 27.59            Market/Operation
87 Lack of coordination and commitment * * 2 6.90              Stakeholders' issue 
88 Need for environmental approval * * 2 6.90              Legal
89 Third party delays * 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue
90 Government intervention * 1 3.45              Political
91 Government reliability * * * * * * 6 20.69            Construction
# Risk factors Total
% of times 
cited
Risk group 
Risk identification in PPP projects
References 
92 Third-party reliability * * * * * * 6 20.69            Construction
93 Immature juristic system * 1 3.45              Legal
94 Improper contract * 1 3.45              Legal
95 Delay in supply * 1 3.45              Construction
96 Technological risk * * * * * * 6 20.69            Operation
97 Payment risk * 1 3.45              Economic and financing
98 Uncompetetive tender * 1 3.45              Political
99 Consortium inability * * * * * 5 17.24            Operation
100 Private investor change * * 2 6.90              Stakeholders' issue 
101 Subjective evaluation * 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue 
102 Insufficient financial audit * 1 3.45              Economic and financing
103 Change in output specification * 1 3.45              Design
104 Innovative design * 1 3.45              Design
105 Design complexity * 1 3.45              Design
106 Constructability * 1 3.45              Construction
107 Defects in construction * 1 3.45              Construction
108 Delay in operation * * 2 6.90              Operation
109 Excessive maintenance and refurbishment * * 2 6.90              Operation
110 Filre/delay in commissioning test * 1 3.45              Commissioning risks 
111 Technical obsolescence * 1 3.45              Market
112 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders * 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue
113 Misinterpretation of contract * 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue
114 Stakeholder management * 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue
115 Low financial attraction of project to investors * * * * * 5 17.24            Economic and Financing
116 Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation * 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue 
117 Staff crisis * 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue 
118 Cultural differences between main stakeholders * 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue 
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APPENDIX B: RISK RANKING 
  
# Risk factors Total
% of times 
cited
Risk group 
1 Inflation 24 82.76            Economic and Financing
2 Interest rate 24 82.76            Economic and Financing
3 Force Majeure 20 68.97            Natural
4 Operation cost overrun 20 68.97            Operation
5 Material availability 19 65.52            Construction
6 Design deficiency 19 65.52            Design
7 Public opposition 18 62.07            Stakeholders' issue 
8 Delay in approval and permits 18 62.07            Political
9 Change in tax regulation 16 55.17            Economic and Financing
10 Construction cost overrun 16 55.17            Construction
11 Change in law 16 55.17            Political/Legal/Financial
12 Weather 15 51.72            Natural
13 Market demand change/Demand below anticipation 15 51.72            Market/Operation
14 Nationalization/Expropriation 14 48.28            Political
15 Geological conditions 14 48.28            Construction
16 High finance cost 14 48.28            Construction
17 Construction/design changes 14 48.28            Construction/Design
18 Availability of finance 13 44.83            Construction
19 Unproven engineering techniques 13 44.83            Construction and design
20 Construction completion 13 44.83            Construction
21 Environment 12 41.38            Natural
22 Level of demand for project 12 41.38            Feasibility study
23 Site availibility 12 41.38            Construction
24 Residual asset risk 12 41.38            Operation
25 Poor quality workmanship 11 37.93            Construction
26 Low operation productivity 11 37.93            Operation
27 Labor availability 11 37.93            Construction
28 Unstable government 10 34.48            Political
29 Maintenance cost higher than expected 10 34.48            Operation
30 Maintenance more frequent than expected 10 34.48            Operation
31 Exclusivity 10 34.48            Market
32 Residual risk 10 34.48            Operation
33 Site safety and security 9 31.03            Construction
34 Lack of communication between stakeholders 9 31.03            Stakeholders' issue 
35 Insolvency of Subcontractors 9 31.03            Construction
36 Foreign currency exchange 9 31.03            Economic
37 Poor financial market 8 27.59            Economic and Financing 
38 Inconsistent legal framework 8 27.59            Legal
39 Operator default 8 27.59            Operation
40 Third party tort liability 8 27.59            Stakeholders' issue 
41 Ownership assets 8 27.59            Legal
42 Insolvency of Concession company 8 27.59            Legal
43 Need for land acquisition 8 27.59            Stakeholders' issue
44 Operating revenues below expectation 8 27.59            Market/Operation
45 Lack of support from government 7 24.14            Stakeholders' issue 
46 Strong political interference 7 24.14            Political 
47 Construction delays 7 24.14            Construction
48 Termination of concession by government 7 24.14            Political
49 Influential economic events 7 24.14            Political
50 Supporting utilities risk 7 24.14            Construction
51 Quality of operation 7 24.14            Operation
52 Condition of facility 7 24.14            Operation
Ranking of all risks
# Risk factors Total
% of times 
cited
Risk group 
Ranking of all risks
53 Contractual risk 7 24.14            Legal
54 Insufficient income 7 24.14            Market
55 Tariff change 7 24.14            Market
56 Corruption and bribery 6 20.69            Political
57 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities 6 20.69            Stakeholders' issue 
58 Change in industrial code of practice 6 20.69            Political and construction
59 Labor disputes/strikes 6 20.69            Construction
60 Land use 6 20.69            Construction
61 Waste of materials 6 20.69            Construction
62 Protection of geological and historical objects 6 20.69            Construction
63 Fluctuation of material cost (by government) 6 20.69            Market
64 Fluctuation of material cost (by private sector) 6 20.69            Market
65 Government reliability 6 20.69            Construction
66 Third-party reliability 6 20.69            Construction
67 Technological risk 6 20.69            Operation
68 Excessive contract variation 5 17.24            Construction
69 Scope variation 5 17.24            Design
70 Consortium inability 5 17.24            Operation
71 Low financial attraction of project to investors 5 17.24            Economic and Financing
72 Lack of legal/regulatory framework 4 13.79            Legal
73 Indequate PPP experience 4 13.79            Stakeholders' issue
74 Lack of commitment between parties 4 13.79            Stakeholders' issue 
75 Poor public decision making process 4 13.79            Political/Feasibility study
76 Inadequate distribution of authorities 3 10.34            Stakeholders' issue 
77 Differences in working methods/Knowhow between parties 3 10.34            Stakeholders' issue 
78 Delay in resolving litigation or arbitration dispute 3 10.34            Legal
79 Competition 3 10.34            Market
80 Financial attraction of project to investors 2 6.90              Economic and financing
81 Changes in value of granted land due to development 2 6.90              Economic
82 Changes in value of granted land due to inflation 2 6.90              Economic
83 Financial problems due to environmental protection 2 6.90              Economic
84 Need for land appraisal 2 6.90              Economic
85 Limited capital 2 6.90              Economic
86 Delay in resolving contractual dispute 2 6.90              Stakeholders' issue
87 Inadequate study and unsufficient data 2 6.90              Legal
88 Lack of standard model for PPP agreements 2 6.90              Legal
89 Lack of coordination and commitment 2 6.90              Stakeholders' issue 
90 Need for environmental approval 2 6.90              Legal
91 Private investor change 2 6.90              Stakeholders' issue 
92 Delay in operation 2 6.90              Operation
93 Excessive maintenance and refurbishment 2 6.90              Operation
94 Influencial economic events 1 3.45              Political
95 Sanction 1 3.45              Political
96 Arbitrary definition of tariff of services by government 1 3.45              Market
97 Third party delays 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue
98 Government intervention 1 3.45              Political
99 Immature juristic system 1 3.45              Legal
100 Improper contract 1 3.45              Legal
101 Delay in supply 1 3.45              Construction
102 Payment risk 1 3.45              Economic and financing
103 Uncompetetive tender 1 3.45              Political
104 Subjective evaluation 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue 
# Risk factors Total
% of times 
cited
Risk group 
Ranking of all risks
105 Insufficient financial audit 1 3.45              Economic and financing
106 Change in output specification 1 3.45              Design
107 Innovative design 1 3.45              Design
108 Design complexity 1 3.45              Design
109 Constructability 1 3.45              Construction
110 Defects in construction 1 3.45              Construction
111 Filre/delay in commissioning test 1 3.45              Commissioning risks 
112 Technical obsolescence 1 3.45              Market
113 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue
114 Misinterpretation of contract 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue
115 Stakeholder management 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue
116 Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue 
117 Staff crisis 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue 
118 Cultural differences between main stakeholders 1 3.45              Stakeholders' issue 
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APPENDIX C: RISK SOURCES FROM THE LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
  
# Reference letter Reference name Reference year Country
1 A Kumaraswamy and Zhang 2001 Hong Kong
2 B Grimsey and Lewis 2002 Scotland
3 C Li et al. 2005 United Kingdom
4 D Shen et al. 2006 Hong Kong
5 E Ng and Loosemore 2007 Australia
6 F Estache et al. 2007 Worldwide
7 G Medda 2007 Worldwide
8 H Zou et al. 2008 China and Australia
9 I Thomas et al. 2003 India
10 J Xu et al. 2010 China
11 K Hwang et al. 2012 Singapore
12 L Ke et al. 2009 China
13 M Lam et al. 2007 Hong Kong
14 N Arndt 1998 Australia
15 O Wang and Tiong 2000 China
16 P NTSA 2004 South Africa
17 Q VDTF 2001 Australia
18 R Valipour et al. 2016 Iran 
19 S Ke et al. 2011 China
20 T Doloi 2012 Australia
21 U Kaming et al. 1997 Indonesia
22 V Sambasivan and Soon 2007 Malysia
23 W Ghosh and Jintanapakanout 2004 Thailand
24 X Singh et al. 2006 India
25 Y Lemos et al. 2004 Portugal
26 Z Grimsey et al. 2002 United Kingdom
27 A1 Wang et al. 2000 China
28 B1 Akintoye et al. 1998 United Kingdom
29 C1 Li and Zou 2012 Worldwide
30 C2 Badala et al. 2018 Worldwide
List of 30 sources 
 
Page 301 of 313 
 
APPENDIX D: RISK DEFINITIONS 
  
# Risk factors Definition Risk group 
4 Corruption and bribery Happens in the case the local government is corrupt and asks for bribes or unjust rewards Political
5
Nationalization/Expropriation
Happens when the public partner unreasonably takes over the facility operated by the private 
partner without giving the latter the proper compensation Political
6
Poor financial market
This happens in the case of unavailability of financial instrument resulting in difficulty in 
financing the project Economic and Financing 
7
Inflation
Happens in case the local economic and banking system in the country is immature which leads to 
an unexpected local inflation rate Economic and Financing
8
Interest rate
Happens in case the local economic and banking system in the country is immature which leads to 
an unexpected fluctuation in the interest rate Economic and Financing
11 Change in tax regulation Happens in cxase the government applies tax regulations in an inconsistent way. Economic and Financing
12 Public opposition Objection from the public Stakeholders' issue 
13 Environment Stringent regulations regarding the environment which will have an impact on construction. Natural
14
Force Majeure
Unforeseen adverse conditions out of the control of both parties such as flood, fires, hurricanes, 
storms, epidemic diseases, wars and hostilities Natural
15 Weather Unforeseen adverse weather conditions Natural
16 Geological conditions Unforeseen ground conditions Construction
26 Delay in approval and permits This happens when any of the project's approvals or permits are delayed Political
32 Operation cost overrun This happens as a result of inadequate planning, low efficiency or improper measurement Operation
36
Residual asset risk
This happens at the end of the concession period in case the project transferred from the private 
partner to the public partner is not running properly Operation
38
Lack of communication between stakeholders
Poor communication or organization among stakeholders leading to increased disputes causing 
parties to incur additional cost and/or time Stakeholders' issue 
44 Change in law Happens when the government applies, in an inconsistent way, new laws and regulations Political/Legal/Financial
49
Construction/design changes




This happens when the construction period exceeds the planned period, exceeds the planned 
budget or is performed below the required quality Construction
54
Supporting utilities risk
This happens when the supporting utilities such as: water, electricity used in the construction 
and/or operation are not timely available or are available at a higher rate that anticipated. Construction
66
Tariff change
Happens in case of unsufficient project income leading to a change in tariff as it was originally 
not adequately designed. Market
67 Market demand change/Demand below anticipation Happens when the demand for the project changes for various factors except the exclusive right Market/Operation
68 Exclusivity The presence of another "competitive" project Market
69 Foreign currency exchange Happens in the case of currency exchange fluctuation Economic
79 Need for land acquisition This happens when the project land is unavailable or cannot be occupied at the required time Stakeholders' issue
82
Poor public decision making process
This happens when the government lacks a long term view and lacks adequate PPP experience or 
makes decisions based on personal interests Political/Feasibility study
83
Sanction
A type of damages that can be applied by one party over the other in case of non-compliance with 
contract terms and conditions Political
85
Competition
This happens when the government does not offer the "exclusive right" or does not honor its 
commitment and build another competitive project. Market
90 Government intervention Means the unjustified intervention of the government in the matters of the private facility Political
91 Government reliability Means the credibility that the government will honor their responsibilities in the future Construction
92 Third-party reliability Means the credibility that a third party will honor their responsibilities in the future Construction
93 Immature juristic system Happens in case the PPP law is absent or recent Legal
94
Improper contract
This happens when the contract's terms and conditions are not drafted in a proper way, 
stakeholders are not defined, risks are not adequately allocated between projects stakehodlers Legal
95 Delay in supply This happens when the suppliers and subcontractors are unable to supply work on time Construction
96 Technological risk This happens when the technology used is inadequate to the project or not good enough Operation
97
Payment risk
This happens when the end user/consumer or even the government is not willing to pay due to 
several reasons (economic, social, etc.) Economic and financing
98 Uncompetetive tender The absence of a standardized transparent model for tender to PPP projects in each country Political
99 Consortium inability The project company is unable to fulfill its obligations set for in the PPP terms and conditions Operation
100
Private investor change
This happens when one or more of the investors exit the consortium and the projects due to 
disputes, poor relationship among the stakeholders or due to any other reason. Stakeholders' issue 
101 Subjective evaluation Subjective evaluation and design of the concession period, market demand, tariff structure, etc. Stakeholders' issue 
102
Insufficient financial audit
The government is doing the necessary monitoring over the financial aspect of the project 
company throughout the project's lifetime Economic and financing
Definition of risks
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1 Lack of support from government * * * * * * * Stakeholders' issue 
2 Unstable government * * * * * * * * * * Political
3 Strong political interference * * * * * * * Political 
4 Corruption and bribery * * * * * * Political
5 Nationalization/Expropriation * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Political
6 Poor financial market * * * * * * * * Economic and Financing 
7 Inflation * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Economic and Financing
8 Interest rate * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Economic and Financing
9 Lack of legal/regulatory framework * * * * Legal
10 Inconsistent legal framework * * * * * * * * Legal
11 Change in tax regulation * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Economic and Financing
12 Public opposition * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Stakeholders' issue 
13 Environment * * * * * * * * * * * * Natural
14 Force Majeure * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Natural
15 Weather * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Natural
16 Geological conditions * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
17 Construction delays * * * * * * * Construction
18 Site safety and security * * * * * * * * * Construction
19 Poor quality workmanship * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
20 Construction cost overrun * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
21 Excessive contract variation * * * * * Construction
22 Material availability * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
23 Availability of finance * * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
24 High finance cost * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
25 Financial attraction of project to investors * * Economic and financing
26 Delay in approval and permits * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Political
27 Design deficiency * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Design
28 Scope variation * * * * * Design
29 Unproven engineering techniques * * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction and design
30 Level of demand for project * * * * * * * * * * * * Feasibility study
31 Site availibility * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
32 Operation cost overrun * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Operation
33 Low operation productivity * * * * * * * * * * * Operation
34 Maintenance cost higher than expected * * * * * * * * * * Operation
35 Maintenance more frequent than expected * * * * * * * * * * Operation
36 Residual asset risk * * * * * * * * * * * * Operation
37 Indequate PPP experience * * * * Stakeholders' issue
38 Lack of communication between stakeholders * * * * * * * * * Stakeholders' issue 
39 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities * * * * * * Stakeholders' issue 
40 Inadequate distribution of authorities * * * Stakeholders' issue 
41 Lack of commitment between parties * * * * Stakeholders' issue 
42 Differences in working methods * * * Stakeholders' issue 
43 Termination of concession by government * * * * * * * Political
44 Change in law * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Political/Legal/Financial
45 Influential economic events * * * * * * * Political
46 Change in industrial code of practice * * * * * * Political and construction
47 Insolvency of Subcontractors * * * * * * * * * Construction
48 Labor availability * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
49 Construction/design changes * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction/Design
50 Labor disputes/strikes * * * * * * Construction
51 Land use * * * * * * Construction
52 Waste of materials * * * * * * Construction
53 Construction completion * * * * * * * * * * * * * Construction
54 Supporting utilities risk * * * * * * * Construction
55 Protection of geological and historical objects * * * * * * Construction
56 Operator default * * * * * * * * Operation
57 Quality of operation * * * * * * * Operation
58 Condition of facility * * * * * * * Operation
59 Contractual risk * * * * * * * Legal
60 Third party tort liability * * * * * * * * Stakeholders' issue 
61 Ownership assets * * * * * * * * Legal
62 Insolvency of Concession company * * * * * * * * Legal
63 Insufficient income * * * * * * * Market
64 Fluctuation of material cost (by government) * * * * * * Market
65 Fluctuation of material cost (by private sector) * * * * * * Market
66 Tariff change * * * * * * * Market
67 Market demand change/Demand below anticipation * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Market/Operation
68 Exclusivity * * * * * * * * * * Market
69 Foreign currency exchange * * * * * * * * * Economic
70 Residual risk * * * * * * * * * * Operation
71 Changes in value of granted land due to development * * Economic
72 Changes in value of granted land due to inflation * * Economic
73 Financial problems due to environmental protection * * Economic
74 Need for land appraisal * * Economic
75 Limited capital * * Economic
76 Delay in resolving contractual dispute * * Stakeholders' issue
77 Inadequate study and unsufficient data * * Legal
78 Lack of standard model for PPP agreements * * Legal
79 Need for land acquisition * * * * * * * * Stakeholders' issue
80 Delay in resolving litigation or arbitration dispute * * * Legal
81 Influencial economic events * Political
82 Poor public decision making process * * * * Political/Feasibility study
83 Sanction * Political
84 Arbitrary definition of tariff of services by government * Market
85 Competition * * * Market
86 Operating revenues below expectation * * * * * * * * Market/Operation
87 Lack of coordination and commitment * * Stakeholders' issue 
88 Need for environmental approval * * Legal
89 Third party delays * Stakeholders' issue
90 Government intervention * Political
91 Government reliability * * * * * * Construction
92 Third-party reliability * * * * * * Construction
93 Immature juristic system * Legal
94 Improper contract * Legal
Risk factors 




































































































































95 Delay in supply * Construction
96 Technological risk * * * * * * Operation
97 Payment risk * Economic and financing
98 Uncompetetive tender * Political
99 Consortium inability * * * * * Operation
100 Private investor change * * Stakeholders' issue 
101 Subjective evaluation * Stakeholders' issue 
102 Insufficient financial audit * Economic and financing
103 Change in output specification * Design
104 Innovative design * Design
105 Design complexity * Design
106 Constructability * Construction
107 Defects in construction * Construction
108 Delay in operation * * Operation
109 Excessive maintenance and refurbishment * * Operation
110 Filre/delay in commissioning test * Commissioning risks 
111 Technical obsolescence * Market
112 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders * Stakeholders' issue
113 Misinterpretation of contract * Stakeholders' issue
114 Stakeholder management * Stakeholders' issue
115 Low financial attraction of project to investors * * * * * Economic and Financing
116 Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation * * Stakeholders' issue 
117 Staff crisis * * Stakeholders' issue 
118 Cultural differences between main stakeholders * * Stakeholders' issue 
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APPENDIX F: DATA CLEANING AND TRANSFORMATION 














1 infrastructure Upgrade 25,657,895.00 16 22 6 37.5
2 infrastructure Refurbishment 13,589,460.00 13 18 5 38.5
3 infrastructure Replace 347,751,310.00 45 54 9 20
4 Electricity New-build 776,500,000.00 9 10 1 11.1
5 Electricity New-build 343,500,000.00 8 10 2 25
6 Electricity Upgrade 233,433,089.00 29 32 3 10.3
7 Electricity Upgrade 527,687,890.00 30 32 2 6.7
8 wastewater New-build 130,000,000.00 26 32 6 23.1
9 wastewater New-build 118,000,000.00 24 26 2 8.3
10 other Upgrade 15,435,000.00 20 30 10 50
Mean 22 26.6 4.6 23.05
Standard 
Deviation
11.3 12.9 3.1 14.8
Median 22 28 4 21.5
Minimum set 
value
-0.59 0.81 -1.67 -6.58
Maximum Set 
value
44.6 52.4 10.9 52.7
Actual Minimum 
value 
8 10 1 6.7
Actual Maximum 
value 



















1 16 0.216 22 0.273 6 0.556 37.5 0.712
2 13 0.135 18 0.182 5 0.444 38.5 0.734
3 45 1.000 54 1.000 9 0.889 20 0.308
4 9 0.027 10 0.000 1 0.000 11.1 0.103
5 8 0.000 10 0.000 2 0.111 25 0.423
6 29 0.568 32 0.500 3 0.222 10.3 0.085
7 30 0.595 32 0.500 2 0.111 6.7 0.000
8 26 0.486 32 0.500 6 0.556 23.1 0.379
9 24 0.432 26 0.364 2 0.111 8.3 0.038













1 Wastewater New-build 140,000,000.00 21 23 2 9.5
2 Electricity New-build 380,000,000.00    44 50 6 13.6
Mean 32.5 36.5 4 11.58
Standard 
Deviation
16.26 19.09 2.83 2.91
Median 32.5 36.5 4 11.58
Minimum set 
value
-0.03 -1.68 -1.66 5.76
Maximum Set 
value
65.03 74.68 9.66 17.40
Actual Minimum 
value 
21 23 2 9.5
Actual Maximum 
value 



















1 21 0.000 23 0.000 2 0.000 9.5 0.000



































Data Cleaning and transformation for projects' general data 
Statistical Analysis and Normalization 
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APPENDIX G-A: OVERALL RISK MATRIX – TRADITIONAL 
PROJECTS 
  
Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude Occurrence Magnitude 
# Risk factors 
1 Public opposition
2 Lack of communication between stakeholders √ 15 √ 12
3 Third party tort liability √ 10 √ 12.96 √ 13.33 √ 8.33 √ 8.89 √ 8.33 √ 8.33
4 Need for land acquisition √ 11.11 √ 8.33 √ 7.78 √ 11.67 √ 50 √ 20
5 Lack of support from government √ 13.33 √ 18.52 √ 20 √ 8.33 √ 7.78 √ 11.67 √ 50 √ 20
6 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities √ 5 √ 8.89 √ 13.33 √ 5
7 Inadequate PPP experience
8 Lack of commitment between parties
9 Inadequate distribution of authorities √ 5 √ 8.89 √ 13.33 √ 5
10 Differences in working methods/Knowhow between parties √ 10
11 Delay in resolving contractual dispute √ 14.44 √ 12.67 √ 6.67 √ 10 √ 10 √ 8.89 √ 8.33 √ 6.67 √ 50 √ 20.67
12 Lack of coordination √ 19.45 √ 6.67 √ 16.67 √ 10 √ 8.33 √ 4.44 √ 5 √ 6.11 √ 16.67 √ 17.33
13 Private investor change
14 Third party delays √ 8 √ 12.96 √ 13.33 8.33 √ 8.89 √ 8.33 √ 8.33
15 Subjective evaluation
16 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders
17 Misinterpretation of contract √ 11.33
18 Stakeholder management √ 5 √ 8.89 √ 13.33 √ 5
19 Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation
20 Staff crisis √ 6.3 √ 6.67
21 Cultural differences between main stakeholders
# Risk factors
22 Material availability √ 8
23 Construction cost overrun √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
24 Geological conditions √ 7.04 √ 10 √ 6.67 √ 4.44 √ 11.67
25 High finance cost √ 18.52 √ 6.67 √ 10 √ 6.67 √ 10 √ 17.78 √ 13.33 √ 4
26 Availability of finance √ 18.52 √ 6.67 √ 10 √ 6.67 √ 10 √ 17.78 √ 13.33 √ 4
27 Construction completion √ 100 √ 100 √ 100 √ 100 √ 100 √ 100 √ 100 √ 100 √ 100 √ 100
28 Site availability √ 10 11.11 √ 8.33 √ 7.78 √ 11.67 √ 50 √ 20
29 Poor quality workmanship √ 12 √ 5.56 √ 16.67 10 √ 11.11 √ 13.33 √ 4.33
30 Labor availability √ 3.33
31 Site safety and security √ 6.67
32 Insolvency of Subcontractors √ 8.33 √ 13.33 √ 8.33
33 Construction delays √ 12 √ 5.56 √ 16.67 √ 10 √ 11.11 √ 13.33 √ 4.33
34 Supporting utilities risk √ 3.89
35 Labor disputes/strikes √ 6.67
36 Land use √ 50
37 Waste of materials √ 8.33 √ 10 √ 11.67 √ 5
38 Protection of geological and historical objects
39 Government reliability √ 18.52 √ 6.67 √ 10 √ 6.67 √ 10 √ 17.78 √ 13.33 √ 4
40 Third-party reliability √ 10 √ 12.96 √ 16.66 √ 22.22 √ 8.33
41 Excessive contract variation √ 15.56 √ 6.67 √ 16.67 √ 10 √ 8.33 √ 17.78 √ 5 √ 6.11 √ 16.67 √ 17.33
42 Delay in supply √ 15
43 Constructability
44 Defects in construction √ 12 √ 5.56 √ 16.67 √ 10 √ 11.11 √ 13.33 √ 4.33










































































































































































Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)





















After Outlier removal After Outlier removal After Outlier removal After Outlier removal After Outlier removal After Outlier removal After Outlier removal After Outlier removal After Outlier removal
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# Risk factors 
1 Public opposition
2 Lack of communication between stakeholders
3 Third party tort liability 20 20
4 Need for land acquisition 5.56 5.56
5 Lack of support from government 28.33 5.56 16.945 16.1008214 5.56 28.33
6 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities 8.33 8.33
7 Inadequate PPP experience 33.33 28.33 30.83 3.53553391 28.33 33.33
8 Lack of commitment between parties 16.67 16.67
9 Inadequate distribution of authorities 8.33 8.33
10 Differences in working methods/Knowhow between parties
11 Delay in resolving contractual dispute
12 Lack of coordination 20.56 20.56
13 Private investor change
14 Third party delays 20 20
15 Subjective evaluation 10 10
16 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders 33.33 10 21.665 16.4968012 10 33.33
17 Misinterpretation of contract
18 Stakeholder management 8.33 8.33
19 Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation 33.33 10 21.665 16.4968012 10 33.33
20 Staff crisis
21 Cultural differences between main stakeholders 28.33 28.33
# Risk factors
22 Material availability
23 Construction cost overrun
24 Geological conditions
25 High finance cost 6.11 6.11
26 Availability of finance 6.11 6.11
27 Construction completion 100 100
28 Site availability 5.56 5.56
29 Poor quality workmanship
30 Labor availability
31 Site safety and security
32 Insolvency of Subcontractors
33 Construction delays 7.22 7.22
34 Supporting utilities risk
35 Labor disputes/strikes
36 Land use
37 Waste of materials 13.33 13.33
38 Protection of geological and historical objects
39 Government reliability 6.11 6.11
40 Third-party reliability 20 20
41 Excessive contract variation 20.56 20.56
42 Delay in supply
43 Constructability
44 Defects in construction
Dataset # 2 (PPP projects)
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on final duration 
(days) 











Construction Delay in Supply 
Delay in installation of glass partitions 18 TIA 6
The glass partitions were not 
installed by the Contractor on time 
due to a lack of specialized 
personnel  




















Unresolved claims 40 TIA 26
There have been several 
unresolved claims which were 
pending for a long time. The Owner 
took longer than expected to 
respond and there have been 
several negotiation meetings 
without reaching a concrete 
resolution. 
Stakeholders
Delay in resolving 





Construction completion  -  - 87
As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs    -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are 
in excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -   - 




Number of Construction risks Total 
3 6 9
% of Stakeholders 












Contractor  - √ √  -  - √
Owner 
Late application for permanent power by 
Contractor
15 TIA 7
The Contractor did not apply for 
permanent power on time which 
delayed the delivery of permanent 
power to the Site. 
Recent modifications raised by Owner 54 TIA 28
There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late 
in the project which caused also 
rework activities. 





Contractor √ √ √
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 
project (180 
days) 
Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 1
Effect Risk
Late purchase of IT racks by Contractor 35 TIA 20
The Engineer specified its intention 
to change the type of IT racks. The 
Contractor inquired about the type 
of the racks several times but the 
Engineer did not reply on time 
which delayed the Contractor.  
Owner
/Engineer
Contractor √ √ √
% of Stakeholders 
risks 
33%
%  of Construction 
risks 
67%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 1


























on final duration 
(days) 
















Construction Third party reliability 
Subcontractor 
(Third Party)









The date on which the Contractor 
should have given access to the 
Site was delayed. 










There have been several 
unresolved claims which were 
pending for a long time. The Owner 
took longer than expected to 
respond and there have been 
several negotiation meetings 
without reaching a concrete 
resolution. 
Stakeholders









Instructions that were communicated from 
the Owner to the Engineer and were not 






There was a problem in the transfer 
of information from the Owner to the 
Contractor through the Engineer 
















Stakeholders Third party delays 





There has been some conflicting 
information between the drawings 
and the specifications and the 
Contractor, erroneously, did the 
pricing based on the wrong priority 
of documents in the tender stage 
which caused subsequent delays in 














The Contractor faced delays in 
obtaining the relevant permits for 
the project. When the Contractor 
contacted the Owner, the latter 
specified that it is the role of the 
Contractor to obtain such permit 
and that the Owner shall only 
provide "reasonable assistance". 
The lack of support from the Owner 
delayed the project. 
Stakeholders 
Lack of support from 
government 










There were problems in some of the 
items constructed by the Contractor 
as they did not pass the necessary 
tests. Such defective works needed 
rework by the Contractor which 

















As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs   -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are 
in excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -   - 




Number of Construction risks Total 
7 7 14
% of Stakeholders 
risks %  of Construction risks 
50.00 50.00
Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay 
6.67
Shortage in the type pf manhole covers 






The manhole covers required by the 
Owner were not readily available 
and there has been a problem in 
their production overseas which 
delayed their delivery and several 
subsequent activities. Meanwhile, 
the Owner did not accept 
alternatives.  




There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late 










Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 2
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 








There has been several delays 
caused by the Subcontractor 
responsible for pipe installation
10.00





% of Stakeholders 
risks 
50%
%  of Construction 
risks 
50%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 2

























on final duration 
(days) 








Third party tort liability 
Third party delays





The Contractor faced delays in 
obtaining the relevant permits for the 
project. When the Contractor 
contacted the Owner, the latter 
specified that it is the role of the 
Contractor to obtain such permit and 
that the Owner shall only provide 
"reasonable assistance". The lack of 
support from the Owner delayed the 
project. 
Stakeholders 
Lack of support from 
government 









There have been several unresolved 
claims which were pending for a 
long time. The Employer took longer 
than expected to respond and there 
have been several negotiation 
meetings without reaching a 
concrete resolution. 
Stakeholders


















There has been an unplanned and 
unforeseen departure of the project 
manager which caused delays on 
site









The project owner faced severe 
financing problems due to the 
floating problem that occurred in 
Egypt in 2016. This problem 















There were subsurface soil 
conditions which were not 
discovered during the due diligence 
and which needed further studies 
from the Contractor´s side





Stakeholders Lack of support from 
government
Need for land 
acquisition
Construction Site availability
Defected items in construction and rework 





There were several defects that 
were discovered by the Engineer in 
the construction procedures which 
needed rework from the 
Contractor´s side. Tests needed to 
















As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 











Additional incurred costs  -  -   - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are in 
excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 
Total (Construction + Stakeholders) 249 92.22
Number of 
Stakeholders risks 
Number of Construction risks Total 
7 12 19
% of Stakeholders 








/Engineer  - √ √ √






The Owner delayed the site handing 
over to the Contractor and delayed 






Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay 
Owner
/Engineer  










There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late 
in the project which caused also 
rework activities. 
√
Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 3
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 





There has been several delays 
caused by the Subcontractor 




Modifications raised by Client
% of Stakeholders 
risks 
37%
%  of Construction 
risks 
63%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 3

























on final duration 
(days) 







Negotiations regarding the mounting of 






The Owner/Engineer instructed the 
Contractor to perform the mounting 
of one of the generators. However, 
the Contractor proposed an 
alternative method. Negotiations 
were held between both parties until 



















During transportation, an accident 
occurred to the steam turbine. It was 
the supplier´s fault. The damages 
were not severe but the turbine 
needed few repairs. 
Stakeholders
Third party tort 
liability
Third party delays  
Owner
/Engineer  










The Contractor faced delays in 
obtaining the relevant permits for 
the project. When the Contractor 
contacted the Owner, the latter 
specified that it is the role of the 
Contractor to obtain such permit 
and that the Owner shall only 
provide "reasonable assistance". 
The lack of support from the Owner 
delayed the project. 
Stakeholders 
Lack of support from 
government 










There have been several 
unresolved claims which were 
pending for a long time. The 
Employer took longer than expected 
to respond and there have been 
several negotiation meetings 
without reaching a concrete 
resolution. 
Stakeholders


















The Owner delayed the Contractor 
in sending its reply. 
Stakeholders 
Lack of support from 
government 










The project owner faced severe 
financing problems due to the 
floating problem that occurred in 
Egypt in 2016. This problem 
















There were subsurface soil 
conditions which were not 
discovered during the due diligence 
and which needed further studies 
from the Contractor´s side





Defected items in construction and rework 






There were several defects that 
were discovered by the Engineer in 
the construction procedures which 
needed rework from the 
Contractor´s side. Tests needed to 

















As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are 
in excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 




Number of Construction risks Total 
7 10 17
% of Stakeholders 
risks %  of Construction risks 
41.18 58.82






Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 4
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 
project (30 days) 





There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late 





% of Stakeholders 
risks 
41%
%  of Construction 
risks 
59%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 4


























on final duration 







Stakeholders Lack of support from 
government












Construction Third party reliability 
Subcontractor 
(Third Party)








There have been several unresolved 
claims which were pending for a long 
time. The Employer took longer than 
expected to respond and there have 
been several negotiation meetings 
without reaching a concrete 
resolution. 
Stakeholders









Delayed Advance payment by the Owner 15
Impacted 
As-planned 













The date on which the Contractor 
should have given access to the Site 
was delayed. 














There were problems in some of the 
items constructed by the Contractor 
as they did not pass the necessary 
tests. Such defective works needed 
rework by the Contractor which 
















One of the Subcontractors faced a 
problem of bankruptcy due to major 
losses in one of the other projects it 
was involved in. This matter delayed 
the works on site as there was a 
need to restart the subcontracting 





 Third party reliability  
Third party 
(Subcontractor)









There was a problem with waste 
disposal on site. The Owner asked 
the Contractor to dispose waste at 
an area that is far away from the Site 
and with the political instabilities, the 
disposal process was interrupted 
several times also because this area 
suffered curfew issues until the issue 
was resolved. 









There were subsurface soil 
conditions which were not discovered 
during the due diligence and which 
needed further studies from the 
Contractor´s side









The Owner requested the Contractor 
to obtain certain permits which were 
hard for the Contractor to obtain and 
which subsequently delayed the 
Contractor. Getting such permits was 
a huge responsibility on the 
Contractor which would be easier if it 
was obtained by the Owner; 
especially that the Owner is public so 
it will be easier for the public sector to 
obtain specific permits or at least 



















As the project suffered from delays, it 
is evident that the construction period 











Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are in 
excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 




Number of Construction risks Total 
9 15 24
% of Stakeholders 




Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay 






The Owner delayed the site handing 
over to the Contractor and delayed 
giving the latter access to the Site
Owner
/Engineer  - √ √ √ √ √
There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late in 












Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 5
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 





There has been several delays 
caused by the Subcontractor 
responsible for pipe installation
8.33




% of Stakeholders 
risks 
37%
%  of Construction 
risks 
63%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 5

























on final duration 











There have been several unresolved 
claims which were pending for a 
long time. The Owner took longer 
than expected to respond and there 
have been several negotiation 
meetings without reaching a 
concrete resolution. 
Stakeholders









Stakeholders Lack of support from 
government












Construction Third party reliability 
Subcontractor 
(Third Party)








The Owner delayed the Advance 
Payment to the Contractor which 















There were problems in some of the 
items constructed by the Contractor 
as they did not pass the necessary 
tests. Such defective works needed 
rework by the Contractor which 
















One of the Subcontractors faced a 
problem of bankruptcy due to major 
losses in one of the other projects it 
was involved in. This matter delayed 
the works on site as there was a 
need to restart the subcontracting 





 Third party reliability  
Third party 
(Subcontractor)









There was a problem with waste 
disposal on site. The Owner asked 
the Contractor to dispose waste at 
an area that is far away from the Site 
and with the political instabilities, the 
disposal process was interrupted 
several times also because this area 
suffered curfew issues until the 
issue was resolved. 









There were subsurface soil 
conditions which were not 
discovered during the due diligence 
and which needed further studies 
from the Contractor´s side









The Owner requested the 
Contractor to obtain certain permits 
which were hard for the Contractor 
to obtain and which subsequently 
delayed the Contractor. Getting such 
permits was a huge responsibility on 
the Contractor which would be 
easier if it was obtained by the 
Owner; especially that the Owner is 
public so it will be easier for the 
public sector to obtain specific 
permits or at least provide 




























Site Safety and 
security 




As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are in 
excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 




Number of Construction risks Total 
10 17 27
% of Stakeholders 







Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay 












Recent modifications raised by Owner




There were instabilities on site as 
labor strikes occurred in order to ask 
for higher salaries. Work was 
seriously affected on site and 








There has been several delays 
caused by the Subcontractor 
responsible for pipe installation
√
4
There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late in 
the project which caused also 
rework activities. 
Owner 
Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 6
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 
project (90 days) 






The Owner delayed the site handing 
over to the Contractor and delayed 
giving the latter access to the Site
Owner
/Engineer  - √ √
Subcontractor´s delays 
% of Stakeholders 
risks 
37%
%  of Construction 
risks 
63%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 6

























on final duration 











There have been several 
unresolved claims which were 
pending for a long time. The Owner 
took longer than expected to 
respond and there have been 
several negotiation meetings 
without reaching a concrete 
resolution. 
Stakeholders









Stakeholders Lack of support from 
government













Construction Third party reliability 
Subcontractor 
(Third Party)








The Owner delayed the Advance 
Payment to the Contractor which 















There were problems in some of 
the items constructed by the 
Contractor as they did not pass the 
necessary tests. Such defective 
works needed rework by the 

















There was a problem with waste 
disposal on site. The Owner asked 
the Contractor to dispose waste at 
an area that is far away from the 
Site. 









There were subsurface soil 
conditions which were not 
discovered during the due diligence 
and which needed further studies 













The Owner requested the 
Contractor to obtain certain permits 
which were hard for the Contractor 
to obtain and which subsequently 
delayed the Contractor. Getting 
such permits was a huge 
responsibility on the Contractor 
which would be easier if it was 
obtained by the Owner; especially 
that the Owner is public so it will be 
easier for the public sector to 
obtain specific permits or at least 


























As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are in 
excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 
Total (Construction + Stakeholders) 56 93.33
Number of 
Stakeholders risks 
Number of Construction risks Total 
9 13 22
% of Stakeholders 
risks %  of Construction risks 
40.91 59.09
Recent modifications raised by Owner
8.33





There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late 
in the project which caused also 
rework activities. 








There has been several delays 
caused by the Subcontractor 







Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 7
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 
project (60 days) 






The Owner delayed the site handing 
over to the Contractor and delayed 
giving the latter access to the Site
Owner
/Engineer  - √ √ √
% of Stakeholders 
risks 
41%
%  of Construction 
risks 
59%
Stakeholders and Construction risks 
percentage in Project 7

























on final duration 







Stakeholders Lack of support from 
government










There have been several 
unresolved claims which were 
pending for a long time. The Owner 
took longer than expected to 
respond and there have been 
several negotiation meetings 
without reaching a concrete 
resolution. 
Stakeholders














The Owner delayed the Advance 
Payment to the Contractor which 
















There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late 


















There was a problem with waste 
disposal on site. The Owner asked 
the Contractor to dispose waste at 
an area that is far away from the 
Site and with the political 
instabilities, the disposal process 
was interrupted several times also 
because this area suffered curfew 
issues until the issue was resolved. 










As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are 
in excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 




Number of Construction risks Total 
4 9 13
% of Stakeholders 
risks %  of Construction risks 
30.77 69.23




Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay 
Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 8
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 
project (180 
days) 







Despite several and continuous 
demands from the Contractor´s 
side, the Owner delayed the site 
handing over to the Contractor and 
delayed giving the latter access to 
the Site. This was due to the fact 
that the site was located in an area 
with some political instabilities. 
Finally, after the site was handed 
over to the Contractor, there were 
some areas with restricted access. 
Owner
/Engineer  - √
% of Stakeholders 
risks 
31%
%  of Construction 
risks 
69%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 8

























on final duration 












There have been several 
unresolved claims which were 
pending for a long time. The Owner 
took longer than expected to 
respond and there have been 
several negotiation meetings 
without reaching a concrete 
resolution. 
Stakeholders














The Owner delayed the Advance 
Payment to the Contractor which 





















As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are 
in excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 




Number of Construction risks Total 
2 6 8
% of Stakeholders 
risks %  of Construction risks 
25.00 75.00
16.67√ √ √ √ √
Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 9
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 
project (60 days) 
Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay 





There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late 






% of Stakeholders 
risks 
25%
%  of Construction 
risks 
75%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 9

























on final duration 











There have been several unresolved 
claims which were pending for a long 
time. The Owner took longer than 
expected to respond and there have 
been several negotiation meetings 
without reaching a concrete 
resolution. Then, a Dispute 
Adjudication Board was formed in 
order to solve the pending claims 
and disputed matters. 
Stakeholders




and Contractor  





Stakeholders Lack of support from 
government












Construction Third party reliability 
Subcontractor 
(Third Party)








The Owner delayed the Advance 
Payment to the Contractor which 














There were problems in some of the 
items constructed by the Contractor 
as they did not pass the necessary 
tests. Such defective works needed 
rework by the Contractor which 
















The Owner requested the Contractor 
to obtain certain permits which were 
hard for the Contractor to obtain and 
which subsequently delayed the 
Contractor. Getting such permits 
was a huge responsibility on the 
Contractor which would be easier if 
it was obtained by the Owner; 
especially that the Owner is public 
so it will be easier for the public 
sector to obtain specific permits or 
at least provide reasonable 

























One of the Subcontractors faced a 
problem of bankruptcy due to major 
losses in one of the other projects it 
was involved in. This matter delayed 
the works on site as there was a 
need to restart the subcontracting 





 Third party reliability  
Third party 
(Subcontractor)









As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 











Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are in 
excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 
Total (Construction + Stakeholders) 264 88.00
Number of 
Stakeholders risks 
Number of Construction risks Total 
9 12 21
% of Stakeholders 






There has been several delays 
caused by the Subcontractor 
responsible for pipe installation
17.33






The Owner delayed the site handing 
over to the Contractor and delayed 
giving the latter access to the Site
Owner










Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
Project 9
Effect Risk
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 
project (300 days) 
Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay 




There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late in 
the project which caused also 
rework activities. 
Owner Contractor √
% of Stakeholders 
risks 
43%
%  of Construction 
risks 
57%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 10
% of Stakeholders risks %  of Construction risks
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on final duration 












The Contractor faced problems of 
the discontinuous and insufficient 
water supply needed for the hydro 
tests. Several letters have been 
sent to the governmental entities 
highlighting this problem and its 
effects on the project. The 
Contractor proposed several 
solutions and prepared scenarios 
with different amount of daily water 
supply to study its effects on the 
scheduled operation date and how 
to mitigate delays as much as 
possible. 
Stakeholders




















Construction Third party reliability 
Subcontractor 
(Third Party)









The Contractor received a variation 
order concerning the final disposal 
of effluent material. 
Construction waste of materials Owner Contractor √ √ √ √ √ √ 13.33





There have been several delays due 
to negotiations which took longer 













 -  √ √ √ √ √  - 33.33





As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are 
in excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 




Number of Construction risks Total 
7 4 11
% of Stakeholders 
risks %  of Construction risks 
63.64 36.36
There has been several delays 
caused by the Subcontractor 
responsible for pipe installation
20.00
Dataset # 2 (PPP projects)
Project 1
Effect Risk Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay 
% Contribution to 
total delay of the 






% of Stakeholders 
risks 
64%
%  of Construction 
risks 
36%
Stakeholders and Construction risks percentage 
in Project 1-PPP

























on final duration 











The Contractor was delayed in 
selecting the substation contractor. 
This delay caused a subsequent 
delay to the procurement schedule 
as well as the primary design of 
substation electrical equipment. 
Stakeholders
Lack of commitment 











The Contractor was delayed in the 
structural design which I the basis 













The coordinated project time 
schedule needs further 
coordination. There is a mismatch 
between delivery dates of some 
equipment and finishing dates for 
other components. This is due to 
the new technology used in the 
porject and the leck of time to do a 
thorough study for the project and 











Stakeholders Lack of support from 
government
Need for land 
acquisition
Construction Site availability




The Owner delayed the Advance 
Payment to the Contractor which 














Due to the new nature of the porject 
and the new technologies used,  
there has been a delay in the 
assembly proecedure. The current 
mitigation plan was not sufficent. 









The Owner requested the 
Contractor to obtain certain permits 
which were hard for the Contractor 
to obtain and which subsequently 
delayed the Contractor. Getting 
such permits was a huge 
responsibility on the Contractor 
which would be easier if it was 
obtained by the Owner; especially 
that the Owner is public so it will be 
easier for the public sector to 

























There have been several delays 
due to negotiations which took 













 -  √ √ √ √ √  - 10.00




As the project suffered from delays, 
it is evident that the construction 












Additional incurred costs  -  -  - 
This risk is associated with the 
additional costs incurred during 
construction. Cost overruns occur 
when the costs being incurred are in 
excess of the amounts that have 








√ √ √ √ √  -  - 
Total (Construction + Stakeholders) 167 92.78
Number of 
Stakeholders risks 
Number of Construction risks Total 
10 7 17
% of Stakeholders 
risks %  of Construction risks 
58.82 41.18
The Owner delayed the site handing 
over to the Contractor and delayed 
giving the latter access to the Site
Dataset # 2 (PPP projects)
Project 2
Effect Risk Responsible partner Corresponding document justifying the delay % Contribution to 
total delay of the 
project (180 
days) 














There were several modifications 
raised by the Owner in the design 
which affected many subsequent 
activities such as construction, 
purchase of materials, etc. Such 
modifications were introduced late 




/Engineer  - √ √ √ √




% of Stakeholders 
risks 
59%
%  of Construction 
risks 
41%
Stakeholders and Construction risks 
percentage in Project 2-PPP
% of Stakeholders risks %  of Construction risks
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(months) % Delay 
% Contribution of 
Stakeholder and 
Construction Risks to 







1 16 22 6 37.5 48.33 33.33 66.67
2 13 18 5 38.5 96 50 50
3 45 54 9 20 92.22 36.84 63.16
4 9 10 1 11.1 96.67 41.18 58.82
5 8 10 2 25 91.67 37.5 62.5
6 29 32 3 10.3 91.11 37.04 62.96
7 30 32 2 6.7 93.33 40.91 59.09
8 26 32 6 23.1 85.56 30.77 69.23
9 24 26 2 8.3 80 25 75





































































% of Stakeholders risks and Construction 
risks for each project 
% Stakeholders risks % Construction risks
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(months) % Delay 
% Contribution of 
Stakeholder and 
Construction Risks 







1 21 23 2 9.52381 95 63.64 36.36
2 44 50 6 13.6 92.78 58.82 41.18
















































% of Stakeholders risks and Construction 
risks for each project 
% Stakeholders risks % Construction risks
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APPENDIX J-A: NORMALIZATION AND 



















































Z value Normalized value 
# Risk factors 
1 Public opposition
2 Lack of communication between stakeholders 15.000 0.707 1.000 12.000 -0.707 0.000
3 Third party tort liability 10.000 -0.011 0.334 12.960 1.325 0.926 13.330 1.492 1.000 8.330 -0.765 0.000 8.890 -0.512 0.112 8.330 -0.765 0.000 8.330 -0.765 0.000
4 Need for land acquisition 11.110 -0.434 0.079 8.330 -0.606 0.013 7.780 -0.640 0.000 11.670 -0.400 0.092 50.000 1.965 1.000 20.000 0.114 0.289
5 Lack of support from government 13.330 0.011 0.454 18.520 1.029 0.879 20.000 1.320 1.000 8.330 -0.969 0.045 7.780 -1.077 0.000 11.670 -0.314 0.318 50.000 20.000 1.320 1.000
6 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities 5.000 -0.770 0.000 8.890 0.211 0.467 13.330 1.330 1.000 5.000 -0.770 0.000
7 Inadequate PPP experience
8 Lack of commitment between parties
9 Inadequate distribution of authorities 5.000 -0.770 0.000 8.890 0.211 0.467 13.330 1.330 1.000 5.000 -0.770 0.000
10 Differences in working methods/Knowhow between parties 10.000 0.000 0.000
11 Delay in resolving contractual dispute 14.440 0.788 0.555 12.670 0.391 0.429 6.670 -0.954 0.000 10.000 -0.208 0.238 10.000 -0.208 0.238 8.890 -0.457 0.159 8.330 -0.582 0.119 6.670 -0.954 0.000 50.000 20.670 2.184 1.000
12 Lack of coordination 19.450 1.439 1.000 6.670 -0.755 0.149 16.670 0.962 0.815 10.000 -0.183 0.370 8.330 -0.470 0.259 4.440 -1.137 0.000 5.000 -1.041 0.037 6.110 -0.851 0.111 16.670 0.962 0.815 17.330 1.075 0.859
13 Private investor change
14 Third party delays 8.000 -0.742 0.000 12.960 1.374 0.931 13.330 1.532 1.000 8.330 -0.601 0.062 8.890 -0.362 0.167 8.330 -0.601 0.062 8.330 -0.601 0.062
15 Subjective evaluation
16 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders
17 Misinterpretation of contract 11.330 0.000 0.000
18 Stakeholder management 5.000 -0.770 0.000 8.890 0.211 0.467 13.330 1.330 1.000 5.000 -0.770 0.000
19 Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation
20 Staff crisis 6.300 -0.707 0.000 6.670 0.707 1.000
21 Cultural differences between main stakeholders
# Risk factors
22 Material availability 8.000 0.000 0.000
23 Construction cost overrun
24 Geological conditions 7.040 -0.323 0.360 10.000 0.711 0.769 6.670 -0.452 0.308 4.440 -1.230 0.000 11.670 1.294 1.000
25 High finance cost 18.520 1.444 1.000 6.670 -0.793 0.184 10.000 -0.165 0.413 6.670 -0.793 0.184 10.000 -0.165 0.413 17.780 1.305 0.949 13.330 0.464 0.643 4.000 -1.298 0.000
26 Availability of finance 18.520 1.444 1.000 6.670 -0.793 0.184 10.000 -0.165 0.413 6.670 -0.793 0.184 10.000 -0.165 0.413 17.780 1.305 0.949 13.330 0.464 0.643 4.000 -1.298 0.000
27 Construction completion 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 100.000
28 Site availability 10.000 -0.462 0.182 11.110 -0.389 0.273 8.330 -0.573 0.045 7.780 -0.609 0.000 11.670 -0.352 50.000 20.000 0.200 1.000
29 Poor quality workmanship 12.000 0.365 0.622 5.560 -1.130 0.100 16.670 1.449 1.000 10.000 -0.099 0.459 11.110 0.158 0.549 13.330 0.673 0.729 4.330 -1.415 0.000
30 Labor availability 3.330 0.000 0.000
31 Site safety and security 6.670 0.000 0.000
32 Insolvency of Subcontractors 8.330 -0.577 0.000 13.330 1.155 1.000 8.330 -0.577 0.000
33 Construction delays 12.000 0.365 0.622 5.560 -1.130 0.100 16.670 1.449 1.000 10.000 -0.099 0.459 11.110 0.158 0.549 13.330 0.673 0.729 4.330 -1.415 0.000
34 Supporting utilities risk 3.890 0.000 0.000
35 Labor disputes/strikes 6.670 0.000 0.000
36 Land use 50.000 0.000 0.000
37 Waste of materials 8.330 -0.147 0.499 10.000 0.439 0.750 11.670 1.025 1.000 5.000 -1.317 0.000
38 Protection of geological and historical objects
39 Government reliability 18.520 1.444 1.000 6.670 -0.793 0.184 10.000 -0.165 0.413 6.670 -0.793 0.184 10.000 -0.165 0.413 17.780 1.305 0.949 13.330 0.464 0.643 4.000 -1.298 0.000
40 Third-party reliability 10.000 -0.725 0.120 12.960 -0.193 0.333 16.660 0.472 0.600 22.220 1.471 1.000 8.330 -1.025 0.000
41 Excessive contract variation 15.560 0.676 0.826 6.670 -1.018 0.131 16.670 0.888 0.913 10.000 -0.384 0.391 8.330 -0.702 0.261 17.780 1.100 1.000 5.000 -1.337 0.000 6.110 -1.125 0.087 16.670 0.888 0.913 17.330 1.014 0.965
42 Delay in supply 15.000 0.000 0.000
43 Constructability










Dataset # 1 (Traditional projects)
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APPENDIX J-B: NORMALIZATION AND 
STANDARDIZATION- PPP PROJECTS 
  
Dataset # 2 (PPP projects)
Magnitude Z value 
Normalized 
value 
Magnitude Z value 
Normalize
d value 
# Risk factors 
1 Public opposition
2 Lack of communication between stakeholders
3 Third party tort liability 20 0 0 0 0
4 Need for land acquisition 0 0 5.56 0 0
5 Lack of support from government 28.33 0.70710678 1 5.56 -0.707107 0.803742
6 Inadequate distribution of responsibilities 0 0 8.33 0 0
7 Inadequate PPP experience 33.33 0.70710678 1 28.33 -0.707107
8 Lack of commitment between parties 0 0 16.67 0 0
9 Inadequate distribution of authorities 0 0 8.33 0 0
10 Differences in working methods/Knowhow between parties
11 Delay in resolving contractual dispute
12 Lack of coordination 0 0 20.56 0 0
13 Private investor change
14 Third party delays 20 0 0 0 0
15 Subjective evaluation 0 0 10 0 0
16 Misunderstanding the role of stakeholders 33.33 0.70710678 1 10 -0.707107 0
17 Misinterpretation of contract
18 Stakeholder management 0 0 8.33 0 0
19 Inadequate negotiation period prior to initiation 33.33 0.70710678 1 10 -0.707107 0
20 Staff crisis
21 Cultural differences between main stakeholders 28.33 0 0 0 0
# Risk factors
22 Material availability
23 Construction cost overrun
24 Geological conditions
25 High finance cost 0 0 6.11 0 0
26 Availability of finance 0 0 6.11 0 0
27 Construction completion 100 0 0 0 0
28 Site availability 0 0 5.56 0 0
29 Poor quality workmanship
30 Labor availability
31 Site safety and security
32 Insolvency of Subcontractors
33 Construction delays 0 0 7.22 0 0
34 Supporting utilities risk
35 Labor disputes/strikes
36 Land use
37 Waste of materials 13.33 0 0 0 0
38 Protection of geological and historical objects
39 Government reliability 0 0 6.11 0 0
40 Third-party reliability 20 0 0 0 0
41 Excessive contract variation 0 0 20.56 0 0
42 Delay in supply
43 Constructability
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APPENDIX K: PLOTTED HISTOGRAMS AND DATA 
DISTRIBUTION 
  
3.3 Lack_of_communica on_between_stakeholders distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Lack_of_communica on_between_stakeholders.
The abscissa represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies.
The minimum frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 12, 15. The maximum
frequency is 83.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.4 Third_party_tort_liability distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Third_party_tort_liability. The abscissa represents
the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 8.89, 10, 12.96, 13.33, 20. The maximum frequency is
33.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.5 Need_for_land_acquisi on distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Need_for_land_acquisi on. The abscissa
represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum
frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 5.56, 7.78, 8.33, 11.11, 11.67, 20, 50.
The maximum frequency is 41.6667%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.6 Lack_of_support_from_government distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Lack_of_support_from_government. The abscissa
represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum
frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 5.56, 7.78, 8.33, 11.67, 13.33, 18.52,
28.33. The maximum frequency is 25%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.7 Inadequate_distribu on_of_responsibili es distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Inadequate_distribu on_of_responsibili es. The
abscissa represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The
minimum frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 8.33, 8.89, 13.33. The
maximum frequency is 58.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.8 Inadequate_PPP_experience distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Inadequate_PPP_experience. The abscissa
represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum
frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 28.33, 33.33. The maximum frequency is
83.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.9 Lack_of_commitment_between_par es pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable
Lack_of_commitment_between_par es. The percentage of nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than
the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.10 Inadequate_distribu on_of_authori es distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Inadequate_distribu on_of_authori es. The
abscissa represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The
minimum frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 8.33, 8.89, 13.33. The
maximum frequency is 58.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.11 Differences_in_working_methods pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Differences_in_working_methods. The
percentage of nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances
(8.33333%). 
3.12 Delay_in_resolving_contractual_dispute distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Delay_in_resolving_contractual_dispute. The
abscissa represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The
minimum frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 8.33, 8.89, 12.67, 14.44, 20.67.
The maximum frequency is 25%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.13 Lack_of_coordina on  distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Lack_of_coordina on . The abscissa represents
the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
0%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 11.694, 13.306, 14.918, 18.142. The maximum frequency is
27.2727%, which corresponds to the bin with center 16.53. 
3.14 Private_investor_change pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Private_investor_change. The
percentage of nega ves instances (100%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (0%). 
3.15 Third_party_delays distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Third_party_delays. The abscissa represents the
centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 8, 8.89, 12.96, 13.33, 20. The maximum frequency is
33.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.16 Subjec ve_evalua on pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Subjec ve_evalua on. The percentage
of nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.17 Misunderstanding_the_role_of_stakeholders distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Misunderstanding_the_role_of_stakeholders. The
abscissa represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The
minimum frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 10, 33.33. The maximum
frequency is 83.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.18 Misinterpreta on_of_contract pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Misinterpreta on_of_contract. The
percentage of nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances
(8.33333%). 
3.19 Stakeholder_management distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Stakeholder_management. The abscissa
represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum
frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 8.33, 8.89, 13.33. The maximum
frequency is 58.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.20 Inadequate_nego a on_period_prior_to_ini a on distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable
Inadequate_nego a on_period_prior_to_ini a on. The abscissa represents the centers of the containers,
and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds
to the bins with centers 10, 33.33. The maximum frequency is 83.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with
center 0. 
3.21 Staff_crisis distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Staff_crisis. The abscissa represents the centers of
the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is 8.33333%,
which corresponds to the bins with centers 6.3, 6.67. The maximum frequency is 83.3333%, which
corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.22 Cultural_differences pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Cultural_differences. The percentage
of nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.23 Material_availability pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Material_availability. The percentage
of nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.24 Construc on_cost_overrun pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Construc on_cost_overrun. The
percentage of nega ves instances (100%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (0%). 
3.25 Geological_condi ons distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Geological_condi ons. The abscissa represents
the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 4.44, 6.67, 7.04, 10, 11.67. The maximum frequency
is 58.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.26 High_finance_cost distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable High_finance_cost. The abscissa represents the
centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 4, 6.11, 13.33, 17.78, 18.52. The maximum frequency
is 25%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.27 Availability_of_finance distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Availability_of_finance. The abscissa represents
the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 4, 6.11, 13.33, 17.78, 18.52. The maximum frequency
is 25%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.28 Construc on_comple on pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Construc on_comple on. The
percentage of nega ves instances (83.3333%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances
(16.6667%). 
3.29 Site_availability distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Site_availability. The abscissa represents the
centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 5.56, 7.78, 8.33, 10, 11.11, 11.67, 20. The maximum
frequency is 41.6667%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.30 Poor_quality_workmanship distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Poor_quality_workmanship. The abscissa
represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum
frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 4.33, 5.56, 10, 11.11, 12, 13.33, 16.67.
The maximum frequency is 41.6667%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.31 Labor_availability pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Labor_availability. The percentage of
nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.32 Site_safety pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Site_safety. The percentage of
nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.33 Insolvency_of_Subcontractors distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Insolvency_of_Subcontractors. The abscissa
represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum
frequency is 8.33333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 13.33. The maximum frequency is 75%,
which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.34 Construc on_delays distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Construc on_delays. The abscissa represents the
centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 4.33, 5.56, 7.22, 10, 11.11, 12, 13.33, 16.67. The
maximum frequency is 33.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.35 Suppor ng_u li es_risk pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Suppor ng_u li es_risk. The
percentage of nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances
(8.33333%). 
3.36 Labor_disputes pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Labor_disputes. The percentage of
nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.37 Land_use pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Land_use. The percentage of
nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.38 Waste_of_materials distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Waste_of_materials. The abscissa represents the
centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 5, 8.33, 10, 11.67, 13.33. The maximum frequency is
58.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.39 Protec on_of_geological_and_historical_objects pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable
Protec on_of_geological_and_historical_objects. The percentage of nega ves instances (100%) is greater
than the percentage of posi ves instances (0%). 
3.40 Government_reliability distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Government_reliability. The abscissa represents
the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 4, 6.11, 13.33, 17.78, 18.52. The maximum frequency
is 25%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.41 Third-party_reliability distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Third-party_reliability. The abscissa represents the
centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
9.09091%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 8.33, 10, 12.96, 16.66, 20, 22.22. The maximum
frequency is 45.4545%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.42 Excessive_contract_varia on distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Excessive_contract_varia on. The abscissa
represents the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum
frequency is 0%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 3.084, 11.308, 13.364. The maximum frequency
is 33.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 17.476. 
3.43 Delay_in_supply pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Delay_in_supply. The percentage of
nega ves instances (91.6667%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (8.33333%). 
3.44 Constructability pie chart
The following pie chart shows the distribu on for the binary variable Constructability. The percentage of
nega ves instances (100%) is greater than the percentage of posi ves instances (0%). 
3.45 Defects_in_construc on distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Defects_in_construc on. The abscissa represents
the centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is
8.33333%, which corresponds to the bins with centers 4.33, 5.56, 10, 11.11, 12, 13.33, 16.67. The maximum
frequency is 41.6667%, which corresponds to the bin with center 0. 
3.46 Schedule_Growth distribu on
The following chart shows the histogram for the variable Schedule_Growth. The abscissa represents the
centers of the containers, and the ordinate their corresponding frequencies. The minimum frequency is 0%,
which corresponds to the bins with centers 17.525, 30.515, 34.845, 43.505. The maximum frequency is
33.3333%, which corresponds to the bin with center 8.865. 
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4.1 Task descrip on
Box plots display informa on about the minimum, maximum, first quar le, second quar le or median and
third quar le of every variable in the data set. They consist of two parts: a box and two whiskers. The
length of the box represents the interquar le range(IQR), which is the distance between the third quar le
and the first quar le. The middle half of the data falls inside the interquar le range. The whisker below the
box shows the minimum of the variable while the whisker above the box shows the maximum of the
variable. Within the box, it will also be drawn a line which represents the median of the variable. Box plots
also provide informa on about the shape of the data. If most of the data are concentrated between the
median and the maximum, the distribu on is skewed right, if most of the data are concentrated between
the median and the minimum, it is said that the distribu on is skewed le  and if there is the same number of
values at the both sides of the median, the distribu on is said to be symmetric. 
4.2 Public_opposi on box plot
The variable Public_opposi on is constant and, therefore, no box plot is shown. 
4.3 Lack_of_communica on_between_stakeholders box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Lack_of_communica on_between_stakeholders.
The minimum of the variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le
is 6 and the maximum is 15. 
30
4.4 Third_party_tort_liability box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Third_party_tort_liability. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 4.165, the second quar le or median is 8.61, the third quar le is 13.145 and
the maximum is 20. 
4.5 Need_for_land_acquisi on box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Need_for_land_acquisi on. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 8.055, the third quar le is 15.835 and the
maximum is 50. 
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4.6 Lack_of_support_from_government box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Lack_of_support_from_government. The minimum
of the variable is 0, the first quar le is 6.67, the second quar le or median is 12.5, the third quar le is 20
and the maximum is 28.33. 
4.7 Inadequate_distribu on_of_responsibili es box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Inadequate_distribu on_of_responsibili es. The
minimum of the variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 2.5, the third quar le is
8.61 and the maximum is 13.33. 
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4.8 Inadequate_PPP_experience box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Inadequate_PPP_experience. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 14.165 and the
maximum is 33.33. 
4.9 Lack_of_commitment_between_par es box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Lack_of_commitment_between_par es. The
minimum of the variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0
and the maximum is 16.67. 
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4.10 Inadequate_distribu on_of_authori es box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Inadequate_distribu on_of_authori es. The
minimum of the variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 2.5, the third quar le is
8.61 and the maximum is 13.33. 
4.11 Differences_in_working_methods box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Differences_in_working_methods. The minimum of
the variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the
maximum is 10. 
34
4.12 Delay_in_resolving_contractual_dispute box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Delay_in_resolving_contractual_dispute. The
minimum of the variable is 0, the first quar le is 6.67, the second quar le or median is 9.445, the third
quar le is 13.555 and the maximum is 20.67. 
4.13 Lack_of_coordina on  box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Lack_of_coordina on . The minimum of the
variable is 4.44, the first quar le is 6.11, the second quar le or median is 10, the third quar le is 17.33 and
the maximum is 20.56. 
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4.14 Private_investor_change box plot
The variable Private_investor_change is constant and, therefore, no box plot is shown. 
4.15 Third_party_delays box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Third_party_delays. The minimum of the variable is
0, the first quar le is 4, the second quar le or median is 8.33, the third quar le is 13.145 and the maximum
is 20. 
4.16 Subjec ve_evalua on box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Subjec ve_evalua on. The minimum of the variable
is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the maximum is 10. 
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4.17 Misunderstanding_the_role_of_stakeholders box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Misunderstanding_the_role_of_stakeholders. The
minimum of the variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 5
and the maximum is 33.33. 
4.18 Misinterpreta on_of_contract box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Misinterpreta on_of_contract. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the
maximum is 11.33. 
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4.19 Stakeholder_management box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Stakeholder_management. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 2.5, the third quar le is 8.61 and the
maximum is 13.33. 
4.20 Inadequate_nego a on_period_prior_to_ini a on box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Inadequate_nego a on_period_prior_to_ini a on.
The minimum of the variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le
is 5 and the maximum is 33.33. 
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4.21 Staff_crisis box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Staff_crisis. The minimum of the variable is 0, the
first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 3.15 and the maximum is 6.67. 
4.22 Cultural_differences box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Cultural_differences. The minimum of the variable is
0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the maximum is 28.33. 
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4.23 Material_availability box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Material_availability. The minimum of the variable is
0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the maximum is 8. 
4.24 Construc on_cost_overrun box plot
The variable Construc on_cost_overrun is constant and, therefore, no box plot is shown. 
4.25 Geological_condi ons box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Geological_condi ons. The minimum of the variable
is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 2.22, the third quar le is 8.52 and the maximum
is 11.67. 
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4.26 High_finance_cost box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable High_finance_cost. The minimum of the variable is
0, the first quar le is 5.055, the second quar le or median is 8.335, the third quar le is 15.555 and the
maximum is 18.52. 
4.27 Availability_of_finance box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Availability_of_finance. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 5.055, the second quar le or median is 8.335, the third quar le is 15.555
and the maximum is 18.52. 
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4.28 Construc on_comple on box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Construc on_comple on. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 50 and the
maximum is 100. 
4.29 Site_availability box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Site_availability. The minimum of the variable is 0,
the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 8.055, the third quar le is 11.39 and the maximum is
20. 
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4.30 Poor_quality_workmanship box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Poor_quality_workmanship. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 7.78, the third quar le is 12.665 and the
maximum is 16.67. 
4.31 Labor_availability box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Labor_availability. The minimum of the variable is 0,
the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the maximum is 3.33. 
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4.32 Site_safety box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Site_safety. The minimum of the variable is 0, the
first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the maximum is 6.67. 
4.33 Insolvency_of_Subcontractors box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Insolvency_of_Subcontractors. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 8.33 and the
maximum is 13.33. 
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4.34 Construc on_delays box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Construc on_delays. The minimum of the variable
is 0, the first quar le is 2.165, the second quar le or median is 8.61, the third quar le is 12.665 and the
maximum is 16.67. 
4.35 Suppor ng_u li es_risk box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Suppor ng_u li es_risk. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the
maximum is 3.89. 
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4.36 Labor_disputes box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Labor_disputes. The minimum of the variable is 0,
the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the maximum is 6.67. 
4.37 Land_use box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Land_use. The minimum of the variable is 0, the first
quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the maximum is 50. 
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4.38 Waste_of_materials box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Waste_of_materials. The minimum of the variable is
0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 2.5, the third quar le is 10.835 and the maximum is
13.33. 
4.39 Protec on_of_geological_and_historical_objects box plot
The variable Protec on_of_geological_and_historical_objects is constant and, therefore, no box plot is
shown. 
4.40 Government_reliability box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Government_reliability. The minimum of the
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The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Government_reliability. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 5.055, the second quar le or median is 8.335, the third quar le is 15.555
and the maximum is 18.52. 
4.41 Third-party_reliability box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Third-party_reliability. The minimum of the variable
is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 8.33, the third quar le is 16.66 and the maximum
is 22.22. 
4.42 Excessive_contract_varia on box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Excessive_contract_varia on. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 7.5, the second quar le or median is 16.115, the third quar le is 17.555 and
the maximum is 20.56. 
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4.43 Delay_in_supply box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Delay_in_supply. The minimum of the variable is 0,
the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 0, the third quar le is 0 and the maximum is 15. 
4.44 Constructability box plot
The variable Constructability is constant and, therefore, no box plot is shown. 
4.45 Defects_in_construc on box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Defects_in_construc on. The minimum of the
variable is 0, the first quar le is 0, the second quar le or median is 7.78, the third quar le is 12.665 and the
maximum is 16.67. 
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4.46 Schedule_Growth box plot
The following chart shows the box plot for the variable Schedule_Growth. The minimum of the variable is
6.7, the first quar le is 10.7, the second quar le or median is 21.55, the third quar le is 38 and the
maximum is 50. 
5 Inputs-targets correla ons
5.1 Task descrip on
It might be interes ng to look for dependencies between single input and single target variables. This task
calculates the values of the correla on coefficient between all inputs and all targets. Correla ons close to 1
mean that a single target is correlated with a single input. Correla ons close to 0 mean that there is not a
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